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School districts have implemented filtering and safety policies in response to 
legislative and social mandates to protect students from the proliferation of objectionable 
online content. Subject related literature suggests these policies are more restrictive than 
legal mandates require and are adversely affecting information access and instruction. 
There is limited understanding of how filtering and safety policies are affecting teaching 
and learning because no comprehensive studies have investigated the issues and trends 
surrounding filtering and safety policy implementation. In order to improve existing 
safety policies, policymakers need research-based data identifying end user access issues 
that limit technology integration in the kindergarten-12th grade (K-12) educational 
setting. 
This study sought to examine Internet filtering and safety policy implementation 
issues in South Carolina’s K-12 public schools to determine their influence on 
information access and instruction. A mixed methods research design, which includes 
both quantitative and qualitative approaches, was used to investigate the research 
problem. Quantitative data were collected from information technology (IT) 
administrators who were surveyed regarding filtering and safety policy implementation, 
and school library media specialists (SLMS) were surveyed concerning the issues they 
encounter while facilitating information access in a filtered environment. Qualitative data 
were collected through interviews with a subset of the SLMS population, thereby 
providing further insight about Internet access issues and their influence on teaching and 
learning. School districts’ Acceptable Use Policies (AUPs) were analyzed to determine 
how they addressed recent legislative mandates to educate minors about specific Web 2.0 
safety issues. 
The research results support the conclusions of previous anecdotal studies which 
show that K-12 Internet access policies are overly restrictive, resulting in inhibited access 
to online educational resources. The major implication of this study is that existing 
Internet access policies need to be fine-tuned in order to permit greater access to 
educational content. The study recommends Internet safety practices that will empower 
teachers and students to access the Internet’s vast educational resources safely and 
securely while realizing the Internet’s potential to enrich teaching and learning. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Background 
When the World Wide Web and graphical browsers popularized the Internet and 
made it easier to use, technology enthusiasts predicted the Internet would revolutionize 
every aspect of society—particularly education. Many educators envisioned a world in 
which Web-based technology would be the catalyst for educational reform. Students 
would no longer be passive recipients of knowledge because the Internet would empower 
them to become active participants in their own education. Students would collaborate 
with peers in distant lands and subject experts to solve problems. Internet-based 
education would tear down classroom barriers and the classroom would become the 
world. This was the promise of the Internet, but it has fallen short of such lofty 
educational potential (Hope, 2012). Nevertheless, outside of the school walls, the Internet 
has revolutionized daily life and work, and is at the core of nearly every aspect of society. 
Gossett and Shorter (2011) state the Internet is a transformative technology that has 
revolutionized the manner in which users around the world disseminate information.  
The Internet has not had the same transformative effect on teaching and learning. 
An ever-widening inconsistency exists between technology utilization in schools and its 
utilization in the larger society. Collins and Halverson (2009) purport that outside of 
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school, technology is highly influential in areas that are the major focus of schools—
reading, writing, calculating, and thinking—yet, it is marginalized in schools, fully 
integrated mostly in specialized courses. The growing disparity between students’ 
technology experiences in and out of school is noted in the National Educational 
Technology Plan (NETP), released by the U.S. Department of Education in March 2010. 
The report states, “students use computers, mobile devices, and the Internet to create their 
own engaging learning experiences outside school and after school hours—experiences 
that too often are radically different from what they are exposed to in school” (p. 4). The 
NETP concludes that if students are going to be prepared adequately to live and work in 
the 21st century, they must have authentic learning experiences using Web tools such as 
wikis, blogs, and digital content in the same way they are used in the real world—for 
research, collaboration, and communication.  
Researchers have suggested that public school Internet use policies are not 
aligned with the realities of the 21st century, thus contributing to a culture where Internet 
technology is fully integrated in students’ out-of-school experiences, but marginalized 
within the school walls (Cramer & Hayes, 2010; Hope, 2012; Lemke, Coughlin, Garcia, 
Reifsneider, & Baas, 2009).  Lemke et al. state school Internet policies still restrict 
students’ use of new technologies such as social networking sites, chat rooms, blogs, 
wikis, visual media, instant messaging and texting, virtual worlds, and interactive games. 
The NETP concludes that electronic filtering required by the Children’s Internet 
Protection Act (CIPA) sometimes creates barriers to engaging learning experiences that 
in-school Internet access should provide students. Increasingly, technology integration 
experts are advising school boards, administrators, and teachers to re-examine their 
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technology policies to accommodate the rapidly changing technology landscape and 
support the incorporation of new Web-based and mobile technologies (Consortium for 
School Networking (CoSN), 2011). Policymakers must adapt Internet safety and filtering 
policies so they balance the need for student safety and security with the educational 
benefits of the Internet. Without Internet policy changes, schools cannot successfully 
integrate new technologies and the vast educational promises of the Internet will continue 
to be unrealized for students who do not have access to the Internet outside of school. 
Problem Statement  
Public schools have instituted Internet filtering and safety policies in response to 
federal or state legislation, and public pressure to protect students from inappropriate 
Internet content. Some literature reports that administrators are filtering beyond federal 
and state mandates (Johnson, 2012; Fuchs, 2012) in order to combat increasing security 
threats, degraded network performance, and distractions caused by non-educational 
Internet content (Hua, 2011). Excessively restrictive Internet filtering policies limit 
access to constitutionally protected information, often involve time-consuming and 
bureaucratic procedures for unblocking acceptable Web sites, frustrate users, and could 
potentially make schools vulnerable to First Amendment litigation (Willard, 2010b; 
Maycock, 2011).  
Moreover, proponents for less stringent filtering policies argue that overly 
restrictive filtering policies prevent use of Web 2.0 applications such as wikis, blogs, and 
online productivity tools, which are critical to the achievement of information literacy 
and technology learning standards (Losh & Jenkins, 2012). Twenty-first century teaching 
and learning necessitates access to technology resources that enable educators and 
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students to collaborate, create, and share content online (Bosco & Krueger, 2011). 
Ultimately, blocking of such tools inhibits public schools from accomplishing their 
educational mission of preparing students to live and work in an increasingly global and 
digital age.  
 Recently, anecdotal research has highlighted specific instances of how filtering 
policies are influencing teaching and learning. In some Los Angeles schools, Losh and 
Jenkins (2012) report teachers have been granted override privileges to access blocked 
YouTube™ videos, but the override worked for only 20 minutes. Consequently, teachers 
were unable to set up YouTube™ videos prior to class, but had to interrupt instruction to 
input override codes. Losh and Jenkins report this practice “discouraged the instructional 
use of Web-based materials” (p.18). Moreover, in some Indiana schools, the filtering 
software blocked access to several important Herman Melville sites because his most 
famous novel includes “dick” in the title. Other school districts blocked access to 
participatory platforms such as Twitter™, LiveJournal™, and even materials created for 
social media platforms by the White House and other government entities. Willard 
(2010b) also discovered from email discussion group comments that one of the biggest 
filtering policy issues was blocking of forums. A California discussion group participant 
reported that any site with a comment area was blocked, including all blogs, and most 
Web 2.0 sites.  
The aforementioned scenarios detail how filtering and safety policies negatively 
affect teaching and learning.  However, not all educators have had negative experiences 
with filters. Some school districts have found ways to balance safety and security 
concerns with the need to provide access to the engaging educational resources available 
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on the Internet (Bosco & Krueger, 2011).  An examination of Internet filtering and safety 
policies was needed to determine the prevalence of the aforementioned restrictive access 
issues. There was also a need to uncover salient information access issues and trends of 
relevance to policymakers seeking to adapt their filtering and safety policies to the ever-
changing technology landscape. 
Goal 
This dissertation examined Internet filtering and safety policy implementation in 
South Carolina’s K-12 public schools. The major goal of the study was to update and 
expand upon anecdotal or small-scale studies examining the influence of Internet filtering 
on instruction and information access in the K-12 sector. Results of this study, coupled 
with previous studies, can be used to inform filtering policy evaluation in order to 
maximize access to legitimate educational content while minimizing access to 
inappropriate content. Furthermore, this study expands the filtering policy research base 
and validates the issues identified in previous anecdotal and less comprehensive studies.   
A limited number of studies have investigated the effect of filtering policies on 
teaching and learning. This research supplements existing literature by addressing 
unanswered questions from previous studies. Finsness (2008) found that Internet filtering 
configurations limited student access to information necessary for achieving Minnesota’s 
U.S. history and health standards. The study also suggested that further research was 
needed to determine if students had sufficient access to Web resources enabling them to 
hone necessary 21st century information technology and literacy skills. This research 
addressed Finsness’ conclusion. Holzhauer (2009) found that filters limited classroom 
Internet use, but concluded that additional research was needed to learn how school 
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districts decide what to filter (beyond what legal mandates require) and what changes are 
necessary to improve Internet use policies. This investigation sought answers to 
Holzhauer’s conclusions.              
District information technology (IT) administrators were surveyed to ascertain 
how filtering and safety policies were implemented. Furthermore, school library media 
specialists (SLMS1), who have historically been advocates for greater information access 
(Losh & Jenkins, 2012; Maycock, 2011), were surveyed and interviewed to determine 
how filtered Internet access influenced teaching and learning.  Data from the interviews 
and surveys define Internet use policies that negatively affect teaching and learning and 
practices that mitigate filtering issues. School districts need filtering and safety policy 
guidelines as they seek to exploit the educational benefits 21st century digital 
technologies afford. This study provides those guidelines. Combined with previous 
studies, this study provides stakeholders (administrators, teachers, SLMS, technology 
coordinators, and parents) with the data and information necessary to guide filtering and 
safety policy decisions.  
Research Questions 
This research investigated the following research questions:  
• How are filtering and safety policies being implemented in public schools? 
• What issues do SLMS encounter as they facilitate information access on filtered 
computers?  
• How are school districts addressing Web 2.0 safety issues?    
                                                 
1
 SLMS acronym is used for school library media specialist or school library media specialists. 
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• In what ways do filtering policies impede access to information and resources 
necessary to achieve 21st century technology and information literacy standards? 
 
Relevance and Significance 
Internet-based educational resources have become almost as ubiquitous in today’s 
public schools as the traditional textbook. With the advent of the World Wide Web, 
educators and government officials enthusiastically embraced the Internet as an important 
educational tool because of its purported educational benefits (Ott, Beard, Blue, Cleugh, 
Greenfield, Lee,…Stager, 2010; Fuchs, 2012). Education reformers contend the Internet 
has not realized its educational potential (Lemke et al., 2009); however, outside of school 
it has become woven into the fabric of today’s society because of its importance in 
research, communication, and an abundant list of daily activities (Hall, 2011). 
 As Internet accessibility in public schools has increased, so has concern about 
preventing students from inadvertently or deliberately accessing inappropriate online 
content. Despite its educational benefits, the Internet exposes students to an ever-
increasing amount of objectionable content. Robinson, Brown, and Green (2010) report 
that the Web is “riddled with inappropriate and undesirable content” (p. 14) such as 
dangerous or illegal guides (i.e., bomb-making instructions), pornography, gruesome and 
violent images, racist/hateful content, and advertising. Efforts to shield minors from 
exposure to this type of content continue to fuel public debate and present “intriguing 
policy and practice dilemmas” (Moyle, 2012, p. 403). 
In response to rising public concern, Congress enacted legislation on several 
occasions in an effort to insulate children from exposure to online indecency. The 
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Communications Decency Act (CDA) (1996) and the Child Online Protection Act 
(COPA) (1998) were two notable congressional attempts to restrict the distribution of 
sexually explicit Internet materials to minors. However, free speech advocates challenged 
the constitutionality of both laws and the Supreme Court agreed, declaring both acts 
unconstitutional because they violated free speech under the provisions of the First 
Amendment.  
The Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA) (2000) is Congress’ most recent 
attempt to restrict access to inappropriate online content. CIPA requires schools and 
public libraries receiving federal funds for Internet access to implement “technology 
protection measures” to prevent access to “visual depictions that are obscene, child 
pornography, or harmful to minors” (Section 3601). Reminiscent of its predecessors, free 
speech proponents promptly challenged the constitutionally of CIPA’s filtering mandate. 
The American Library Association (ALA) filed suit on behalf of public libraries 
contending that CIPA was unconstitutional and created an infringement of First 
Amendment protections. In 2002, the United States District Court in Pennsylvania 
sustained the ALA’s claim and overturned the library filtering law, concurring that 
filtering software blocked access to constitutionally protected Internet expression (ALA v 
United States, 2002). However, in June 2003, the Supreme Court reversed the lower 
court’s decision and endorsed CIPA’s constitutionality (United States v ALA, 2003).  
Even before the Supreme Court upheld CIPA, Internet filtering had become a 
political necessity in American schools as policymakers sought to provide safer Internet 
access and avoid potential litigation arising from student exposure to what was deemed 
harmful online content (Sutton, 2012). Following the Supreme Court’s ruling and similar 
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legislation in many states, filtering became a legal necessity. However, widespread 
deployment of Intent content controls and legal mandates has not settled the filtering 
debate. Not only are Web 1.0 access issues fueling the debate, but also Web 2.0 access 
issues continue to underscore the significance of online safety policy deliberations 
(Quillen, 2010). Regarding Web filtering policies, Quillen suggests that a “seismic 
showdown is brewing,” (p.20) and “something must change if schools are to continue 
exploring the use of Web 2.0 tools” (p. 20). Filtering continues to be an important issue 
for most schools because many schools have implemented aggressive filtering policies 
that impede student research and inhibit online collaborative activities (American 
Association of School Librarians (AASL), 2012) 
Growing concern about sexual predators preying on minors using social 
networking sites prompted the U. S. House of Representatives to pass the Deleting 
Predators Online Act (DOPA) in 2006, which required education rate (E-rate) schools to 
block access to all social networking sites and chat rooms. Free speech proponents 
objected to the bill’s broad language claiming the law, as written, would have prohibited 
access to most interactive Web 2.0 sites and services that permit users to create and edit 
Web content, such as wikis and blogs (Holcomb, Brady, & Smith, 2010; Macleod-Ball, 
2011). They also argued that the best approach to online safety was not filtering, but 
teaching children about safe and appropriate online behavior (Willard, 2010b). After 
years of deliberation, the Protecting Children in the 21st Century Act (2008), which 
supplanted DOPA, became law. The act no longer required E-rate schools to restrict 
access to social networking sites, but mandated that schools educate students “about 
appropriate online behavior, including interacting with other individuals on social 
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networking sites and in chat rooms and cyber bullying awareness and response” (Section 
215).  
The emergence of the read/write Web (Web 2.0) and perceived ineffectiveness of 
current Internet safety policies continues to fuel deliberations that suggest school districts 
need to re-examine their filtering and safety policies (Bosco & Krueger, 2011). Some 
school districts, in an effort to protect children, have blocked Web 2.0 tools—not only 
social-networking sites, but blogs, wikis, and other online participatory tools that allow 
teachers and students to create and share content (Losh & Jenkins, 2012; Robinson, 
Brown & Green, 2010). Adams (2010) suggests that current safety policies rely solely on 
filters to protect children and fail to emphasize the importance of teaching students how 
to evaluate information and navigate safely when using unfiltered computers outside of 
school. Quillen (2010) claims the ability to override the filter rapidly has not been 
established in many schools and is, therefore, hampering instructional activities. Willard 
(2010b) concludes that current filtering policies prevent schools from realizing the 
educational potential of the Internet because of more restrictive filtering policies, 
increased bureaucracy, and lack of focus on Internet safety education. The widening gap 
between policymakers and some educators is reflected in the following statement: 
In many schools, any website that has “blog” in the URL or its name is off limits. 
Photo sharing sites like Flickr don’t stand a chance. Even closed networks like a 
Ning or an invitation-only wiki might be blocked. School administrators may 
simply not understand what the tools are and how they can be used in school 
settings. Many rely heavily on the judgment of technology coordinators who have 
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(not unjustifiable) concerns about safety and security issues or, in some cases, the 
loss of control that Web 2.0 tools imply. (Harris, 2009a, p. 58) 
However, Manzo (2009) portrays the filtering dilemma from the administrators’ 
perspective in the following statement:  
Faced with concerns about Internet predators, cyber bullying, students’ sharing of 
inappropriate content on social networks, and the abundance of sexually explicit 
or violent content online, many school leaders and technology directors are 
placing tighter restrictions on Web access to shield students from potential harm. 
(p. 23)  
IT administrators’ primary mission is establishing the most efficient network 
infrastructure, eliminating security threats (Web viruses, spyware, hacking tools, 
malicious content, worms), and conserving network bandwidth. Consequently, filtering 
software is often configured to minimize security threats and to conserve bandwidth in 
addition to CIPA’s requirement to block access to pictures that are obscene, child 
pornography, or are harmful to minors (Baule, 2010; Hua, 2011). Restrictive filter 
configurations that block entire content categories (i.e., weapons) may lessen security 
threats but prevent access to nonthreatening, constitutionally protected information about 
weapons used during ancient times (Quillen; Hua). Moreover, improperly deployed or 
erroneously configured filtering systems can have a downside and unintended 
consequences (Fuchs, 2012; Nicoletti, 2009). An in-depth investigation of filtering 
policies would elucidate the consequences of filtering policy decisions for end users and 
provide a deeper understanding of factors contributing to administrators’ safety policy 
decisions. 
12 
 
Research evidence is a key ingredient to improved policy and practice (Tseng, 
2012). Research-based evidence is deficient regarding the use and impact of filtering 
technology in public schools given that there is little research-based evidence to guide 
filtering and safety policy decisions. In the past decade, school districts’ Internet use 
policies have been characterized by what Willard (2010a) describes as “technopanic”—
an intensified apprehension about minors’ Internet use that has not been “grounded in 
actual research” ( p. 10). It is important to assess how filtering and safety policy decisions 
are affecting end users in order to improve existing policies. SLMS have a unique 
vantage point from which to provide a deeper understanding of the issues and trends 
surrounding filtering technology implementation and its impact on end users because 
they support both teachers and students in their quest for information. Consequently, this 
investigation of media specialists’ experiences with filtered Internet access identified 
filtering and safety policy-related problems and challenges, and provides essential 
information for improved filtering policy decisions. Inclusion of IT administrators in this 
investigation provided information about the technical considerations of filtering policy 
implementation, which can substantially influence information access. 
Barriers and Issues 
Barriers, bias, and contentious issues presented challenges to accomplishing the 
research goal. Since the Supreme Court upheld CIPA in 2003, many educators, including 
SLMS, have accepted filters as a fact of life in American schools and have concluded that 
the debate is over (Adams, 2010; Fuchs, 2012). Educators' acceptance of filters and their 
inherent flaws has contributed to the misconception that further deliberations or research 
on the topic will have little or no influence on filtering policy implementation. Therefore, 
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reluctance to participate in a research study about policy issues believed to be beyond 
participants’ influence was an issue. This barrier, combined with survey fatigue, may 
have adversely affected the survey response rate. 
Booth (2011) suggests the library profession lacks a research culture and often 
fails to see the relevance of research to improved practice and policy. This factor has 
most likely contributed to the lack of scholarly effort undertaken to provide a deeper 
understanding of the challenges and issues surrounding filtered Internet access as 
perceived by SLMS. The researcher was cognizant that this barrier could adversely affect 
participation in the study. The researcher addressed this issue by emphasizing to potential 
respondents how this research could be used to affect change in filtering and safety policy 
implementation in public K-12 schools. 
The ALA’s Code of Ethics urges librarians to refrain from advancing private 
interests over professional concerns, and conflating personal convictions and professional 
duties (American Library Association, 2013c). ALA members, many are whom are 
SLMS, may feel a professional obligation to support the organization’s vehement stance 
against all attempts to restrict access to what some consider inappropriate Web-based 
information. Consequently, the researcher considered this as a significant barrier because 
of the potential difficulty of distinguishing the study participants’ views from the ALA’s 
and its affiliate associations. To overcome this barrier, survey and interview questions 
were structured so that the researcher could distinguish SLMS’ individual convictions 
from the ALA’s convictions. 
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Limitations and Delimitations 
Limitations 
 The study was not experimental, but was primarily descriptive; therefore, 
controlling variables that threatened internal validity was not a major issue. The data was 
examined to discover if relationships existed between filtering and safety policy 
implementation factors and the issues users encountered as they sought online 
information in a filtered environment. Being that the research design was non-
experimental, safety policy implementation issues are described as they exist naturally 
and relationships are described without attempting to explain the cause of the 
relationships. 
 Another limitation of this study was the sampling technique employed. Not every 
South Carolina school district granted permission for the study to be conducted. For that 
reason, it was impossible to draw a random sample of all South Carolina SLMS and IT 
directors. SLMS and IT directors from 36 school districts were selected using total 
population sampling in order to gather sufficient data to address the research questions. 
Because of the sampling technique employed, generalization of the data to the entire 
population is limited. 
Delimitations  
The researcher limited the scope of the study to South Carolina’s public schools 
to narrow the research focus and to make the research goal more manageable. South 
Carolina is traditionally a conservative state in the “Bible Belt.” Moreover, the state has 
enacted legislation requiring all public schools and libraries to adopt policies intended to 
reduce the ability of users to access Web sites displaying obscene material (National 
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Conference of State Legislatures, 2013). Unlike CIPA’s filtering mandate, South 
Carolina’s filtering mandate must be implemented regardless of whether schools and 
libraries elect to accept state funding. Since the inception of the Internet filtering 
controversy, conservatives have typically been proponents of filtered Internet access in 
public schools and libraries. Consequently, research participants’ perceptions may reflect 
the state’s conservative stance regarding Internet blocking, making it difficult to 
generalize the results of the study beyond South Carolina’s public schools. 
Definition of Terms 
This section provides definitions of key terms used in this investigation.  
Acceptable Use Policy (AUP). AUPs include school board adopted rules, 
regulations, rights, and responsibilities that govern users’ computer-related activities 
(Rodgers, 2012). This document is sometimes referred to as a safety policy. 
Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA). CIPA is a law enacted by Congress in 
December 2000 to address concerns about access to offensive content over the Internet 
on school and library computers. CIPA requires schools and libraries receiving certain 
federal funds to use technology protection measures that prevent access to offensive 
online content (Robinson, Brown, Green, 2010). 
Filtering Policy.  Filtering policies are an extension of an organization’s Internet 
safety policy (AUP), and define the content categories that are blocked, user profiles, and 
their privileges (Hidalgo et al., 2009). 
Internet Filter.  Internet filters are software tools that limit, block, or restrict 
access to Internet content (Moyle, 2012). 
16 
 
Safety Policy.  A safety policy is a CIPA-required document that addresses a 
broader range of computer-related issues. A safety policy, sometimes referred to as an 
AUP,  encompasses access to inappropriate materials on the Internet and includes 
provisions for handling security issues, for protecting children's privacy, and for dealing 
with children's use of computers for illegal activity (e.g., hacking into another computer 
system) (Neighbor Children’s Internet Protection Act (NCIPA), Section 254, 2000). 
Web 2.0.  Web 2.0, also called the read/write Web, is a term referring to online 
technologies that allow users to socialize, collaborate, and share information without 
requiring programming skills. Web 2.0 tools include social networking sites, blogs, wikis, 
social bookmarking sites, and virtual worlds (Robinson, Brown, & Green, 2010; Simkins 
& Shultz, 2010).   
Summary 
 The Internet offers a wealth of educational resources that can potentially reform 
and enhance teaching and learning. However, educators have encountered various 
impediments to full realization of the Internet’s educational potential, including restricted 
access to some constitutionally protected Internet resources. Filtering and safety policies 
and procedures have a substantial influence on information access. This study examined 
the issues surrounding the development and implementation of filtering and safety 
policies in order to determine how these issues impede information access, and limit 
attainment of 21st century learning standards.    
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Chapter 2 
Review of the Literature 
 
Introduction 
This study focused on the issues surrounding K-12 Internet filtering and safety 
policies and how these issues converge to influence information access and instruction. 
Several overarching themes emerged from the literature review, which provided a 
conceptual framework for the study. The literature review focuses on the following 
themes:  the promise and perils of Internet access for K-12 education, Internet safety 
legislation and First Amendment issues, the influence of Internet safety legislation on 
Internet filtering and safety policies, issues related to Internet filtering technology and 
how it works, filtering and safety policy implementation issues, Internet safety policy 
issues and 21st century learning standards, and the implications of filtering and safety 
policy implementation. The final section focuses on the contributions of the current study 
to the research in this domain. 
The literature, which reflects the complexity and controversial nature of Internet 
content controls in public schools and libraries, is often more prescriptive and 
experiential than research-based as noted by Jaeger and Yan (2009). Informational, 
anecdotal, and experiential pieces have been included in the literature review because 
they underscore the significance of the Internet filtering debate and pinpoint the need for 
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more research-based evidence to guide filtering and safety policy decisions. Moreover, 
pertinent early research and prescriptive literature has been included to frame the 
background of the current study and to illustrate the manner in which the need for the 
current study has evolved. Initially, Jaeger and Yan attested to the need for more research 
focusing on the implications of Internet content controls when noting that CIPA and its 
requirements have not generated much research into how the legislation affects schools, 
libraries, and clientele of these institutions. More recently, Ahn, Bivona, & DiScala 
(2011) suggested there was a need for research to advance understanding of how 
technology policies influence educator practices. This investigation incorporates the 
aforementioned identified gaps in the literature. 
The Promise and Perils of Internet Access for K-12 Education 
 In its infancy, the Internet was an important communication tool for scientists and 
academic researchers, but the emergence of the World Wide Web and graphical browsers 
made Internet navigation easy for everyone (Hall, 2011; Internet, 2011). These 
developments were instrumental in the Internet becoming a valuable commercial, 
communication, entertainment, and educational tool. Public schools eagerly embraced the 
Internet; its many educational resources holding promise for significant instructional 
improvement and enhanced student learning. The Internet facilitates access to vast 
amounts of information, enhances communication, and broadens students’ connections to 
diverse people and perspectives. Supporting this conclusion, the National Educational 
Technology Plan (NETP) (U.S. Department of Education, 2010) suggests online 
technologies offer limitless opportunities to “create engaging, relevant, and personalized 
learning experiences (p. vi).” The promise of an enormous range of educational 
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experiences and materials spurred phenomenal growth of Internet connectivity and 
Internet accessible technologies in the K-12 sector. According to the most recent National 
Center for Educational Statistics report, public school Internet accessibility has risen from 
less than 10% in 1995 to almost 100% in 2008 (U.S. Department of Education, 2012).   
 Much of the growth in Internet connectivity can be attributed to the education rate 
(E-rate) program. Recognizing the increasing importance of the Internet and its potential 
to improve education, the U. S. Congress created the E-rate program as part of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, to provide discounts on telecommunications, Internet 
access, and internal networking to schools and libraries. The main goal of this program is 
to lessen the so-called “digital divide” by ensuring Internet access equity across poor and 
rich, rural, urban and suburban areas, and highly served and underserved areas (Manzo, 
2010; Holt & Galligan, 2012).  
A number of challenges have diminished realization of the Internet’s educational 
potential. One of the most significant and controversial challenges involves the possible 
exposure of minors to inappropriate online content including, pornography, hate speech, 
and other controversial materials. Public concern about the proliferation of objectionable 
online content has prompted various legislative attempts to shield minors from exposure 
to offensive Internet content (Ott, et al., 2010; Gros & Hancock, 2011). The limited 
success of these legislative attempts and ongoing debate about minors’ online safety 
underscores the delicate balance between First Amendment free expression rights and 
government regulation of Internet activity to protect youth from online obscenity and 
indecency. 
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Internet Safety Legislation and First Amendment Issues 
From its inception, the Internet has been unregulated and autonomous in nature in 
that anyone with technical skills could post any kind of information including offensive 
and illegal content. The Internet is also a global medium. These factors have complicated 
any efforts to regulate online content because it is extremely difficult to develop one 
standard by which to regulate this medium (Hall, 2011; Gossett & Shorter, 2011; 
Leberknight, Chiang & Wong, 2012). Legislative efforts to restrict access to 
objectionable online content incorporate two kinds of technology--adult verification 
technology, which restricts access on the publisher end and software filters, which restrict 
access on the user end. Congressional legislation initially relied upon adult verification 
technology to zone Internet speech into adult zones and minor zones, but when this 
regulatory approach failed constitutional scrutiny, subsequent legislation relied upon 
filtering software to protect minors (Gros & Hancock, 2011; Macleod-Ball, 2011). 
Recently, congressional legislation has evolved to include more comprehensive and 
proactive approaches beyond restrictive measures emphasizing technology, to focus on 
Internet safety education and awareness (Essex, 2009). Table 1 provides an historical 
perspective of major Internet safety legislation having direct or indirect implications for 
K-12 Internet filtering and safety policy development. 
The Communications Decency Act and the Child Online Protection Act  
The Communications Decency Act (CDA) (1996) was Congress' initial attempt to 
regulate indecent online materials. CDA made it a criminal offense to send or post 
obscene material through the Internet to youths under the age of 18. The Internet’s 
democratic nature and fears that government regulation would diminish this important  
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Table 1. Historical Overview of Major Internet Safety Legislation 
Legislation Summary Internet Safety    
Approach 
Status/Outcome 
Communications 
Decency Act (1996) 
 
Prohibited 
posting/sending 
obscene online 
material to 
individuals under 
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Adult 
Verification 
Technology 
Ruled 
Unconstitutional 
Child Online 
Protection Act (1998) 
 
Prohibited 
commercial Web 
sites from 
displaying 
material deemed 
harmful to minors 
 
Adult 
Verification 
Technology 
Ruled 
Unconstitutional 
Children’s Internet 
Protection Act (2000) & 
Neighborhood Children’s 
Internet Protection Act 
(2000) 
 
Required schools 
and libraries 
receiving certain 
federal funds to 
use technology 
protection 
measures to 
prevent minors 
from accessing 
obscene materials 
 
Filters and 
Internet Safety 
Policy 
Enacted into law 
Protecting Children in  
the 21st Century Act 
(2007)  
 
Prohibited access 
to a commercial 
social networking 
website or chat 
room unless used 
for an educational 
purpose with 
adult supervision 
 
Expanded 
content filtering 
to include social 
networking sites 
and chat rooms 
Revised version 
excluding expanded 
filtering provision, 
but including 
Internet safety 
awareness and 
education passed the 
Senate 
Broadband Data 
Improvement Act (2008); 
Title II, Protecting 
Children in the 21st 
Century Act (2008) 
 
Requires schools 
with Internet 
access to educate 
minors about 
appropriate 
online behavior, 
including online 
social networking 
and chat room 
Internet safety 
awareness and 
education 
Enacted into law 
 
 
22 
 
Legislation Summary Internet Safety    
Approach 
Status/Outcome 
interactions and 
cyber bullying 
awareness and 
response 
    
 
venue of free expression motivated free speech proponents such as the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU), the American Library Association (ALA), the National 
Education Association (NEA), Internet Free Expression Alliance, and several gay and 
lesbian groups to oppose vehemently any attempts to regulate Internet activity (Hall & 
Carter, 2006; Internet, 2011). Consequently, CDA was immediately challenged. The 
Supreme Court ultimately struck down the CDA, ruling that the statute was too 
ambiguous and not narrowly constructed to meet the government’s goal of protecting 
children, while maintaining First Amendment rights (Gros & Hancock, 2011; Macleod-
Ball, 2011).   
 The Child Online Protection Act (COPA) was Congress’ next attempt to protect 
minors from an ever-increasing body of pornographic Internet materials. To avoid the 
vagueness and constitutional problems inherent in CDA, COPA was more narrowly 
focused. Instead of focusing on all online indecency, COPA (1998) targeted commercial 
entities on the Internet, rather than e-mail, chat rooms, or online bulletin boards, and 
criminalized “any communication for commercial purposes that is available to any minor 
and that includes material that is harmful to minors” (Section 231). The legislation 
required that minors’ access to these materials be restricted using adult verification 
techniques such as credit cards, digital age verification certificates, or other verification 
methods (Gros & Hancock, 2011). In 2003, a federal court blocked COPA’s initial 
Table 1 (continued) 
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enforcement because the age verification techniques it required disproportionately 
infringed upon adults’ free expression rights. COPA effectively died in January 2009, 
after a decade of litigation, when the Supreme Court refused to hear the government’s 
final appeal (Supreme Court, 2009). During the appeals process, the Court ruled user-
based filters were a less speech-restrictive, but similarly effective means of protecting 
minors from objectionable online content (Macleod-Ball, 2011).  
The Children Internet Protection Act and the Neighborhood Children’s Internet 
Protection Act 
 The Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA), signed into law in 2000, was 
Congress’ third attempt to regulate minors’ access to online obscenity and indecency. 
Hoping to avoid the constitutional issues that undermined CDA and COPA, Congress 
changed its approach with CIPA (Jaeger &Yan, 2009; Spurlin & Garry, 2009). Instead of 
placing restrictions on Web publishers, CIPA placed restrictions on schools and libraries 
receiving Library Services and Technology Act (LSTA) funds, Title III of the Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) funds, Museum and Library Services Act funds, or 
E-rate funding (Jaeger & Yan; Menuey, 2009; Sutton, 2012). CIPA (2000) required 
libraries and schools receiving funds from the aforementioned sources to use technology 
protection measures (filters) on all computers to restrict access to indecent online 
materials.  
Free speech advocates, including the ALA and ACLU, immediately brought court 
challenges against the law, claiming its filtering mandate infringed upon users’ First 
Amendment rights. A federal district court declared CIPA unconstitutional on First 
Amendment grounds because the filtering mandate prevented users from accessing 
legitimate Web sites as filters inadvertently block legitimate content while blocking 
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objectionable online materials (Menuey, 2009). Menuey adds that CIPA's constitutional 
challenge did not include public schools and school libraries; therefore, the district court 
ruling did not apply to schools. Schools were not included in the court challenge because 
previous legal precedent gave them wider latitude in limiting students' free speech (Hall 
& Carter, 2006; Sutton, 2012). Unlike public libraries, schools serve a subset of the 
community not the entire community. Nevertheless, CIPA withstood legal challenges 
when the Supreme Court ruled it constitutional in a plurality decision in 2003 (Internet, 
2011). 
CIPA and a related act, The Neighborhood Children’s Internet Protection Act 
(NCIPA), are part of a larger appropriations law (PL 106-554).The language is similar in 
the CIPA and NCIPA sections of PL 106-554, but there are important differences. CIPA 
stipulates what must be filtered (visual images that are obscene, child pornography, or 
harmful to minors) and requires the implementation of an Internet safety policy. NCIPA 
focuses on what must be included in a school or library’s Internet safety policy and is 
applicable only to schools and libraries participating in the E-rate program (Jansen, 
2010). Jansen also notes that CIPA defines the phrase "harmful to minors," but 
NCIPA directs the local school board or governing body to determine what is and is not 
suitable for minors to access under its Internet safety policy or acceptable use 
policy (AUP). CIPA and NCIPA impose three mandates on affected agencies. These 
mandates include a safety policy (also called acceptable use policy), use of a technology 
protection measure to prevent access to child pornography or materials harmful to 
minors, and a public meeting informing the community of measures taken to keep minors 
safe while using the Internet (Menuey, 2009).   
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Post-CIPA Internet Safety Legislation 
 Enactment of CIPA and its technology protection measures have not dispelled 
concerns about children’s online safety. Lawmakers continue to introduce Internet safety 
legislation intended to protect children on the Internet. This suggests CIPA’s safety 
strategies have not kept pace with threats posed by rapidly developing technologies, 
particularly mobile technologies, wireless technologies, and burgeoning Web 2.0 
applications such as social networks, blogs, wikis, video sharing, and photo sharing 
(Miller, Thompson & Franz, 2009; Spurlin & Garry, 2009; Willard, 2010a). Essex (2009) 
reports that 15 bills were introduced during the 109th Congress (2005-2006) and 36 bills 
were introduced during the 110th Congress (2007-2008) that referenced child 
exploitation, sexual predators, Internet safety, and related online threats. Essex suggests 
that the growing popularity of social networking Web sites and increased awareness of 
online predators prompted a significant increase in Internet safety legislation during the 
110th Congress (2007-2008). Among the 36 Internet safety bills introduced during the 
110th Congress, there were various responses, approaches, or solutions to Internet 
dangers and online child exploitation.  
Prompted by rising public concern that sexual predators were using social 
networking sites and chat rooms to locate potential abuse victims, the Deleting Online 
Predators Act of 2006 (DOPA) was passed in the House of Representatives (Gros & 
Hancock, 2011). DOPA would have expanded CIPA's filtering mandate by requiring E-
rate funding recipients to prohibit minors from accessing social networks and chat rooms 
in addition to blocking access to obscene, pornographic or “harmful to minors” materials. 
DOPA was included in a related Senate bill, the Protecting Children in the 21st Century 
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Act of 2007 (S. 49), which did not pass in the Senate chamber. However, a reworded 
version of the Protecting Children in the 21st Century Act (S. 1965) passed the Senate by 
unanimous consent in May, 2008 (Essex, 2009). Essex states S. 49, which incorporated 
DOPA, included a filtering and an Internet safety awareness approach, but S.1965 deleted 
the filtering approach, expanded the awareness approach, and added an education 
approach. Senate bill 1965 subsequently became part of Public Law 110–385, the 
Broadband Data Improvement Act of 2008. The law, also known as the Protecting 
Children in the 21st Century Act, requires schools receiving federal E-rate funding to 
educate students “about appropriate online behavior, including interacting with other 
individuals on social networking sites and in chat rooms and cyber bullying awareness 
and response” (Section 215). While online safety legislation has diminished with 
subsequent Congresses, state legislatures continue to debate online safety and pass 
legislation designed to protect students from Web 2.0-related safety threats (Adams, 
2010; King, 2010; Pierce, 2012). Whether at the national or state level, most online safety 
legislation either directly or indirectly influences school technology use policies. 
In addition to federal Internet filtering and safety legislation, many states have 
enacted filtering laws to prevent minors from accessing sexually explicit, obscene, or 
harmful content. According to the National Conference of State Legislatures (2013), 25 
states have filtering laws applicable to public schools and libraries. Most of these laws 
require the affected agencies to adopt Internet safety policies that protect minors from 
inappropriate online materials while some laws specifically require the installation of 
filtering software.  
The emergence of interactive social technologies has also prompted state 
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legislators to pass laws to protect minors from online predators and cyber bullying. Cyber 
bullying legislation has been passed in 20 states according to King (2010). These laws 
differ in scope, but describe the tools of cyber bullying as electronic communication, 
Internet technologies, and several states include cell phones (Miller et al., 2009).  King 
adds that most of the state cyber bullying laws focus on public schools, requiring school 
boards to establish policies prohibiting cyber bullying.  
The prevalence of post-CIPA Internet safety legislation reflects legislators’ 
ongoing concern about Internet dangers and child exploitation on the Internet (Essex, 
2009) and the inability of legislative policy to keep pace with rapidly changing 
technology (Fuchs, 2012; Miller et al., 2009). Moreover, school level policy 
implementation lags behind legislative enactment by several years, thereby propelling 
school technology policy development and implementation into a state of flux (Adams, 
2010). Educational policy emerges from multiple levels—federal, state, school district, 
and building level—which complicates policy coordination. Censorship and First 
Amendment issues are also inextricably linked to safety policies. Therefore, 
policymakers must balance individual rights with safety concerns. Schools do not have a 
significant amount of legal precedent upon which to base safety policies, making Internet 
policy development a more difficult task (Miller et.al.). 
Filtering and First Amendment Issues 
The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and 
to petition the government for a redress of grievances” (U.S. Constitution). The potential 
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erosion of free speech rights has been at the core of the filtering debate. The ALA and 
ACLU are two of the largest and most vocal organizations leading the fight against the 
use of Internet content controls. Both groups believe the use of filtering software in 
public schools and libraries violate the First Amendment’s assurance of free speech and 
expression (Fuchs, 2012; Spurlin & Garry, 2009). Filters cannot limit blocking solely to 
what CIPA mandates—materials harmful to minors, obscenity, and child pornography—
without blocking constitutionally protected information.  
The First Amendment is the basis for the ALA’s Library Bill of Rights, which 
affirms the library’s responsibility to uphold the principles of intellectual freedom—
unfettered access to information and ideas regardless of its source, background, or 
viewpoint. Article V of The Library Bill of Rights was amended in 1980 to include “age” 
and reaffirmed this stance in 1996 (American Library Association, 2013b) in response to 
mounting public concerns about minors having free access to inappropriate Internet 
materials in libraries. In an interpretation of the Library Bill of Rights, the library 
organization contends that limiting access to non-print resources or information 
technology based on age abridges library use for minors. The ALA believes minors 
should have access to these resources with or without parental permission (American 
Library Association, 2013a). This philosophical stance has prompted the ALA to oppose 
legislation such as CIPA—the goal of which is to restrict minors’ access to inappropriate 
Internet materials.  
Minor’s First Amendment Rights and Court Precedents 
The ALA’s philosophical position raises the question of whether minors have the 
same right to access information as adults in the eyes of the courts. Generally, the courts 
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have granted schools greater latitude in limiting students’ First Amendment rights 
(Alexander & Alexander, 2012; Chmara, 2010; Hoover, 2009). Several landmark court 
cases have framed the extent of minors’ First Amendment rights in public school settings. 
These cases demonstrate the tension between balancing First Amendment ideals with 
educational officials’ responsibility to inculcate values (Hall & Carter, 2006). In the 
landmark case of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969), 
the Supreme Court clearly protected students’ freedom of expression in the public school 
settings. The Court’s famous statement—“It can hardly be argued that either students or 
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate”—establishes a precedent supporting minors’ rights to free expression 
within the school setting. On the other hand, the Court in handing down the Tinker 
decision reiterated the school’s authority to inculcate and to intervene and take 
appropriate action when student expressions cause disruptions to the educational 
environment.  
In another landmark case, Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School 
District, No. 26 v. Pico (1982), a New York school board had removed several books 
from a high school library because they were anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, 
and just plain filthy” (Alexander & Alexander, 2012, p. 355). The Court ruled that a 
school board must be allowed, “to establish and apply their curriculum in such a way as 
to transmit community values” (Pico, 457 U.S. at 853), but the First Amendment 
precludes the removal of school library books in order to deny access to ideas believed to 
be objectionable. Being that the school board’s decision was not content neutral, the 
board was essentially engaging in viewpoint discrimination, a biased or political attempt 
30 
 
to protect certain ideas while suppressing others. Despite its prohibition of viewpoint 
discrimination, the Supreme Court has given public schools significant latitude to limit 
minors’ access to information if school officials have made an objective judgment that 
the information is “educationally unsuitable,” as opposed to deciding to limit access to 
information based upon disagreement with or disapproval of the content of the 
information (Alexander & Alexander; Chmara, 2010). 
There are various opinions about how these cases apply to the constitutionality of 
Internet content filters in public schools and what, if any, legal challenges could be 
mounted against the use of Internet filters in public schools. In handing down the Pico 
decision, the Supreme Court distinguished between the acceptable decision of school 
officials not to purchase books because of pervasive vulgarity or lack of educational 
suitability and the unacceptable removal of library books in order to suppress ideas 
considered politically or socially objectionable (Alexander & Alexander, 2012). This 
legal principle has been made analogous to filtering Internet content in recent court cases 
involving the constitutionality of Internet filters.  
In American Library Association v. the United States (2003), the district court 
adopted the analogy that Internet filtering was like the unconstitutional removal of books 
from a library; however, the Supreme Court did not agree with this analogy. The ALA 
plurality opinion viewed Internet content blocking as analogous to a library’s decision not 
to include certain material in its collection. In upholding CIPA, the Court concluded that 
libraries should have broad discretion in determining what materials to include in their 
collections (Hall & Carter, 2006). Legal precedent regarding minors’ rights to access 
information, and public pressure to protect minors has driven rapid and widespread 
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implementation of filters in public schools (Jaeger & Yan, 2009). Jaeger and Yan add that 
there has been little resistance to CIPA in schools as compared to public libraries.  
Litigation Resulting from Internet Safety Policy Implementation  
Despite widespread deployment, filtering opponents argue one source of litigation 
arises from the way Internet filtering and safety policies are being implemented in public 
schools. First Amendment advocates purport the blocking decisions of some filtering 
programs reflect a particular ideological perspective, which is analogous to viewpoint 
discrimination, a practice specifically forbidden by legal precedents (Alexander & 
Alexander, 2012; Willard, 2010b).  Willard maintains that districts may unknowingly be 
engaging in viewpoint discrimination because filtering companies, who protect what they 
block as a trade secret, may block Web sites based on particular ideological perspectives. 
Holzhauer (2009) concludes that when schools set filters at the most restrictive level and 
deploy them based on the vendors’ default setting, viewpoint discrimination is likely to 
occur.  
Viewpoint discrimination has been cited in recent ACLU lawsuits against school 
districts. In May 2009, the ACLU filed a lawsuit on behalf of several students and an 
SLMS in Tennessee’s Knox county and metropolitan Nashville school districts. The 
plaintiffs argued the districts’ filtering software blocked students from accessing sites 
providing information and resources about gay and lesbian issues, but the filter did not 
block sites promoting the view that homosexuals could be rehabilitated and become 
heterosexuals (Manzo, 2009; Staino, 2009). According to Staino, the filtering software 
the districts were using, when deployed at the default setting, blocked all sites 
categorized as lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT). The federal court 
32 
 
dismissed the lawsuit in August 2009, when school officials agreed to unblock the sites 
(Manzo, 2009).  
More recently, the ACLU launched its “Don’t Filter Me” campaign to prevent 
school districts from filtering pro-LGBT information. The organization contacted several 
school districts asking them to reset their filters to allow access to this content. Leading 
filtering software companies were also contacted and asked to remove supportive LGBT 
Web sites from their blacklists. The ACLU claimed school districts using filters from 
companies such as Lightspeed Systems, Blue Coat, Fortiguard, and Websense were 
engaging in viewpoint discrimination (Zwang, 2011). According to the ACLU, school 
districts were engaging in viewpoint discrimination because these filters reportedly 
blocked educational or supportive LGBT content while permitting access to sites that 
oppose LGBT lifestyles. In response to the campaign, some filtering companies, 
including Lightspeed and Fortigate, changed their filter categories to prevent erroneous 
blocking of supportive LGBT content (Adams, 2012). Ultimately, the ACLU filed a 
lawsuit against a Missouri school district alleging improper filtering of educational 
LGBT content (Quillen, 2011). The lawsuit was settled when the school district agreed to 
stop blocking the content in question, submit to monitoring, and pay legal fees that were 
incurred (Associated Press, 2012). The aforementioned legal actions against school 
districts illustrate the legal challenges districts may encounter if filtering policies are 
overly restrictive and configured in such a way that they prevent users from accessing 
resources supporting a particular point of view.  
Filters continue to attract legal scrutiny and expose institutions that use them to 
potential legal action because they provide an imperfect solution to a far-reaching 
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problem. In July 2003 the Supreme Court ultimately upheld CIPA, which settled the 
constitutionally of the law. However, legal experts say subsequent challenges to the law 
may arise from the way the law is implemented. Menuey (2009) explains most of these 
challenges will not apply to schools, but provides three areas in which additional legal 
challenges could arise for schools. First, students could raise First Amendment concerns 
because filters tend to over-block thereby preventing access to materials of interest that is 
neither "disruptive nor harmful to minors" (p. 45). In addition, legal experts say 
challenges could also arise because filtering companies essentially decide what materials 
are being blocked; therefore, school boards are delegating their legal responsibility 
to make decisions about curriculum content to filtering software companies. Finally, 
Menuey suggests filtering exacerbates the so-called "digital divide." The divide widens 
when students with home access to computers are able to access materials at home that 
are filtered at school, but students without a home computer are denied access to these 
same materials.   
The Influence of Internet Safety Legislation on Internet Filtering and Safety Policies 
CIPA and related Internet safety legislation has far-reaching implications for 
filtering and safety policy implementation. The filtering approach to minors’ online 
safety has garnered most of the attention in the debate surrounding CIPA, but the 
legislation employs a two-pronged approach, with the second approach being the 
establishment and enforcement of a comprehensive safety policy (Jaeger & Yan, 2009).  
Acceptable Use Policies 
Prior to CIPA’s enactment, most schools had taken steps to address Internet safety 
concerns and prevent computer and Internet abuse. One step was the development and 
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implementation of Acceptable Use Policies (AUPs). AUPs include school board adopted 
rules, regulations, rights, and responsibilities that govern users’ computer-related 
activities (CoSN, 2011; Robinson, Brown & Green, 2010). Schools usually require all 
users (and parents of minors) to sign a legally binding agreement indicating they 
understand the policy’s privileges, responsibilities, and policy violation penalties. AUPs  
typically prohibit use of the Internet for non-educational activities, and forbids malice, 
recklessness, invasion of privacy, theft, harassment, bullying, copyright infringement, 
lewd and vulgar expression in all forms (words, pictures, videos, or sounds), and use of 
technologies to violate other institutional policies (Ahn et al., 2011; Robinson, Brown 
and Green).  
Filtering technology proponents believed AUPs were insufficient protection for 
children and that limiting access to Internet content would be a better approach. 
Consequently, pro-filtering groups began lobbying Congress in favor of filtering 
legislation, which eventually resulted in CIPA’s enactment (Fuchs, 2012; Finsness, 
2008). CIPA’s regulations have greatly influenced the content, implementation, and 
importance of AUPs in schools. 
CIPA-Compliant Filtering and Safety Policies 
CIPA compliance requires schools and public libraries to adopt an Internet safety 
policy, which is commonly referred to as an AUP (Jansen, 2010). CIPA compliance is 
required if an institution’s funding sources include:  
• Universal Service (E-rate) discounts for Internet access, Internet service, or 
internal connections; 
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• Library Services and Technology Act (LSTA) state grant funding to buy 
computers used to access the Internet or to pay direct Internet access costs; and 
• Title III funding under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) to 
buy computers used to access the Internet or to pay direct Internet access costs 
(Gros & Hancock, 2011; Jansen 2010; Sutton, 2012). 
In addition to adopting an Internet safety policy, institutions receiving E-rate funds (most 
schools receive E-rate funds) must provide notice and hold at least one public meeting on 
the proposed Internet safety policy, and certify annually with the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) that they have adopted and implemented the policy 
(FCC, 2011), which must include a technology protection measure (filters).  
 NCIPA, Subtitle C of CIPA, goes beyond the issue of filtering Web pages, 
requiring E-rate schools to develop and implement a comprehensive policy governing 
minors’ Internet usage (Jansen, 2010). The Internet safety policy must address 
monitoring minors’ online activities (E-rate Central, 2012; Nicoletti, 2009); however, 
Jansen states electronic monitoring is not required. According to FCC rules, the policy 
must encompass the following five areas: 
• Access by minors to inappropriate matter on the Internet and World Wide Web; 
• The safety and security of minors when using electronic mail, chat rooms, and 
other forms of direct electronic communications; 
• Unauthorized access, including so-called "hacking,” and other unlawful activities 
by minors online; 
• Unauthorized disclosure, use, and dissemination of personal information regarding 
minors; and 
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• Measures designed to restrict minors' access to materials harmful to minors 
(NCIPA Section 254, 2000). 
CIPA regulations do not specify any brand of filter nor specify a degree of 
blocking effectiveness, but the filtering policy must be set to block three types of visual 
depictions including obscenity, child pornography, and material that is “harmful to 
minors” (E-rate Central, 2012). CIPA defines the phrase, “Harmful to minors,” as: 
 any picture, image, graphic image file, or other visual depiction that taken as a 
whole and with respect to minors, appeals to a prurient interest in nudity, sex, or 
excretion; depicts, describes, or represents, in a patently offensive way with 
respect to what is suitable for minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual 
contact, actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual acts, or lewd exhibition of 
the genitals; and taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value as to minors. (Children’s Internet Protection Act, 2000) 
NCIPA (2000) does not define “inappropriate matter,” but allows the local school board 
to determine what is and is not appropriate for minors to access under its Internet safety 
policy (Jansen, 2010). This provision allows schools to establish filtering policies that 
block content beyond the three types of visual depictions specified by CIPA (E-rate 
Central, 2012).  
According to E-rate Central (2012), CIPA compliance also includes enabling 
filters on all Internet accessible computers regardless of whether the computer is used by 
minors or adults. The law allows the filter to be disabled for adults only for bona fide 
research or other lawful use by an adult (Chmara, 2010; Jansen, 2010). E-rate Central 
notes that the ESEA and LSTA sections of CIPA allow filters to be disabled for both 
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adults and minors, but there is no disabling provision for minors in the E-rate section. 
Furthermore, no provision precludes schools from setting different filtering policies for 
students based on academic or age groups, or on an individual basis. 
The Protecting Children in the 21st Century Act (2008) adds an additional Internet 
safety policy requirement regarding educating minors about appropriate online behavior, 
specifically including social networking and chat room interactions, and cyber bullying. 
The FCC has not established specific criteria for a CIPA-compliant Internet Safety policy 
or AUP, but E-rate Central (2012) suggests that a CIPA-compliant Internet safety policy 
should:  
• Be applicable to minors and adults; 
• Include the use of an Internet filtering mechanism and specify conditions under 
which filtering can be disabled or overridden; 
• Address staff responsibilities to monitoring minors’ online activities and 
educating minors on appropriate online behavior; and 
• Address NCIPA-specific issues concerning safe use of email and other types of 
electronic communication, unauthorized disclosure of personal information and 
illegal online activities. 
CIPA Compliance in Public Schools 
 Before the Supreme Court decided CIPA’s constitutionality in 2003, most schools 
had become CIPA compliant by implementing various safety strategies to prevent 
students from accessing inappropriate online materials (Jaeger & Yan, 2009). The 
American Association of School Librarians’ (AASL) (2012) most recent School Libraries 
Count filtering survey indicates that most schools have implemented filtering software 
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and safety policies (AUPs) to help maintain students’ online safety. Table 2 also indicates 
schools have employed additional safety measures including supervising students’ online 
activities, limiting Internet access, and allowing Internet access on a case-by-case basis 
(AASL, 2012). 
   Table 2. Internet Safety Strategies in Public Schools 
Internet Safety Approach Percent of Schools 
Implementing 
Filtering  94 
Acceptable Use Policy 
 
87 
Supervise Internet Access 
 
73 
Limit Internet Access 
 
27 
Internet Access on a case-by-case 
basis 
8 
Note: Data from “Filtering in Schools: AASL Executive Summary,” by the 
American Association of School Librarians, 2012. 
 
Jaeger and Yan (2009) note several reasons filters have become as ubiquitous 
as computing devices in public schools. In addition to legal mandates, schools are subject 
to societal pressures to filter Internet content. Minors are considered a susceptible group 
for Internet crimes and child pornography; hence, society has determined schools have a 
fundamental responsibility to protect children from objectionable online materials. In 
addition, federal E-rate funds are essential to school budgets (Sutton, 2012). In order to 
enhance and maintain technology, public schools rely heavily on these funds. 
Consequently, they cannot afford to forego E-rate funding to avoid CIPA's filtering 
directive. These are the primary reasons there have been few objections to the 
comprehensive implementation of filtering policies in public schools as compared to 
public libraries (Jaeger & Yan).    
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Although legal, political, social, and financial factors necessitate widespread 
implementation of filters in public schools (Jaeger & Yan, 2009), the literature pinpoints 
various Internet filtering and safety policy issues having profound implications for 
policymakers, administrators, educators, and students. Recent prescriptive, anecdotal and 
research literature reveals the issues related to filtering technology’s blocking techniques, 
and filtering and safety policy implementation in schools.  
Issues Related to Filtering Technology and its Blocking Techniques 
Internet content filtering technology is employed to restrict users from accessing 
Web content that violates an institution’s AUP. Much of the controversy surrounding 
filtering technology emanates from the techniques these tools use to filter or block access 
to Web-based information. Regardless of the position one adopts regarding the filtering 
controversy, it is generally agreed that filters are an imperfect solution to a complex 
problem. Filtering technology either “over-blocks” and denies access to legitimate Web 
sites, or “under-blocks” and permits access to inappropriate Web sites (Moyle, 2012; 
Sutton, 2012). Ineffective filtering was particularly problematic with first generation 
filters. However, filtering technology has evolved from simplistic keyword and URL 
blocking to more sophisticated tools employing a combination of blocking techniques 
(Baule, 2010; Houghton-Jan, 2010; Hua, 2011). The latest content filters can be very 
powerful, according to Houghton-Jan, when they utilize artificial intelligence, image 
recognition, and complex keyword analysis algorithms at a very granular level. 
Keyword Filtering  
Keyword filtering is the most basic filtering method. This technique uses a 
dictionary of blacklisted words or phrases with assigned positive or negative scores. 
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When users request pages, the page is examined for occurrences of these words or 
phrases. If a requested page exceeds a user-determined threshold, the page is blocked 
(Hidalgo et al., 2009; Quillen, 2010). Blacklists have expanded to include millions of 
keywords and phrases, but updates are performed manually according to Nicoletti (2009). 
Some vendors allow the customer to update or fine tune the list manually to lessen the 
occurrence of false positives. For example, the blacklist can be customized to allow a 
page containing “wire strippers,” but block one containing “strippers” alone. 
Keyword blocking is known for blocking innocuous Web pages because it filters 
Web content without regard its context. However, this technique offers some advantages. 
One advantage is that keyword filtering can quickly determine if a Web page has 
potentially harmful content (Banday & Shah, 2010). In addition, the dictionary of 
objectionable words and phrases does not require continuous updates. As the over-
blocking rate is usually unacceptable for most institutions, this filtering technique 
typically is used in combination with other methods (Chou, Sinha, & Zhao, 2010; 
Hidalgo et al, 2009).   
URL Filtering 
URL filtering prevents or allows Web access by checking a requested Web site's 
URL against a URL database that is categorized according to content (i.e., shopping, 
gambling, etc.) (Sutton, 2012). Categorization allows network administrators to make 
blocking decisions based upon content categories. There are two types of URL 
databases—a black list database that contains URLs of objectionable Web sites and a 
white list database that contains URLs of acceptable Web sites (Chou et al., 2010). Most 
filtering solutions that employ this technique use black lists (Hidalgo et al., 2009). This 
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blocking method can be configured to block entire URLs or only permit access to non-
offensive content on the Web site. As with keyword blocking, vendors usually provide a 
basic URL database requiring the user to perform manual updates. Updates must be 
performed frequently to keep pace with rapidly expanding Internet content; otherwise, an 
institution's URL blacklist could easily fall out of compliance with its AUP (Nicoletti, 
2009).  
This type of filtering is time consuming and resource intensive since most URL 
blocking systems enlist human reviewers to maintain updated URL lists. Filter developers 
are increasingly using automated tools to improve the updating process. Automated Web 
spiders tag potentially offensive sites while human reviewers follow-up to validate the 
automated classifications (Hidalgo et al., 2009; Houghton-Jan, 2010). Nevertheless, 
creating and maintaining URL databases continues to be a labor-intensive and expensive 
process (Banday & Shah, 2010; Chen & Wang, 2010). Therefore, commercial filtering 
companies typically will not reveal specific Web sites by category because the 
information is proprietary or a trade secret (Gossett & Shorter, 2011; Houghton-Jan; 
Willard, 2010b). Since content-based decisions about what is blocked are not shared with 
customers, filtering software critics argue schools and libraries are relinquishing their 
responsibility to make content and selection decisions to filtering software companies 
(Jaeger & Yan, 2009). Sutton (2012) adds that the proprietary claim makes it difficult to 
move an incorrectly categorized Web site to a more appropriate category. 
As speed and accuracy are key attributes of good filtering systems, most 
commercial and open-source Web filters use URL filtering as the primary filtering 
technique. Koumartzis and Veglis (2012) suggest that URL filtering technology is easier 
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to implement and its fast processing speed supports implementation on a massive scale, 
such as in school districts with distributed locations. However, an inherent fault of site 
blocking is its focus on HTTP-based traffic, which fails to detect and block instant 
messaging, email attachments, and file sharing applications that may threaten network 
security. Therefore, most public schools use commercial filtering products that employ a 
combination of filtering techniques in order to achieve greater content blocking 
effectiveness (Chou et al., 2010; Nicoletti, 2009). 
Real-time Contextual Analysis and Categorization  
URL and keyword-matching filtering, the earliest filtering approaches, cannot 
effectively filter the many different types of Web content and protocols of today's 
Internet traffic (Selamat, Zhi Sam, Maaroff & Shamsuddin, 2011). Contextual analysis 
filtering—also known as intelligent content analysis (Hidalgo et al., 2009)—uses 
the latest Web filtering techniques to analyze the patterns and context of text to 
achieve a semantic understanding of the context of the words and phrases on a Web page. 
This process, when used in conjunction with keyword blocking, reduces over-blocking 
errors that occur when Web pages contain words that can be objectionable in some 
contexts. Machine learning techniques categorize Web pages according to salient 
features, and then the results are cached, including offensive and non-offensive content, 
to maximize accuracy and performance (Banday & Shah, 2010; Nicoletti, 2009).  
With dynamic blocking, URLs and category information is updated dynamically, 
eliminating the need to manage and update local blacklists manually. This real-time 
categorization process reduces under-blocking—a primary weakness of URL blocking—
that occurs when emerging inappropriate content has yet to be added to the 
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URL blacklist. Chen and Wang (2010) adds that this filtering approach is advantageous 
because of its ability to examine various elements of a Web page for classification, 
including the metadata, links, text, images, and scripts. However, Varadharajan and 
Cohen (2010) contend dynamically generated content on social networking sites, secure 
sockets layer security protocol (SSL) and non-HTTP protocols for email, discussion 
groups, chat, news servers, and instant messaging continue to create technical and 
practical challenges for filtering technology. The most important disadvantage of real-
time content analysis is inadequate performance. Accurate content analysis systems can 
be developed, but slow processing time makes them inappropriate for most demanding 
filtering situations (Banday & Shah, 2010; Koumartzis & Veglis, 2012). Consequently, 
most commercial filtering tools only use this technique to augment more efficient (faster) 
filtering techniques such as URL filtering (Chou et al., 2010).  
Other Filtering Techniques and Technology Protection Measures 
Image processing continues to be an active filtering research area because of the 
ever-increasing volume of images and multimedia on the Internet, and particularly since 
pornographic images are what CIPA stipulates must be filtered. Most commercial 
filtering tools classify Web content as pornographic or safe, using text on the Web page. 
However, text-based processing is not effective with Web pages containing mostly 
images and minimal or obfuscated text (Chen & Wang, 2010). Image filtering, based on 
skin detection, is an emerging technique with a high degree of accuracy, but slow 
performance makes this technique unusable in real-world systems. Consequently, most 
filtering systems employ moment analysis, textures, histograms, and statistics to produce 
an algorithm that Hidalgo et al. (2009) purport to be highly effective in recognizing 
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pornographic images. However, Sutton (2012) and Chmara (2010) assert current filtering 
technology cannot accurately block only visual depictions of child pornography, 
obscenity, and material harmful to minors as CIPA mandates.  
Content labeling is a self-regulating, self-labeling method of content control. 
When a Web site is developed, the Webmaster describes the Web site's content using an 
Internet Content Rating Association (ICRA) generated questionnaire. Content labels are 
created from the questionnaire results, which are used to either block or to allow access to 
online content. The RTA (Restricted to Adults) and POWDER (Protocol for Web 
Description Resources) are similar self- regulating content labeling initiatives. 
Webmasters are not required to submit content labeling data; therefore, many Web sites 
are not labeled. Nevertheless, IRCA, RTA, and POWDER labels are available in many 
different content control software and Web browsers (Bertino, Ferrari, & Perego, 2010; 
Jeon, Lee, & Won, 2011; Nicoletti, 2009). Content labeling is not regulated, therefore, 
some publishers intentionally or mistakenly mislabel their Web content, thereby 
permitting users to access unwanted content (Banday & Shah, 2010; Jeon et al.). 
Consequently, these self-labeling systems should only be used to augment other Web 
filtering tools. 
Filter Deployment within the Network 
Web filtering solutions can be deployed in several different network scenarios, 
which substantially affect their customization, performance, and manageability (Hidalgo 
et al., 2009). The software can be installed on individual workstations, a networked proxy 
server, a caching appliance, or firewall, or can be installed on a dedicated server (Enex 
Testlab, 2011). Filtering techniques and deployment within the network can substantially 
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influence information access, requiring administrators to balance a number of issues 
including performance, flexibility, and costs to maximize information access.  
Filters installed on individual workstations (also called client-side filters) are 
usually part of a full security suite that includes antivirus, firewall, and other security 
protections. Client-side filtering can be enhanced by the filtering capabilities of most 
traditional Web browsers. Workstation based filtering/security solutions are only feasible 
for home users or small schools/districts because of manageability issues. This type of 
deployment requires individual workstation configuration and cannot accommodate site-
wide policies that apply to all computers (Enex Testlab, 2011; Hidalgo et al., 2009). 
Since most school districts have many networked computers at distributed locations, 
they require standalone solutions consisting of a dedicated database server and a separate 
gateway or firewall that executes the content filtering policy (Thomas & Stoddard, 2011). 
Moreover, tech savvy users can easily bypass client-side filtering solutions to access 
blocked content. 
Filters can be deployed at various points on the network, including on a dedicated 
server, bridging the filtering server between the access point and the rest of the network 
or installing the filtering product on a proxy server through which all Internet traffic is 
routed. Filtering at the network level is a better choice for institutions with distributed 
locations because filtering policies are created once on the gateway and then pushed 
down to individual desktops (Enex Testlab, 2011; Hidalgo et al., 2009; Thomas & 
Stoddard, 2012). Networked filtering solutions require maximum performance as they 
must monitor and filter traffic from many simultaneous users, a standard that is difficult 
to achieve unless they are installed on dedicated high performance servers or appliances 
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with special network hardware. Networked filtering deployment is typically less 
vulnerable to hacking and similar security risks (Nicoletti, 2009).  
A disadvantage of the dedicated appliance solution is the added expense of 
purchasing and managing two separate hardware devices along with the filtering 
software. Additional storage is required for the database server as the database of Web 
sites increases. Websense and SurfControl are two well-known software/server solution 
vendors. Some school districts choose integrated solutions that combine management and 
processing on one gateway or firewall, thus reducing hardware and operational expenses. 
However, when the gateway also houses anti-virus and intrusion prevention, performance 
can be degraded (Enex Testlab, 2011; Gossett & Shorter, 2012).   
Filtering can also occur at the ISP (Internet Service Provider) or carrier level. ISPs 
offer their customers a full suite of security services, including firewalling, antivirus, 
anti-spam, and Web filtering. These security solutions, which are suitable for all kinds of 
institutions and home users, are installed on servers at the ISP level. The quality 
and extent of customization of this filtering solution depends on the product purchased. 
Products that offer basic security services do not allow much user configuration, but if 
higher quality, more expensive filtering/security products are purchased they enable the 
institution-based IT administrator to implement a full suite of institution-defined filtering 
policies remotely. ISP-based filtering performance (speed) is usually not an issue as they 
are optimized to handle millions of concurrent users with minimum delay (Banday & 
Shah, 2010; Enex Testlab, 2011; Hidalgo et al., 2009).  
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Content Filtering Challenges 
Administrators and policymakers have many options and challenges to weigh 
when selecting a filtering solution and establishing filtering policies. Increasing online 
threats from email, chat rooms, peer-to-peer sharing sites, spam, viruses, worms, etc., 
demand that school districts not only filter objectionable Internet content, but also content 
that could subject the network to the aforementioned threats (Thomas & Stoddard, 2011). 
Additionally, filtering policies must combat non-educational use, bandwidth consuming 
content, legal liability, and security breaches (Hidalgo et al., 2009; Nicoletti, 2009).  
To address these challenges, the latest security solutions combine security 
functions such as firewalls, antivirus protection, Web content filtering, anti-spam, 
spyware prevention, intrusion detection and prevention, Internet Protocol security, and 
bandwidth management. These security solutions, also known as unified treat 
management (UTM) appliances, dynamically control Web traffic at the organization's 
gateway providing inline examination of Web content, SSL traffic, Web 2.0 applications, 
and various network protocols to classify dynamic content in real time (Ramaswami, 
2010; Enex Testlab, 2011). For most school districts, the greatest challenge to 
implementation of this type security appliance is cost. According to Ramaswami, “K-12 
schools rarely have the budget to invest in these next-generation security tools, which 
involve the cost of upgrades, maintenance, and user training (p. 27).” Consequently, 
schools are relying on traditional filtering software, which typically blocks entire sites 
instead of dynamically scanning Web sites to block inappropriate content and allow 
appropriate content.  
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Computer-savvy users have discovered numerous ways to circumvent filters and 
exploit built in weaknesses of some commercial filtering tools. Some URL filters use 
only the domain name, not including the IP address, allowing users to input a Web page's 
IP address to access blocked content. Even when the filter uses both IP addresses and 
URLs to block content, it is possible for circumventors to take each number in the IP 
address and convert it to a hexadecimal, then enter it into the browser’s address bar. 
Scripts to compute hexadecimal format are readily available on the Internet. Web 
publishers use techniques that cause inappropriate content to be unfiltered and passed on 
to the user (Fuchs, 2012). Illegal content can be disguised using JavaScript, which some 
filtering software cannot parse or interpret. Another common ploy is to assign safe labels 
to inappropriate content. Therefore, filtering based on labels is not very accurate (Hidalgo 
et al., 2009). 
The use of proxies to bypass filtering mechanisms is the greatest challenge to 
content filtering implementation according to Gossett and Shorter (2011). When tech-
savvy users want to bypass the filter to access blocked content, they utilize a variety of 
proxies including public and private Web-based proxy sites, proxy clients installed on 
flash drives and on remote computers, or by simply changing the browser configuration 
to use an open proxy (Chen & Wang, 2010; Varadharajan, 2010). The most effective 
method to counteract circumvention is via packet inspection, certificate examination, and 
other heuristic techniques (Nicoletti, 2009; Varadharajan). Nevertheless, Gossett and 
Shorter (2011) claim it is virtually impossible to prevent private proxy servers from being 
used to circumvent most firewall schemes. The Online Safety and Technology Working 
Group (OSTWG) (2010)—a group established pursuant to the Protecting Children in the 
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21st Century Act of 2008—concluded that even though software manufacturers advertise 
circumvention-proof filtering products, tech-savvy users seem to find a way to outsmart 
the filter to access prohibited content.  
Users can also circumvent filters using other methods including alternative 
protocols (i.e. FTP, telnet, HTTPS) or searching in a different language. Language 
translation can be used to confuse the filter by converting a blocked Web site to a 
language that the filter does not support. Even when users cannot access external proxies, 
they can use low-tech circumvention methods such as viewing the cached versions of 
blocked Web sites via search engines like Google (Hidalgo et al.). Effective filtering 
solutions support multiple languages, and inspect/rate many different Internet protocols. 
Filtering solutions have the added challenge of inspecting email traffic and making block 
or allow decisions based upon the content filtering policy (Nicoletti, 2009). 
Establishing a safe and secure online environment has become an ongoing 
challenge. Nicoletti (2009) characterized the content filtering challenge in the following 
statement: “Content filtering is a fast-paced battle of new technologies and the relentless 
trumping of these systems by subversion and evasion” (p. 743). Yet, IT administrators 
must allow access to information and resources that support the school district’s 
education mission. In addition to supporting the district’s education mission, filtering 
policies must also enforce districts' AUPs, which should work in concert with other 
approaches such as online safety education, digital citizenship education, and constant 
monitoring of students' online activities (Hidalgo et al., 2009; Johnson, 2012; OSTWG, 
2010). Filtering policies that are not carefully configured to minimize over-blocking can 
lead to censorship, but can be effective tools “when chosen, configured, and monitored 
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carefully” (Johnson, 2012, p. 87). However, the AUP must clearly delineate appropriate 
online behavior and specify ramifications when the policy is violated. In summary, the 
literature suggests that the enormous challenges to achieving online safety for minors can 
only be accomplished through a multifaceted approach with filtering technologies being 
one facet (Losinski, 2009; OSTWG; Sutton, 2012; Varadharajan, 2010). 
Filtering and Safety Policy Implementation Issues  
Filtering Policy Configuration Issues  
Filtering policies are an extension of an organization’s Internet safety policy, and 
govern filtering software configuration. Filters work in concert with AUPs to manage 
users’ online access and to prevent Internet abuses such as accessing inappropriate 
Internet content (Hidalgo et al., 2009; Thomas & Stoddard, 2011). The literature review 
suggests that the most prevalent filtering policy concerns emanate from the way school 
districts are implementing filtering policies. The filtering debate continues among 
educators, not so much in regards to the constitutionality of filtering Internet content, but 
regarding how filtering and safety policies are being implemented in school districts 
(AASL, 2012; Fuchs, 2012; Ott et al., 2010). Establishing filtering policies involves the 
consideration of several factors having considerable influence on end users’ access to 
information and resources. These factors include: 
• Determining which categories to block—beyond what CIPA mandates—and 
whether to fine-tune some blocked categories to allow access to non-objectionable 
content within the category. Most filtering solutions provide granular category 
blocking, which allows administrators to block entire content categories or limit 
blocking to specific subcategories (See Figure 1); 
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• Determining the level of involvement stakeholders (IT staff, administrators, 
faculty, parents, and students) will have in filtering policy decisions;   
• Determining who will be granted filter override privileges and; 
• Determining whether the same filtering policy will apply to all users or whether to 
customize the filtering policy according to specific user groups (i.e., setting 
different policies for elementary students, secondary students, and staff).  
 
The literature outlines various best practices for establishing effective filtering 
policies in order to maximize access to information in a secure environment. Over-
blocking can be minimized if the filtering product provides a granular category list that 
can be expanded into subcategories (as shown in Figure 1), thereby, enabling IT 
administrators to set different policy actions for each subcategory (Nicoletti, 2009; Hua, 
Figure 1.  Example of Fortigate’s® granular category interface. 
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2011). Filtering policies and rules should be developed by a committee, including 
representatives from various stakeholder groups in order to lessen filtering issues and 
provide greater access to education resources (Baule, 2010; Jansen, 2010; Johnson, 
2012). Collaborative content filtering decision-making increases staff buy-in as end users 
will have a greater understanding of the reasons for filtering policy decisions. Hua 
recommends that filtering policies be tailored for specific user groups such as elementary 
students, secondary students, educators, and administrators. For example, teachers may 
need to access certain Web content (i.e., pro-Nazi Web sites) for instructional purposes, 
but the policy could be set to prevent students from accessing this content. Filtering/usage 
policies should define what content is blocked in addition to user profiles and their access 
privileges. An effective filtering solution provides a wide range of categories and makes 
it possible to establish sophisticated user profiles that meet the research, educational, or 
professional needs of all user groups (Hua; Ott et al., 2010). Finally, SLMS, 
administrators, or technical support personnel on each campus should be granted override 
privileges so users will have timely access to curriculum-related information and 
resources (Ott et al.; Willard, 2010b).    
 Recent experiential literature suggests that policymakers, administrators, and IT 
personnel may be establishing and implementing filtering policies without considering 
the aforementioned best practices. The literature also implies that these policy decisions 
are having adverse effects on users’ access to information and teachers’ abilities to 
deliver instruction. Baule (2010) notes that districts are also blocking non-educational 
content and content that threaten network bandwidth, efficiency, and security. Many 
school districts are interpreting CIPA's requirements too broadly and have established 
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overly restrictive filtering polices that prohibit access to any Web site that may be 
potentially troublesome (Johnson, 2012; Maycock, 2011; Pierce, 2012). Issues, such as 
lack of override privileges for designated school-based staff and highly restrictive filter 
configurations, are impeding instructional activities and compromising student safety 
(Willard, 2010b). Lastly, Willard states the override process in many districts consumes 
too much time and is a major frustration for end users. 
 Many factors motivate school districts to implement overly restrictive filtering 
policies. These factors include: fear of negative publicity or litigation, the notion that 
tighter filters keep students safer, adherence to parent and community sentiment, 
concerns that looser filter settings will encourage misuse of Internet resources, 
and bandwidth preservation (Baule, 2010; Fuchs, 2012; Losh & Jenkins, 2012). 
Additionally, proponents for less restrictive technology policies report that policymakers 
are implementing more stringent Internet access policies because of fears about Internet 
predators, cyber bullying, students posting inappropriate content on social networks, and 
the proliferation of sexually explicit or violent online content (Ahn et al., 2011; Bush & 
Hall, 2011; Rodgers, 2012). 
Misinterpretation of CIPA’s regulations may result in highly restrictive filtering 
policies. The U. S. Department of Education’s (2010) NETP concludes that in some cases 
lack of understanding of CIPA’s mandates creates “barriers to the rich learning 
experiences that Internet access should afford students” (p. 54). Willard (2010b) provides 
more insight into school districts’ decisions to implement tight filtering controls. Willard 
states that over-blocking is often the result of misunderstanding CIPA’s requirements or 
results when administrators rely solely on filters to prevent non-educational use. 
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Sometimes, filtering policies are configured according to the mistaken interpretation that 
CIPA requires schools to block all controversial content and prevent students from 
communicating with each other online—not strictly to block visual images that are 
obscene, contain child pornography, or are harmful to minors (Jansen, 2010; Johnson, 
2012). However, blocking access to content other than adult sexual materials is at the 
school district’s discretion as NCIPA stipulates. Sometimes filter overriding is prohibited 
because of misunderstanding CIPA’s disabling provision. The confusion stems from the 
term “disabling,” which means turning the filter off and is used in the CIPA law to 
prevent constitutional challenges; and the term “overriding,” which means providing 
access to sites blocked erroneously. The disabling provision was the key reason the U.S. 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of CIPA in United States v. American Library 
Association).  
Additional Safety Policy Issues 
CIPA requires school districts to develop and implement Internet safety policies, 
in addition to technology protection measures, to prevent the dangers of the Web from 
infiltrating the educational environment. AUPs generally address users’ online rights and 
responsibilities, outline ramifications for policy violations, describe acceptable and 
unacceptable uses, and outline a code of ethical conduct for utilizing technology 
resources (CoSN, 2011; Hidalgo et al., 2009). More recently, the Protecting Children in 
the 21st Century Act (2008) added an Internet safety education component to the AUP, 
which was to be implemented no later July 2012. The literature suggests there are various 
safety policy issues that may be undermining students’ online safety. These issues 
include over reliance on filtering technology and outdated AUPs. 
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Internet safety authorities maintain relying solely on filtering technology can 
undermine students’ online safety and is counterproductive. Willard (2010a) observes 
that schools are placing too much emphasis on CIPA's filtering requirement as opposed to 
its Internet safety policy requirement. Over reliance on filtering technology has resulted 
in ineffective Internet safety education in schools. Content filtering can also generate a 
false sense security, causing educators to be less vigilant about monitoring students' 
online activities (Johnson, 2012; Nantais & Cockerline, 2010; Ott et al., 2010). Willard 
(2010b) notes that the false security notion leads to a failure to teach students how to 
respond to or prevent inadvertent access to inappropriate content. Adams (2010) argues 
that school districts are relying mostly on filters to protect children from Internet dangers, 
and concludes this approach does not teach students to be informed Internet 
searchers who know how to evaluate the accuracy of information or how to navigate the 
Internet safely and responsibly. Adams adds that filters only protect students when they 
are using the Internet in schools and libraries, not when they access the Internet in 
unfiltered locations or on wireless devices such as cell phones.    
Internet use policies should be continuously reviewed and updated regularly to 
ensure they are relevant and address the latest technological advances (CoSN, 2011; 
Hidalgo et al., 2009). Nevertheless, Hidalgo et al. cite recent AUP research that indicated 
many institutions' AUPs were outdated, inconsistent, and did not address the ever-
increasing range of Web-related applications including filtering circumventors (proxies 
and anonymizers), Web-based file sharing applications, instant messaging, and other 
Web protocols. Jansen (2010) examined 30 public school Internet safety policies in April, 
2010, and found that only a few had been updated since October 2008 and even fewer 
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had updated their policies to include the Internet safety education component mandated 
by the 2008 Protecting Children in the 21st Century Act. Outdated AUPs cannot 
effectively address today’s online safety challenges. The literature suggests AUPs, not 
filters, are the cornerstone of an effective online safety strategy. Successful AUP 
implementation mandates that the policy is comprehensive, updated frequently, 
developed collaboratively with all stakeholders, and focuses on safety awareness and 
education (CoSN; Endicott-Popovsky, 2009).  
Internet Safety Policy Issues and 21st Century Teaching and Learning Standards 
  Outmoded filtering and Internet use policies—developed for Web 1.0 (static, read 
only Web content)—appear to be refueling the filtering debate (Quillen, 2010), which 
had mostly been dormant during the years immediately following the Supreme Court’s 
2003 decision upholding CIPA. The debate is not about whether or not to filter, but about 
issues surrounding the use of Web 1.0 filtering techniques to filter dynamic Web 2.0 
traffic. Moreover, concerns have arisen regarding the use of outdated Internet access 
policies that do not effectively address Web 2.0 safety concerns (Bosco & Krueger, 2011; 
Lemke et al., 2009). The evolution of Web 2.0, also known as the “Read/Write Web,” 
provides additional evidence, which implies that school districts may need to re-examine 
current filtering and safety policies in order to prepare students to live and work in the 
21st century (Ahn et al., 2011). 
The Promise and Perils of Web 2.0  
  Web 2.0 is a rapidly expanding and popular genre of Web applications having a 
marked influence on 21st century culture. Lemke et al. (2009) define Web 2.0 as “an 
online application that uses the World Wide Web . . . as a platform and allows for 
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participatory involvement, collaboration and interactions among users” (p. 5). Thousands 
of free Web 2.0 applications have recently become available. Some of the most used 
applications include:  
• Social networking sites such as Facebook™ and Twitter™ where users create 
personal pages and interact;  
• Blogs (Web logs), online diaries where the originator and readers comment on a 
variety of topics; 
• Wikis such as Wikipedia, which are topical collections of information that users 
collectively create, add to, and edit; 
•  Social bookmarking sites such as Del.icio.us™ and Flickr™ where users share 
Internet bookmarks and create descriptive tags to organize resources such as 
videos and pictures; and 
• Cloud computing applications such as Google Docs™, which are online suites of 
applications that allow users to import, share or collaboratively edit documents, 
spreadsheets, and presentations (Bush & Hall, 2011; Lemke et al.; Simkins & 
Schultz, 2010). 
Just as with Web 1.0, technology enthusiasts and many educators are proclaiming 
the enormous promise of Web 2.0 technologies to transform 21st century teaching and 
learning. Simkins and Schultz (2010) state the hallmark of the read/write Web is its 
ability to foster interaction, collaboration, and group productivity. Bush and Hall (2011) 
purport the participative nature of these applications is shifting the focus from 
individualized work to collaborative efforts, from isolated learning to collective 
knowledge, and changing learners from passive recipients of knowledge to active 
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participants in the creation of knowledge. Web 2.0 has the potential to address the needs 
of different types of learners and to engage learners; make schoolwork more relevant for 
learners; enhance communication, collaboration, and critical thinking skills; expand 
learning beyond the classroom and the school day; and build a sense of community 
(CoSN, 2011). For many of the same reasons, these collaborative tools can also enhance 
professional development for educators (Bush & Hall). 
There is widespread use of social, participative, and collaborative technologies in 
the larger society—for personal, business, entertainment, communication, educational, 
and political purposes. Despite a ubiquitous presence in the outside world and substantial 
educational potential, Web 2.0 use in schools is restricted (Ahn et al., 2011). These 
applications have fueled renewed Internet safety concerns and fears of misuse. 
Consequently, many school districts are setting filters to block access to social 
networking sites such as Twitter™ and Facebook™ (Ahn et al.; Lemke et al., 2009) to 
protect students from Web 2.0 perils. Some school districts are going beyond blocking 
social networking sites to block all Web 2.0 sites, including collaborative tools such as 
wikis, blogs, Flickr™, Google Docs™, and Del.icio.us™ (Bush & Hall, 2011; Johnson, 
2012; Losh & Jenkins, 2012). Schools are denying or restricting access to participative 
online tools for several reasons including:  
• Fear that predators may be lurking on social networking sites to target susceptible 
youth; 
• Concerns that Web 2.0 resources use too much bandwidth; 
• Concerns that these tools promote non-educational activities; 
• Concerns that students will post inappropriate content online; 
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• Lack of awareness of the educational value of Web 2.0 technologies; 
• The notion that social media is inundated with inappropriate content; 
• Concerns that access to these tools will subject schools to litigation; and  
• Concerns that students will be exposed to or engage in cyber bullying (Ahn et al.; 
Brooks-Young, 2010; Lemke et al.; Losh & Jenkins). 
Loertscher (2009) defines three categories of technology access policies being 
implemented in school districts, each having a different effect on Web 2.0 and 
information access: 
• Very restrictive filter settings, no access to cloud computing/Web 2.0 tools. 
• Strong firewall allowing access to selected Web sites, multimedia resources, and 
Web 2.0 tools such as internal wikis, blogs, and internal communication tools. 
• Light filtering (only what CIPA requires) allows access to any online tool that has 
educational potential. The focus is on teaching responsible technology use.   
It is difficult to ascertain from the literature the extent to which the three technology 
access categories are being implemented in school districts, or the extent of Web 2.0 
access issues, because few studies have investigated school districts’ filter configuration 
tendencies.  
Twenty-First Century Learning Standards 
Web 2.0 filtering issues have implications for teaching and attainment of 21st 
century learning standards. Assessments of existing filtering technologies indicate these 
technologies are not adept at distinguishing education-specific Web 2.0 content from 
non-educational Web 2.0 content (Fuchs, 2012; OSTWG, 2010; Quillen, 2010). 
Therefore, filtering tools typically make a “block all Web 2.0 content” decision, or “allow 
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all such content” decision instead of allowing the good content and blocking the 
objectionable content. When the “block all Web 2.0 content” decision is made, access to 
information and resources necessary for attaining 21st century learning standards is 
limited (Jansen, 2010). Full integration of Web 2.0 applications into instruction provides 
a wealth of real-world learning opportunities that prepare students to live and work in an 
Internet-powered world (Manzo, 2009). 
A major goal of the most recent International Society for Technology in 
Education (ISTE) and American Association of School Librarians (AASL) national 
standards is to prepare students to thrive in a global and digital world (AASL, 2007; 
ISTE, 2007). These standards enable students to acquire the Partnership for the 21st 
Century’s (2011) five learning and thinking proficiencies: critical thinking and problem-
solving skills, communication skills, collaboration skills, contextual learning skills, and 
information and media literacy skills. Access to the read/write Web fosters achievement 
of all these proficiencies, but the participative and collaborative nature of most Web 2.0 
resources is particularly critical for attaining 21st century communication and 
collaboration skills (Jansen, 2010; Ott et al., 2010). Table 3 includes the AASL and ISTE 
standards that specifically address communication and collaboration skills. Technology 
integration specialists and educators assert that Internet access policies restricting access 
to Web 2.0 resources are counterproductive to attainment of these skills (Adams, 2010; 
Shearer, 2010).  
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Table 3.  ISTE and AASL Collaboration and Communication-specific Learning 
Standards 
International Society for Technology in Education Standards for Students 
Standard Communication and Collaboration 
Students use digital media and environments to communicate and work 
collaboratively, including at a distance, to support individual learning and 
contribute to the learning of others. Students: 
 Performance Indicator a. 
Interact, collaborate, and publish with peers, experts, or others employing a 
variety of digital environments and media. 
Performance Indicator c. 
Develop cultural understanding and global awareness by engaging with 
learners of other cultures. 
Standard Digital Citizenship 
Students understand human, cultural, and societal issues related to 
technology and practice legal and ethical behavior. Students: 
 Performance Indicator a. 
Advocate and practice safe, legal, and responsible use of information and 
technology. 
Performance Indicator b. 
Exhibit a positive attitude toward using technology that supports 
collaboration, learning, and productivity. 
American Association of School Librarians Standards for the 21st Century Learner 
Standard Share knowledge and participate ethically and productively as members of 
our democratic society. 
 Skill 3.1.2 
Participate and collaborate as members of a social and intellectual network 
of learners. 
Responsibility 3.3.5 
Contribute to the exchange of ideas within and beyond the learning 
community. 
 
Standard 
 
Pursue personal and aesthetic growth 
 Skill 4.1.7 
Use social networks and information tools to gather and share information. 
Responsibility 4.3.1 
Participate in the social exchange of ideas, both electronically and in person. 
Responsibility 4.3.4 
Practice safe and ethical behaviors in personal electronic communication and 
interaction. 
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The Implications of Filtering and Safety Policy Implementation 
CIPA has been fully implemented in K-12 schools for more than a decade, yet 
few studies have examined how CIPA compliant filtering and safety policies are 
influencing teaching and learning in institutions implementing these policies. The 
research literature in this domain is not definitive and is largely anecdotal according to 
Rodgers (2012). Nevertheless, anecdotal studies provide foundational data, which 
suggests restrictive technology use policies are hampering technology integration and 
limiting access to online resources that enhance learning (Finsness, 2008; Fuchs, 2012; 
Holzhauer, 2009). More definitive and comprehensive studies are required to advance 
understanding of how technology policies influence end users, and to inform policy 
development and decision-making. The current study endeavored to address these gaps in 
the literature. Previous filtering and safety policy related research is described and 
analyzed in this section to provide the context of the current study. Moreover, pertinent 
older research (2008-2009) is included to illustrate how the need for this study has 
evolved. 
The Effectiveness of Internet Filters 
From the inception of the filtering debate, researchers began to evaluate the 
effectiveness of Internet filters. Sutton (2012) states there has been an abundance of 
literature on the effectiveness of filters, including studies and opinion pieces, because of 
the legal debates emanating from legislative attempts to restrict minors’ access to 
offensive online content. The results of early studies were often used to support the 
implementation of filters or as evidence that filters were not the best approach to protect 
minors from online indecency. These evaluations continue to be useful in the filter 
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selection process as an initial screening of vendors (Hidalgo et al., 2009). Filter 
effectiveness studies have led to improvements in filtering technology, but both public 
and private studies concur filters continue to under-block and over-block (Sutton).  
Hidalgo et al. (2009) describe two approaches to evaluating the effectiveness of 
Web filtering tools—industrial evaluations and scientific evaluations. Industrial 
evaluations typically test several products to determine their strengths and weakness and 
are performed by a magazine or a third-party laboratory. The authors note several 
weaknesses of industrial tests including their subjectivity and lack of rigor. For example, 
performance evaluation is reported in unknown conditions (test set size and composition), 
testing conditions may favor a specific vendor, performance measures are not supported 
with statistical tests, and testing procedures are not transparent. Moreover, testing 
conditions do not mirror real-world scenarios.  
Scientific filter evaluations, which are often reported in scientific journals, 
typically are set up in the context of well-defined experiments and are supported by 
rigorous procedures and metrics. The experiments are conducted under laboratory 
conditions, are reproducible, and the results can be compared to similar tests. Following 
CIPA’s enactment in 2001, research studies began using more statistical approaches to 
determine filtering effectiveness, whereas filter effectiveness tests prior to 2001 tended to 
be less scientific and more anecdotal (Finsness, 2008).  
Scientific filter testing is mostly limited to filtering accuracy (effectiveness)—the 
degree of over-blocking and under-blocking. Efficiency (processing speed), which is 
critical to real-world conditions, is rarely evaluated. The most salient deficiency of 
scientific evaluation is the absence of standard data sets, procedures, and metrics 
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(Hidalgo et al., 2009). Statistical measures can also be manipulated simply by changing 
the number of acceptable sites in a test set. It is also difficult to identify a truly random 
sample of Internet sites; such sites represent actual Web pages that users are likely to 
access. When statistical filter effectiveness studies report percentage summaries of 
correctly or incorrectly blocked content, it is often based upon subjective judgments 
about whether particular Web pages are appropriately blocked.  
Despite the methodological issues with scientific filter tests, they persistently 
conclude filters both over-block and under-block content at consistent and equivalent 
rates, regardless of the filter or the filter’s settings (Houghton-Jan, 2010). Houghton-Jan 
reports that for filter accuracy studies from 2001-2008, all tests combined yielded an 
average accuracy rating of 78%. When isolating the results from the 2007-2008 tests, the 
average accuracy rating increased to 83%, which suggests filtering technology may be 
improving. However, Houghton-Jan notes filters were still wrong 17% of the time and 
54% of the time on image content. 
Since 2008, scientific filter tests have substantially diminished (Houghton-Jan, 
2010). An exhaustive literature review uncovered only two filter evaluation studies 
published after 2008, the results of which are similar to Houghton-Jan’s conclusions and 
suggest filter effectiveness has not improved since 2008. Chou et al. (2010) empirically 
evaluated the performance of three top-ranked filters, CyberSitter™, Net Nanny™, and 
CyberPatrol™, to assess their performance against a proposed text mining filtering 
approach. The average overall accuracy rating for the three commercial filtering products 
was 68%, while an experimental content-based text mining approach achieved a 99% 
accuracy rating. It is interesting to note the filtering product (CyberPatrol™) employing a 
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combination of list-based and advanced content-based filtering techniques had an 
accuracy rate of just 47%, while the two list-based products (CyberSitter™ and 
NetNanny™)  performed much better with accuracy rates of 78% and 66% respectively. 
The researchers concluded commercial filters were particularly inadequate compared to 
approaches employing classification algorithms. However, employing classification 
algorithms, such as text mining, is impractical for most school districts, as they require 
much more skill and resources than commercial filtering products.  
Jeon et al. (2011) conducted a more recent filtering software evaluation of five 
commercial products, which yielded conclusions similar to Chou et al’s (2010). Jeon et 
al.’s empirical evaluation yielded an average filtering accuracy of 70% when filtering 
harmful Web sites. The researchers also concluded that these products performed much 
worse (below 50%) when blocking video, image, and executable files such as those often 
found on social media and gaming Web sites.  
The aforementioned studies indicate filtering technology continues to employ 
mostly list-based filtering techniques (i.e. URL blacklists, keyword blacklists) which 
result in considerable over-blocking and under-blocking. Jeon et al (2011) suggest that 
until machine learning techniques are employed, filtering products will continue under-
performing, and increasingly so in the era of ubiquitous social media and mobile 
technologies. However, advanced filtering technologies that employ machine-learning 
algorithms are impractical for most schools because of cost and efficiency (speed) issues 
(Gossett & Shorter, 2011). Consequently, most school districts have implemented less 
accurate, but more efficient and economical list-based filtering products (AASL, 2012). 
Considering the inadequacies of technology protection measures, what remains largely 
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unknown is the effect these tools are having on end users in the K-12 environment. In 
addition, most filtering tools can be configured to limit over-blocking and under-
blocking, but are school districts configuring them to maximize information access?      
The Influence of Filtering and Safety Policies on End Users 
Finsness (2008) reports that the widespread implementation of filtering 
technology has shifted the research focus from filter effectiveness to CIPA’s actual effect 
on teaching and learning. Although, research into the influence of CIPA-inspired filtering 
and safety policies is beginning to emerge, Jaeger and Yan (2009) conclude “relatively 
small bodies of research have been generated about CIPA’s effects in public libraries and 
public schools” (p. 6) and end users of these institutions. Nevertheless, a few notable 
studies have investigated issues surrounding Internet blocking technology 
implementation in public schools and libraries and how these issues affect users.  
Holzhauer (2009) investigated the effects of filtering on classroom instruction in 
one small, rural school district. Teachers, administrators, and technology personnel of 
two elementary schools, one high school, and one alternative school participated in the 
study. Using quantitative methodology, the researcher surveyed technology personnel to 
determine the degree of filtering restrictiveness at the local level and surveyed 
administrators and teachers to determine if filtering affected classroom Internet usage. 
The study concluded that the district’s filtering policies limited access to Web-based 
resources required for instruction and contributed to teacher reluctance to integrate 
computers into instruction. Another significant finding of the study was the apparent lack 
of communication and stakeholder involvement in the development and implementation 
of the district’s filtering policy. These factors contributed to teacher frustration and 
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reluctance to integrate technology fully into instruction, but administrators and 
technology personnel were mostly satisfied with the effectiveness of the filtering policy. 
This study was also limited in scope as it involved only one school district. A number of 
filtering policy issues was identified, but what remains unknown is the pervasiveness of 
these issues in other school districts. The researcher pointed out that the data and research 
results were relevant specifically for the school district involved in the study, and was not 
applicable to the larger population. Holzhauer recommended that similar studies be 
conducted in other school districts for comparative purposes. 
Finsness (2008) examined whether content filters prevented high school students 
from accessing information required for Minnesota’s Academic Standards. Finsness also 
explored how teachers and technology administrators reacted when students were denied 
access to information required to meet learning standards. This dissertation study was 
largely qualitative, including in-depth interviews with six district technology 
administrators and nine high school health and social studies teachers from 9 of 
Minnesota’s 339 independent school districts. The study concluded that the level of 
filtering (from less restrictive to more restrictive) affected students’ ability to access 
information needed to meet Minnesota’s health and social studies standards. The study 
also concluded that additional research was required to inform CIPA-compliant policy 
and practice. As with Holzhauer’s (2009) research, Finsness’ study was limited in scope, 
involving representatives from only nine school districts. In addressing the study’s 
limitations the researcher states, “The data were anecdotal data collected from a small 
population” (p.154). Finsness also noted that the results of the study could provide 
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baseline data for subsequent investigations into the implications of public school Internet 
filtering. 
Fuchs (2012) conducted a critical ethnographic investigation of how filtering the 
Internet was affecting public education in North Carolina. Through the collective voices 
of 50 participating IT directors, administrators, and teachers, Fuchs concluded that 
misapplied local policies and insufficient staff development for using filtered Internet 
instruction contributed to restricted access to online educational content. The results of 
this qualitative investigation were similar to the aforementioned studies and add 
supporting evidence that filtering and safety policies are adversely influencing teaching 
and learning. However, generalizability of the results is limited because of inherent 
weaknesses of qualitative methodology. 
 A few studies have focused on SLMS’s views of how filtering and safety polices 
are affecting teaching and learning. Harris' (2009b) research analyzed SLMS' postings 
to LM_NET, AASL's (American Association of School Librarians) online discussion 
group, to determine SLMS' perceptions of online information literacy instructional 
challenges. The study revealed that Internet use policies and procedures presented a 
major challenge to teaching students how to search, select, and assess the meaning and 
value of information found online. SLMS' LM_NET postings reflect frustrations 
regarding filtering policy implementation and procedures that limited access to online 
content. They described cumbersome unblocking procedures, blocking entire categories 
of tools (i.e., wikis and blogs), and certain domains of Web sites (Geocities and 
Wikipedia). Postings also revealed that in many cases filtering configurations were not 
fine-tuned so that distinctions were made between education-related Web 2.0 applications 
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and non-education-related applications. Problems of limited access were exacerbated by 
SLMS not being granted filter override privileges to provide timely access to erroneously 
blocked content and poorly maintained filtering and security systems. The major 
limitation of this study was that it reflected only the views of SLMS who posted 
messages, not the feelings of lurkers or non-members of the discussion group. Therefore, 
the findings cannot be generalized to the larger population of SLMS. In addition, Harris 
noted that the coding process used to analyze the data was subjective, which further 
limited the applicability of the results to other settings. 
 More recently, AASL (2012) collected data on filtering in schools as part of its 
annual School Libraries Count longitudinal survey. This survey, which involved 4,299 
SLMS, was the most comprehensive filtering/safety policy research to date, relative to 
the number of participants and the range of filtering/safety policy issues addressed. The 
study addressed the types of filters, online safety approaches, educational content most 
often blocked, timeliness of unblocking procedures, differentiated filtering for various 
user groups, and the impact of filtering on learning. Major conclusions of this study 
according to Devaney (2013) were that Web filtering impedes learning and prevents 
students from taking advantage of learning’s social potential. More than half (52%) of 
respondents indicated internet filters impeded student research, particularly keyword 
searches. Even though most respondents reported filtering decreased distractions and the 
need for direct supervision, AASL concluded, “filtering continues to be an important 
issue for most schools” (Title page, para. 2) because many schools are filtering beyond 
CIPA requirements, thereby impeding learning. This study was comprehensive in many 
respects; however, it was limited in that only quantitative data were collected and did not 
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investigate filtering policy decision making from the perspective of technology 
administrators.  
 The aforementioned studies mostly focused on the effect of CIPA’s filtering 
strategy on information access and end users, but CIPA employs two strategies to protect 
minors while online. Few studies have focused on the effect of CIPA’s safety awareness 
strategy. Yan's (2010) quasi-experimental research compared high school students’ 
Internet access in a filtered environment to undergraduate students’ access in an 
unfiltered environment to investigate differences in basic knowledge and perceived 
cognizance of Internet safety protection strategies. The study also investigated CIPA’s 
influence on students' Internet use at home and school. Yan states Internet safety 
awareness and sufficient Internet safety educational experiences are fundamental for 
protecting students from harmful online content and encounters. However, the 
study found that CIPA's Internet safety strategies did not have a beneficial impact on 
students' basic knowledge of Internet safety. CIPA has reduced students' Internet use at 
school, but not outside; thereby reducing exposure to potentially harmful Internet content 
at school. Nevertheless, CIPA does not positively influence students' online 
behaviors outside of school. The results suggests that CIPA's filtering and 
safety strategies, which are only enforced in schools and libraries, are not effective as 
these venues are not the only places students can be exposed to harmful online materials. 
Yan’s study was also limited in scope in that it involved students from only one high 
school and focused only on CIPA’s Internet safety awareness approach.   
A national survey of over 1600 educators also suggests that schools may not be 
fully implementing CIPA’s safety awareness strategy as part of their Internet safety 
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policies (National Cyber Security Alliance (NCSA), Educational Technology Policy 
Research and Outreach, Microsoft Corporation, & Zogby International, 2010). The 
NCSA et al. study revealed no concerted effort exists among educators or administrators 
to teach safe and secure digital navigation and prepare students to be responsible digital 
citizens and employees. Instead, the survey showed more than 90 percent of schools 
relying mostly on filtering and blocking social-networking Web sites to protect students 
from potentially harmful online materials (Pierce, 2010). This study used valid sampling 
techniques to choose a broad spectrum of participants, but the survey focused mostly on 
one aspect of CIPA—cyber safety awareness and education. A comprehensive 
investigation of other issues surrounding school districts’ filtering and safety policy 
development and implementation was not conducted.   
Social Media (Web 2.0) Access Policies   
Research is beginning to emerge that provides an indication of how Internet 
access policies may be influencing access to Web 2.0 resources in schools. To establish a 
baseline for Web 2.0 policies, practices and perspectives in American K-12 schools, 
Lemke et al. (2009) conducted a national study involving superintendents, curriculum 
directors, and technology directors. The study reported that Web 2.0 use is mostly guided 
by pre-Web 2.0 policies that include AUP’s, Web filtering, and informal practices. 
Policies that specifically address Web 2.0 use are limited, typically are restrictive, and are 
more reactive than proactive. The majority of the survey respondents agreed that Web 2.0 
resources can positively influence teaching and learning, but acknowledged concerns 
about balancing Web 2.0’s educational potential with safety issues.  
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TICAL (Technology Information Center for Administrative Leadership) 
conducted an informal survey of  educators including principals, district administrators, 
technology directors, curriculum specialists, SLMS, and classroom teachers to get their 
perspective on the promise of Web 2.0 tools, obstacles to their use in teaching and 
learning, and overcoming these barriers. Almost 90% believed Web 2.0 resources had the 
potential to enhance instruction and increase student engagement. However, nearly half 
of these respondents said district filtering and Internet safety policies were a major barrier 
to realizing the educational potential of this technology (Simkins & Schultz, 2010).  
More recent studies continue to show there is a stark difference in the use of 
technology in and out of school, particularly social media technologies. Ahn et al. (2011) 
analyzed 217 district AUPs to determine how they framed social media access in schools. 
A major finding was that the majority of AUPs made no mention of social media 
technologies and 14% of districts banned social media entirely. The researchers 
concluded that while some AUPs implied social media tools might be useful educational 
resources, just a few clearly stated that social media had potential educational value. A 
major recommendation of the study was that additional studies of this nature would 
forward understanding of how technology policies influence educator practices.  
Contribution to the Literature 
This study addressed the limitations of the aforementioned studies. These studies 
were limited because they were either anecdotal or did not use a combination of data 
collection methods to comprehensively investigate the filtering and safety policy issues 
identified in the literature. This research enlisted a large number of participants from 
thirty-six school districts and used multiple data collection methods. Investigating the 
73 
 
research problem on a broader scale enabled a more comprehensive investigation of the 
major safety policy issues and how they influence information access and 21st century 
instruction.  
This research also addressed existing gaps in the literature about districts’ filtering 
and safety policy predilections. What remained to be determined was the actual level of 
filtering restrictiveness schools districts were implementing, what specific categories 
were being blocked, what circumstances prompt filtering category blocking decisions, 
and how these decisions affect access to information and resources required for 21st 
century teaching and learning. This study sought to address these unanswered questions, 
which are essential for district policymakers and stakeholders seeking to revise Internet 
use policies or evaluate the effectiveness of existing policies. 
Filtering and safety policy related literature is largely opinion-based or 
prescriptive (Sutton, 2012) and lacks a solid research base (Rodgers, 2012), which is an 
essential element of informed policy making. Researchers have acknowledged the 
difficulty of designing research studies that determine the effect filters have on 
information access. This investigation was cumulative in that it added to existing research 
about the influence of Internet filtering on student learning. It also provides descriptive 
data about the types of information and resources filters block, and reveals the outcome 
of filtering policy decisions on attainment of specific 21st century learning standards. 
Chapter Summary 
 This literature review established a conceptual framework for the study of 
filtering and safety policies, surveyed issues surrounding filtering and safety policy 
implementation in public K-12 schools, and the manner in which these issues converge to 
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influence 21st century teaching and learning. An analysis of relevant research was 
conducted to establish the basis and need for this research.
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Chapter 3 
  Methodology 
 
Introduction 
 This chapter restates the research problem and reiterates the purpose of this study. 
It provides an overview of the research design and the rationale for employing the 
research methodology. This section also describes the data collection instruments, defines 
the data collection procedures, outlines the measures used to ensure that the research 
design and instruments yield valid and reliable data, and describes the participants and 
sample selection procedures. Finally, the data analysis and presentation methods are 
briefly explained along with a description of the resources used for this investigation. 
Restatement of the Problem 
School districts have implemented filtering and safety policies in response to 
legislative and social mandates to protect students from the proliferation of objectionable 
Internet content. The literature suggests these policies are more restrictive than legal 
mandates require and are adversely affecting information access and instruction. There is 
no clear understanding of the manner in which filtering and safety policies are affecting 
teaching and learning because no comprehensive studies have investigated the issues and 
trends surrounding filtering and safety policy implementation or the implications of these 
issues for end users. Policymakers need this type of research-based data as they evaluate 
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and revise Internet use policies in order to enhance instruction and provide greater access 
to the most recent online learning technologies. 
Purpose of the Study 
The goal of this research was to examine Internet filtering and safety policy 
implementation in South Carolina’s K-12 public schools to determine current trends and 
issues and the way these policies influence information access and instruction. The study 
investigated the following research questions:   
• How are filtering and safety policies being implemented in public schools? 
• What issues do SLMS encounter as they facilitate information access on filtered 
computers? 
• How are school districts addressing Web 2.0 safety issues 
• In what ways do filtering policies impede access to information and resources 
necessary to achieve 21st century technology and information literacy standards? 
Research Method 
To accomplish the research goal, the researcher utilized a mixed methods research 
design including both quantitative and qualitative approaches.  Ivankova et al., (2006) 
suggest neither quantitative nor qualitative approaches by themselves are adequate to 
“capture the trends and details of a situation” (p. 3). Therefore, a mixed methods strategy 
was implemented; quantitative data from mostly closed ended surveys was collected and 
analyzed. Data analysis from the quantitative phase informed the second phase of the 
study, which entailed the collection and analysis of qualitative data. Creswell and Plano 
Clark (2007) state when researchers utilize this approach, they typically use qualitative 
data to develop a better understanding of the data collected during the quantitative phase 
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of the study. Moreover, Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009) contend a multi-method research 
design is superior to single methods because it enables data triangulation, the use of a 
variety of data sources in a study. The study utilized data collected from multiple surveys, 
interviews, and analyses of artifacts (AUPs). Triangulation also enabled this investigation 
to overcome weaknesses or inherent biases of single method studies and provides a 
deeper understanding of the research problem. Creswell (2009) suggests that combining 
qualitative and quantitative approaches provide a more accurate portrayal by revealing 
trends and generalizations and provide an expanded understanding of the research 
problem. 
This investigation was primarily descriptive in nature. Gay, Mills, and Airasian 
(2011) state quantitative descriptive or survey research is undertaken to answer questions 
regarding the current status of the research topic or to gather information about 
preferences, practices, or concerns of a target group. Accordingly, the initial quantitative 
phase of this study provides an overview of the filtering and safety policy implementation 
trends and issues in South Carolina’s public schools. Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009) 
explain that “quantitative questionnaires can be used to generate large numbers of 
responses that produce information across a broad range of survey topics” (p. 240). 
However, it was not possible to address the research questions sufficiently via 
quantitative data only. It was therefore imperative to include a qualitative phase to answer 
the research questions more conclusively. 
Instrument Development and Alignment to Research Questions 
Prior to developing the online surveys for this study, the researcher was cognizant 
that online surveys are not as advantageous as once believed and typically have a lower 
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response rate than paper-based surveys (Lefever, Dal, & Mattiasdottir, 2007). On the 
other hand, they provide the timeliest and most cost efficient data collection method. 
Web-based surveys are also practical for well-defined population groups whose e-mail 
addresses can be obtained easily (Rea & Parker, 2005). Because the intended population 
was homogeneous with respect to a key variable, profession, lower response rate was less 
of an issue for this study. Lefever et al. also state online surveys provide an effective way 
to access large and geographically distributed populations and are particularly useful for 
collecting preliminary data. This study utilized survey data to obtain an overview of the 
issues and trends relative to filtered Internet access and follow-up interviews were 
utilized to gain a deeper understanding of these issues. Consequently, the inherent 
disadvantages of Web-based surveys were mitigated. 
Two surveys, an IT administrators’ survey and a SLMS’ survey (see Appendix B 
and Appendix C), were designed to achieve the research goal and answer the research 
questions. The surveys were grounded in the research literature and gathered descriptive 
data that enabled a deeper understanding of South Carolina public schools’ filtering and 
safety policy issues. Survey items focused on the following filtering and safety policy 
issues as identified in the literature: content category blocking decisions and the rationale 
for those decisions (Jansen, 2010; Johnson, 2012; Manzo, 2009; Willard, 2010b), the 
implications of over-blocking and under-blocking (Jansen; Maycock, 2011; Willard, 
2010b), the efficiency of unblocking procedures (AASL, 2012; Harris, 2009b; Quillen, 
2010; Willard, 2010b), the effect of filtering policies on Web 2.0 access (Adams, 2010; 
Losh & Jenkins, 2012; Manzo, 2009; Quillen, 2010), stakeholder involvement in 
filtering/safety policy decisions (Baule, 2010; Johnson), distinct filtering policies for 
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different user groups (AASL, 2012; Hua, 2011), and the role of Internet safety education 
programs in overall student online safety (Adams, 2010; Willard, 2010a). It is important 
to show how the research variables relate to the research questions and specific survey 
items (Creswell, 2009). Table 4 provides a visual representation of the relationship 
between the filtering and safety policy issues (variables) identified in the literature, the 
research questions, and response items on the data collection instruments. 
Table 4. Filtering/safety policy issues, research questions, and survey items 
Filtering/Safety Policy 
Issue (Variables) 
Research Question Survey Item 
Content blocking 
considerations   
 
 
Research Question 1:  
How are filtering and 
safety policies being 
implemented in public 
schools? 
IT Survey questions 4, 6,7a, 7b: 
blocked content categories, 
rationale for blocking decisions, 
use of default filter settings, sub-
category blocking 
 
Stakeholder 
involvement in policy 
decisions 
Research Question 1:  
How are filtering and 
safety policies being 
implemented in public 
schools? 
IT survey question 5: who makes 
blocking decisions 
SLMS survey questions 2,7a: 
who makes blocking decisions, 
stakeholder input 
 
Differentiated access 
levels for specific 
groups 
Research Question 1:  
How are filtering and 
safety policies being 
implemented in public 
schools? 
 
IT survey question 7e: 
differentiated access 
SLMS survey question 7d: 
differentiated access 
 
Over-blocking and 
under-blocking  
 
 
Research Question 2: 
What issues do SLMS 
encounter as they 
facilitate information 
access on filtered 
computers? 
 
IT survey question 9, 10: over-
blocking and under-blocking 
frequency, blocking effectiveness 
SLMS survey questions  3, 5, 6, 
8a,8b, 8c: blocked educational 
content, over-blocking and under-
blocking frequency, blocking 
effectiveness, over-blocking 
effect on instructional staff,  
over-blocking effect on students, 
under-blocking effect on students 
 
Unblocking procedures Research Question 2: SLMS survey questions 4,7b,7c, 
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Filtering/Safety Policy 
Issue (Variables) 
Research Question Survey Item 
What issues do SLMS 
encounter as they 
facilitate information 
access on filtered 
computers? 
 
8d:  timeliness of unblocking 
process, filter override privileges, 
blocked page notification, 
unblocking efficiency 
IT survey question 7c,7d, 7f,: 
capability of overriding filter, 
blocked page notification, filter 
override privileges  
 
Internet safety education  Research Question 3: 
How are school districts 
addressing Web 2.0 safety 
issues?  
IT survey question 8: programs 
addressing cyber bullying and 
social networking safety 
education 
SLMS survey question 7e, 8f: 
programs addressing cyber 
bullying and social networking 
safety issues, effectiveness of 
safety policies/practices 
 
Web 2.0 accessibility  Research Question 4:  
In what ways do filtering 
policies impede access to 
information and resources 
necessary to achieve 21st 
century technology and 
information literacy 
standards? 
SLMS survey questions 4, 8e: 
over-blocking of Web 2.0 
resources, access to collaboration 
and communication tools 
 
The IT administrators’ survey was developed to gather descriptive data from IT 
administrators and mostly addressed the first research question. The first research 
question sought to determine how filtering and safety policies were being implemented in 
South Carolina’s public schools. The IT survey consisted primarily of closed-ended 
response items that could be easily analyzed, were less time-consuming for the 
participant, and encouraged a higher response rate (Williams & Protheroe, 2008). A 
comment section was included for most questions so that respondents could explain 
responses or provide additional information. The IT survey sought to collect data about 
Table 4 (continued) 
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the types of content filters used in school districts, content categories that were blocked, 
the rationale for blocking these categories, whether blocked categories are fine-tuned to 
minimize over-blocking, Web filtering rules and how they were established, procedures 
for unblocking legitimate content, and whether specific filter settings were established for 
different user groups.  
 An SLMS survey consisting primarily of closed-ended response items was 
developed to collect data about filtering/safety policy procedures/practices, and the 
challenges end users encountered as a result of filtering/safety policy implementation. 
The SLMS survey instrument focused mostly on the second research question regarding 
the issues SLMS experience as they facilitate information access on filtered computers. 
Most questions included a comment section so that respondents could explain responses 
or provide additional information. The survey response items were based upon the 
research literature and were designed to provide a better understanding of how content 
filtering policies affect end users. Survey items focused on the effectiveness of content 
filters, filtering/safety policy procedures and practices, instances when over-blocking and 
under-blocking occurred, the nature of the information that was blocked, and the extent to 
which filtering policies impeded access to constitutionally protected information. 
The third research question sought to determine how school districts were 
addressing Web 2.0 safety issues. To answer this question, the researcher examined 
safety policies from 99% of the traditional school districts (excludes charter schools and 
career centers). These policies, also known as Acceptable Use Policies, were examined 
using an instrument designed to assess whether they had been updated to reflect the 
FCC’s most recent mandate and referenced Web 2.0 safety issues. This mandate requires 
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all E-rate discount recipients to amend their AUPs to provide for educating minors about 
appropriate online behavior, including interacting with other individuals on social 
networking Web sites and in chat rooms, and cyber bullying awareness and response 
(Federal Communications Commission, 2011). This AUP amendment was to be 
implemented by July 1, 2012. Additionally, the SLMS’ survey instrument and  IT 
administrators’ survey instrument included social networking and safety education 
related response items and the SLMS’ interview protocol included response items that 
investigated whether social networking safety issues were addressed via Internet safety 
education programs. This data was analyzed to determine how school districts were using 
Internet safety instruction to educate students about Web 2.0 safety concerns.  
The fourth research question sought to determine how filtering policies impede 
access to information and resources required to achieve communication and collaboration 
related national technology and information literacy standards. The researcher identified 
specific technology and information literacy standards that require online communication 
and collaboration to address this question (see Table 3). Online communication and 
collaboration necessitates access to Web 2.0 social technologies such as blogs, wikis, 
podcasting, forums, and multimedia sharing for collaborative school projects. However, 
proponents of less restrictive filtering polices suggest that many school districts are 
configuring filters to block access to these online tools (Shearer, 2010; Losh & Jenkins, 
2012). To determine how filtering policies are affecting the use of Web 2.0 collaborative 
tools, the researcher reviewed school districts’ blocked content categories to determine if 
Web 2.0 resources such as wikis, blogs, and social networks were blocked. The SLMS’ 
survey and interview responses were analyzed to determine if users were unable to access 
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online communication and collaboration resources. SLMS were surveyed regarding 
unblocking procedures and whether they provided timely access at the point of need 
when Web 2.0 resources were blocked. 
Qualitative data was collected during the second phase of the study. Qualitative 
research is undertaken to deepen understandings about the way things are, why they are 
that way, and how participants view them (Gay et al., 2011). Gay et al. also state 
interviews are advantageous for qualitative data collection because they enable the 
researcher to probe and explain phenomenon, are flexible to use, and can be recorded for 
subsequent analysis. Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009) add that when interviews and 
questionnaires (surveys) are used together in a study, they generate complex mixed data. 
Quantitative survey data added breadth to the study and qualitative data allows depth of 
understanding.  
The interview protocol mirrored the survey in that it addressed each research 
question and the issues identified in the literature (see Appendix E). The interview 
protocol consisted of five question sets that addressed the following themes and 
respective research questions (RQ): stakeholder involvement in policy decisions (RQ1), 
unblocking/blocking procedures and practices (RQ1, RQ2), influence of over-blocking 
and under-blocking on teaching/learning (RQ2), Internet safety education programs 
(RQ3), and Web 2.0 safety and access issues (RQ3, RQ4). SLMS were asked to share 
their perceptions of stakeholder involvement in Internet policy decisions, 
unblocking/blocking procedures and practices, the influence of over-blocking and under-
blocking on teaching/learning, the effectiveness of Internet safety education programs, 
and Web 2.0 safety and access issues. Qualitative data collected via the interview 
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protocol added depth to the study by providing the personal experiences and impressions 
of participants concerning filtering and safety policy implementation.  
Validity and Reliability 
Validity 
There were various threats to the validity of the study and the researcher took 
steps to minimize these threats. Validity refers to the extent to which an instrument 
measures what it is supposed to measure (Gay et al, 2011). A valid instrument has 
content validity. That is, it fairly and comprehensively covers the domain or issues that it 
purports to cover (Cohen, Manion, and Morrison, 2011). When designing the survey 
instruments, the researcher ensured that the response items aligned with the research 
questions. The researcher also ensured that the questionnaires were grounded in the 
literature. That is, the questionnaires addressed the issues of concern enumerated in the 
filtering and safety policy literature. Table 4 presents a visual display of significant 
filtering and safety issues identified in the literature, identifies survey items that address 
these issues, and aligns survey items to the research questions. 
To increase validity, a panel of experts with extensive subject related background 
reviewed the data collection instruments. The panel included two college professors, a 
university library dean, and two IT administrators (see Appendix A), all of whom have 
published articles or research relating to the research topic. Each panelist independently 
rated each data collection item for relevance to the research questions, using a four-point 
Likert scale: not relevant, slightly relevant, quite relevant, and very relevant. The 
numerical values ranged from 4 for very relevant to 1 for not relevant. The mean score 
for each item ranged from a high of 4.0 to a low of 3.2 (see Appendix A). Since the 
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average rating for each item was above 3.0, no item was deleted from the instruments. 
The expert evaluation instrument also included a space for reviewers to suggest changes 
for each item. Appendix A outlines how each data collection item was changed in 
response to expert reviewers’ recommendations. 
Creswell (2009) states pilot testing is important to establish an instrument’s 
content validity and to improve questions, format, and the scales. Similarly, Cohen et al 
(2011) conclude that pilot testing increases an instrument’s reliability, validity, and 
practicability. Cohen et al suggest that pilot testing should:   
• Assess whether survey items and instructions are clear;  
• Provide feedback on the validity of the response items (Do they measure what 
they are supposed to?);  
• Identify redundant items;  
• Provide feedback on response item format;  
• Assess whether the survey’s length is appropriate; and 
• Provide feedback on the layout, sectionalizing, numbering, and itemization of the 
instruments. 
Accordingly, the data collection instruments were pilot tested with a subset of the 
population of SLMS and IT administrators. Fourteen SLMS and IT administrators were 
invited to pilot test the surveys and eight participated in the pilot test. Pilot test 
participants were asked to indicate problems encountered while taking the surveys and 
submit suggestions for survey improvement on the final survey screen. Participants did 
not recommend any changes or encounter problems during the pilot test. Therefore, the 
survey was launched with the changes the expert panel recommended. Survey pretesting 
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ensured that the data collection instruments consistently collected the data required to 
answer the research questions. 
Nonresponse was also an important threat to external validity or generalizability 
of research, particularly if non-respondents results are systematically different from the 
respondents’ results (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). To minimize the threat to external 
validity and to maximize the survey response rate, researchers must employ an extensive 
follow-up method that consists of reminders and resending surveys to non-respondents. 
Ye (2007) and Cohen et al. (2011) suggest a variety of strategies to increase response 
rates. These strategies include electronic pre-notices, follow-up reminders with the survey 
links, follow-up telephone calls, stressing the importance and benefits to the target group, 
employing a simple and technically uncomplicated survey design, and ensuring that 
respondents’ privacy was protected. The researcher utilized these strategies to maximize 
the survey response rate and increase the external validity of the research conclusions. 
Triangulation entails the use of two or more methods of data collection and “is a 
powerful way of demonstrating concurrent validity” (Cohen et al, 2011, p.112). When 
different methods of data collection yield similar results, concurrent validity is 
established. Collecting and analyzing both quantitative and qualitative data enabled the 
researcher to explain more completely the richness and complexity of the issues of focus. 
To enhance data triangulation, the IT and SLMS surveys included identical items on 
stakeholder involvement in content filtering decisions, filter effectiveness, on-campus 
override privileges, blocked page notifications, different access levels for specific user 
groups, and safety education programs that educate users about Web 2.0 safety issues.    
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Reliability 
Reliability refers to the consistency with which an instrument measures whatever 
it is intended to measure (Gay et al., 2011). Developing instruments with good questions 
ensures a consistent data collection experience for all respondents according to Fowler 
(2009). Fowler explains that good questions, “mean the same thing to every respondent” 
(p. 89), and “the kinds of answers that constitute an appropriate response to the question 
are communicated consistently to all respondents” (p. 89). To design reliable survey 
response items, the researcher was careful to employ the following survey design 
recommendations: 
• Avoid inadequate wording; 
• Avoid terms or concepts that have multiple meanings; 
• Avoid asking two questions at once; 
• Keep response items clear and simple; and 
• Whenever possible, use closed ended questions that provide a list of 
acceptable responses (Fowler). 
Population and Sample 
  The target population included IT administrators and SLMS. IT administrators 
were included because they are largely responsible for the selection, configuration, and 
ongoing administration of content filtering programs. This factor allowed them to provide 
important data about Internet filtering and safety policies and practices. Moreover, SLMS 
have an advantageous perspective from which to provide a deeper understanding of the 
issues and trends surrounding filtering technology implementation and its impact on end 
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users. SLMS facilitate user information access and are keenly aware of the information 
access issues end users encounter while using filtered computers.  
The population of IT administrators and SLMS were well-defined; in most cases, 
their e-mail addresses were readily accessible, and they had Internet access to facilitate 
completion of the Web-based surveys. The researcher acquired SLMS’ email addresses 
from the South Carolina Association of School Librarians (SCASL) online listserv, 
school Web sites or via telephone contact. Email addresses for IT directors were obtained 
from school districts’ Web sites or via telephone contact. Prior to contacting the target 
population, the researcher requested school district authorization to conduct research with 
the target population groups (see Appendix G).  
Thirty-six of 81 traditional South Carolina school districts agreed to participate in 
the study. After obtaining research authorization and IRB approval (see Appendix H), the 
target population was invited to participate in the study via email (see Appendix I and 
Appendix J). The email invitation included a link to the surveys, which were hosted on 
the SurveyGizmo™ Web site. 
Data Collection Procedures and Time Frame 
The time frame for collection of data from four sources—IT survey, SLMS 
survey, SLMS interviews, and analysis of AUPs—was approximately four months. The 
SLMS survey was launched at the end of May 2012 and remained open until the end of 
June 2012 while the IT survey was launched in mid-June and remained open until the end 
of July 2012. To improve the response rate, the surveys remained open for several weeks 
as much of the data collection period coincided with summer break, when the target 
population is mostly away from school and may not check school email on a daily basis. 
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Interviews were conducted with a subset of the SLMS population over a two-week period 
in mid-August 2012. The analysis of AUPs was performed from mid-July 2012 until mid-
September 2012. 
SurveyGizmo™, an online survey tool that allows users to develop, customize, 
and distribute Web-based surveys, was used to conduct the surveys. This survey tool 
allowed participants' responses to be recorded electronically, and summary data was 
available immediately. The researcher selected SurveyGizmo™ to create, disseminate, 
and collect the survey because of its reputation, ease of use, and flexibility (Marie & 
Weston, 2009). Moreover, SurveyGizmo’s™ surveys are low cost and flexible. The 
survey tool allows collected data to be downloaded in a variety of formats, including 
Excel spreadsheet format for data analysis. 
Eighty-one traditional South Carolina school districts were contacted to obtain 
permission for the target population to participate in the study. School districts were sent 
a letter explaining the proposed research (see Appendix G) and a copy of each survey 
(see Appendix B and Appendix C). Thirty-six school districts granted permission for 
their SLMS and IT directors to be contacted and invited to respond to the surveys. This 
factor made it impossible to draw a random sample of the entire population of South 
Carolina SLMS and IT directors. The 36 participating school districts consisted of 
approximately 463 SLMS and 36 IT directors (or their designees). In an effort to increase 
the number of respondents, the researcher’s goal was to email the survey to the entire 
population of SLMS and IT directors, excluding pilot test participants. 
The researcher collected the email addresses of 428 SLMS from the SCASL 
listserv, telephone contacts, and individual school Web sites. The SLMS survey 
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instrument was then launched using SurveyGizmo™. An email message containing 
consent information and a link to the online survey was successfully delivered to 398 
media specialists. The survey link allowed recipients to respond anonymously to the 
survey. One hundred twenty-three SLMS responded to the survey for a 32% response 
rate. Email addresses for 36 IT administrators were obtained from school districts’ Web 
sites and telephone contact. One IT director participated in the pilot test, therefore the 
survey invitation was sent to 35 IT directors. Twenty-one IT administrators responded to 
the anonymous IT survey for a 60% response rate. To increase the response rate, two 
reminders were sent to both groups while the surveys were open. 
During the subsequent qualitative phase, the researcher conducted interviews with 
a subgroup of SLMS to gain a more in-depth understanding of SLMS’ convictions and 
concerns about the impact of filtering and safety policies upon end users. The last page of 
the survey included a note stating the researcher was seeking four-to-five respondents to 
participate in a brief follow-up interview. To preserve the anonymity of the survey 
responses, respondents were asked to contact the researcher via email or telephone if they 
were willing to be interviewed. Six respondents indicated they wanted to be interviewed; 
ultimately, five respondents participated in the interviews. The interviews were 
conducted after the IT and SLMS surveys were closed and preliminary data analyses 
were completed. The researcher reviewed the interview protocol based upon the 
preliminary data analyses to determine if the protocol needed modifications. No 
modifications were necessary in order for the protocol to collect qualitative data that 
added depth to the quantitative data. Prior to conducting the interviews, the researcher 
mailed a hard copy of the informed consent document to each interviewee for signature. 
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After the signed consent form was returned, the researcher contacted the prospective 
interviewees to review the consent form and to schedule the interview. The consent form 
outlines interviewee rights and steps the investigator took to ensure the interviewee’s 
confidentiality (see Appendix K).  Interviews were conducted over a two-week period in 
August 2012. The investigator took copious notes during each interview session. 
Interview data were thematically analyzed for presentation. 
An analysis of AUPs from 80 of 81 traditional school districts was conducted 
over a two-month period from mid-July 2012 to mid-September 2012. The researcher 
used the protocol for analyses of artifacts (see Appendix D) to assess how school districts 
were updating their Internet safety policies in response to Web 2.0 safety issues and 
recent legislative mandates to educate minors about Internet safety, particularly Web 2.0 
safety. The researcher located school districts’ AUPs on their Web sites in most cases. If 
a school district’s online AUP was outdated or was not on the district Web site, the 
researcher contacted the district to request a copy. The data was quantified for 
presentation to show how schools have updated their AUPs to address Web 2.0 safety 
concerns. 
Data Analysis and Presentation 
This research sought to gain a deeper understanding of filtering and safety policy 
implementation in public K-12 schools. Data collected during the survey phase were 
analyzed using descriptive statistical methods, which provided an understanding of the 
nature of Internet safety policy implementation issues and their relationships. According 
to Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009), descriptive statistical methods include techniques for 
summarizing numeric data with tables, graphs, or single representations of a group of 
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scores in order to understand the data, detect trends and patterns, discover relationships 
between variables, and better communicate the results. The most appropriate data 
analysis methods for this study include frequency tables and graphic displays. Graphic 
displays and frequency tables coupled with accompanying summaries paint a realistic 
picture of safety policy implementation issues and their relationships.  
Follow-up qualitative interviews were conducted with a small number of SLMS. 
Data collected from interviews, which took place during the second phase, were 
thematically analyzed to provide a deeper understanding of filtering and safety policy 
issues and how they influence information access and instruction. This phase of the study 
revealed the manner in which policy issues influenced user access to Internet resources. 
Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009) state most qualitative analytic techniques involve 
generating emergent themes that evolve from the study of specific pieces of information 
that the investigator has collected. Interview notes were transcribed and color-coded to 
identify common themes and categories. Open-ended survey comment items were also 
thematically analyzed and combined with interview data. Thematic development 
facilitates comparisons among variables, thus leading to a better understanding of the 
research questions (Teddlie & Tashakkori).   
School districts’ AUPs were also analyzed to determine if they had been updated 
to address Web 2.0 safety concerns. Wording in the AUP was also examined for 
references to Internet safety education and whether they addressed cyber bullying 
awareness and response, chat room interactions, and social networking interactions. This 
data was quantified for presentation in table format. 
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Resources 
 Professional experience and expertise coupled with external resources contributed 
to this study. The investigator was a SLMS for 30 years and has experience facilitating 
access to information at all K-12 public school academic levels. Some of the 
investigator’s professional experience was in a filtered environment. This experience 
provided personal knowledge of some access issues that users encounter while accessing 
information in a filtered environment. 
 The Nova Southeastern University Library was the principal source of online and 
print resources relevant to the study. SCASL’s Listserv, individual school Web sites, and 
school district Web sites provided most of the email addresses of the target population. 
The target population of IT administrators and SLMS coupled with school districts’ 
AUPs were sources of data for the study. SurveyGizmo™, a Web-based survey 
development and hosting utility, allowed direct input of survey participants’ responses, 
while maintaining their anonymity. SurveyGizmo™ and Excel Data Analysis ToolPak 
were used for data analysis and presentation of the research results. 
Summary 
 In order to describe filtering/safety policy implementation and its influence on 
teaching and learning accurately, a mixed methods design was utilized. Quantitative 
methodology during the first phase included two surveys, one for SLMS and one for IT 
administrators. Additional data collection during the qualitative phase involved 
interviews with a small number of SLMS and an analysis of artifacts (AUPs). Expert 
review, pilot testing, and member checking was used to establish the validity and 
reliability of the data. The data were used to describe the manner in which filtering and 
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safety policies were being implemented, the issues users encountered as a result of 
filtering and safety policy implementation, measures used to address Web 2.0 safety 
issues, and the manner in which filtering and safety policies prevented access to resources 
necessary to attain 21st century communication and collaboration standards. 
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Chapter 4 
Results 
 
Introduction 
 This study was undertaken to investigate filtering and safety policy 
implementation in South Carolina’s public K-12 schools and its influence on teaching 
and learning. The study utilized a mixed methodology, in which both quantitative and 
qualitative data were collected to answer the following research questions: 
• How are filtering and safety policies being implemented in public schools? 
• What issues do SLMS encounter as they facilitate information access on filtered 
computers? 
• How are school districts addressing Web 2.0 safety issues?  
• In what ways do filtering policies impede access to information and resources 
necessary to achieve 21st century technology and information literacy standards? 
Quantitative data using an anonymous online survey questionnaire were gathered 
from SLMS and IT directors (or their designees) to gain a general understanding of 
filtering and safety policy implementation and how it influences information access. 
Subsequent one-on-one telephone interviews with five SLMS provided a deeper 
understanding of Internet safety practices and how these practices either impede or 
enhance information access. AUPs were also examined to determine whether districts 
were educating minors about Web 2.0 safety issues. The data collection instruments 
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contributed to a comprehensive depiction of filtering and safety policy implementation. 
This portrayal is presented from the perspective of stakeholders (IT administrators) with 
first-hand knowledge of safety policy development and implementation, and stakeholders 
(SLMS) with first-hand knowledge of how safety policies affect end users.  
The data analysis presented in this chapter summarizes the findings of the 
research. The researcher drew connections from Phase 1 data, the personal experiences 
and perceptions of the interviewees from Phase 2, and the AUP analysis. The researcher 
looked for interconnections among the data in order to portray accurately filtering and 
safety policy implementation and its effect on end users. To address the research 
questions, the investigator employed both quantitative and qualitative data. As Creswell 
and Plano Clark (2007) state: 
It is not enough to simply collect and analyze quantitative and qualitative data; 
they need to be “mixed” in some way so that together they form a more complete 
picture of the problem than they do when standing alone. (p.7) 
Analysis of both phases provided insight into the research questions. The data analysis 
and findings are presented in reference to each research question using frequency 
distribution tables, graphs, and relevant participant observations. 
Demographics and Filtering/Safety Policy Context 
 The SLMS survey was successfully delivered to 398 email addresses, which were 
obtained from public South Carolina school Web sites, SCASL’s listserv, and via 
telephone contact. One hundred twenty-three usable SLMS responses were submitted via 
SurveyGizmo’s™ website, constituting a 32% response rate. The IT survey was 
successfully delivered to 35 email addresses, which were obtained from school districts’ 
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Web sites and via telephone contact. Twenty-one usable IT responses were used in the 
analysis yielding a 60% response rate.  
At the beginning of each survey, demographic information was collected. The 
first SLMS survey item asked respondents to specify their job title and the academic level 
of the students they served. The first IT survey item asked respondents to provide their 
job title. In response to the job title question, 104 (84.5%) SLMS survey respondents 
specified media specialist or library media specialist, 15 (12%) specified librarian or 
teacher librarian, 1 (<1%) specified computer teacher, 1 (<1%) specified information 
technology specialist, and 1 (<1%) specified learning commons teacher as their job title 
(see Table 5). Thirteen (62%) of IT survey respondents claimed the title, director of 
technology or technology director, 2 (9.5%) stated technology coordinator, 1 (4.8%) 
stated chief financial and operations officer, 1 (4.8%) stated IT security manager, 1 
(4.8%) stated IT specialist, 1 (4.8%) stated infrastructure and support officer, 1 (4.8%) 
stated network tech, and 1 (4.8%) stated technology support in response to the job title 
question.  As Table 5 indicates, there were instances when the respondents’ job title was 
not, “SLMS” or “IT director.” However, in those instances the job title respondents 
provided was closely related to or synonymous with the job titles identified for the target 
population groups, “SLMS” and “IT director.” 
Table 5. Respondents' Job Titles 
Respondents’ Job Titles Population 
N=144 
N                   %                   
1a) SLMS Survey Respondents N=123  
Library Media Specialist/Media Specialist 104 84.5 
Librarian/Teacher Librarian 15 12 
Computer Teacher 1  <1% 
Information Technology Specialist 1 <1% 
Learning Commons Teacher 1 <1% 
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Respondents’ Job Titles Population 
N=144 
N                   %                   
No Response  1 <1% 
1) IT Survey Respondents N=21  
Director of Technology/Technology Director 13 62 
Technology Coordinator 2 9.5 
Chief Financial and Operation Officer 1 4.8 
IT Security Manager 1 4.8 
IT Specialist 1 4.8 
Infrastructure & Support Officer 1 4.8 
Network Tech 1 4.8 
Technology Support 1 4.8 
 
 To gain an overview of the academic levels SLMS respondents represented, they 
were asked to provide the academic level of the schools where they served. Academic 
level data is summarized in Table 6. The largest percentage of respondents, 38.2% 
(N=47), was elementary SLMS. Nineteen percent (N=23) were high school SLMS and 
19% (N=23) were middle school SLMS. Several respondents worked at schools with a 
combination of academic levels. Four percent (N=5) worked at combined middle/high 
schools, 8.1% (N=10) at combined elementary/middle schools, and 2.4% (N=3) at 
combined elementary/middle/high schools. Eight percent (N=10) of respondents did not 
respond to this item. One respondent (<1%) indicated “Master’s Degree” for this item, 
which suggests a misunderstanding of the question. Responses from SLMS who served 
only elementary level students were compared to those who served middle or high school 
students to determine if there was a difference in the information access issues they 
encountered. 
 
Table 5 (continued) 
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Table 6. Respondents' Academic Level 
1b) SLMS’ Academic Level Population 
N=123 
N               % 
High School (9-12) 23 19% 
Middle School (6-8) 23 19% 
Elementary (K-5) 47 38.2% 
Middle/High Combined 5 4% 
Elementary/Middle Combined 10 8.1% 
Elementary/Middle/ High Combined 3 2.4% 
No Response 10 8% 
Irrelevant Response 1 <1% 
 
 To establish a context for school districts’ filtering and safety policy 
implementation, the IT survey asked respondents whether their school districts 
participated in the federal E-rate program and what filtering product was utilized.  
Table 7. Filtering Products Used in School Districts 
Filtering Products  Population 
N=21 
N               % 
Lightspeed Systems 10 48% 
Barracuda 2 9.5% 
iPrism 2 9.5% 
Fortinet/Fortigate Web Filtering 2 9.5% 
CIPAFilter 1 4.8% 
Marshall 8e6 1 4.8% 
SmoothWall 1 4.8% 
SonicWall 1 4.8% 
SquidGuard 1 4.8% 
 
One hundred percent (N=21) were E-rate participants, and thus were required to filter 
Internet access and implement CIPA-compliant AUPs. Table 7 identifies the types of 
filtering products school districts were deploying, and reveals the number and percentage 
of districts in which the product is used. A review of each product’s Web site concluded 
that these filtering solutions provide a variety of Web security features including URL 
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filtering, gateway-based spyware and virus protection, application protocol blocking, 
such as IM and P2P, and HTTPS scanning. 
Research Question 1 
 Research Question 1 asked, “How are filtering and safety policies being 
implemented in public schools?” Several items on the IT survey, the SLMS survey, and 
the interview protocol addressed the question. Survey and interview items focused on 
three filtering and safety policy implementation issues (variables) that were identified in 
the literature review (see Table 4). These variables include content blocking 
considerations, stakeholder involvement in policy decisions, and differentiated access 
levels for specific user groups.  
Content Blocking Considerations 
Important filtering and safety policy implementation considerations include 
deciding what content should be blocked, the level of blocking within each content 
category, and whether to deploy the filter’s “out of the box” or default settings. Factors 
that influenced filtering and safety policy decisions included CIPA compliance, 
bandwidth preservation, non-educational network usage, potential litigation, network 
security, student safety, and community opinions. The IT survey, SLMS survey, and 
interview protocol items focused on these considerations.  
IT survey question 4 solicited responses regarding the content categories that 
were filtered and the level of filtering within those categories. Table 8 summarizes this 
data. Some survey respondents did not select an answer choice for each content category; 
therefore, the results show the frequency and percentages of survey participants who 
selected an answer choice.  
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CIPA requires school districts receiving E-rate discounts to block access to visual 
images that are obscene, contain child pornography, or are harmful to minors. One 
hundred percent (N=21) of school districts filtered adult/mature and pornography/nudity 
content as CIPA requires. Most school districts (95.2%, N=20) filtered all, and 4.8% 
(N=1) filtered some adult/mature and nudity/pornographic content. School districts 
filtered categories in addition to obscene content, including controversial and 
questionable content. Eighty-one percent (N=17) filtered all gambling content, 9.5% 
(N=2) filtered some, and 4.8% (N=1) filtered none. Most (77.8%, N=14) respondents 
filtered all alcohol/tobacco related content, 22.2% (N=4) filtered some, while 0% filtered 
none. All hate/racism content was filtered in 76.5% (N=13) of responding school 
districts, 17.6% (N=3) filtered some, and 5.9% (N=1) did not filter this content. All drug 
related content was filtered in 66.7% (N=12) of responding school districts, 33.3% (N=6) 
filtered some, and 0% filtered none. More than half of all respondents (66.7%, N=12) 
filtered all criminal/illegal content, 27.8% (N=5) filtered some, and 5.6% (N=1) filtered 
none of this content. Similarly, more than half (62.5%, N=10) filtered all cult/occult 
content, 25% (N=4) filtered some, and 12.5% (N=2) filtered none. All violent content 
was filtered in 53.3% (N=8) of school districts, 46.7% (N=7) filtered none, and 0% 
filtered none. Most (58.8%, N=10) filtered all weapon related content, 35.3% (N=6) 
filtered some, and 5.9% (N=1) filtered none of this Web content. A smaller percentage 
(46.2%, N=6) filtered all alternate lifestyles (LGBT) content, 38.5% (N=5) filtered some, 
and 15.4 (N=2) filtered none. Fewer than half (40%, N=6) filtered all intimate apparel 
and swimsuit content, 53.3% (N=8) filtered some, while 6.7% (N=1) filtered none. A 
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smaller percentage of respondents (20%, N=3) filtered the entire sex education category, 
66.7% (N=10) filtered some, and 13.3% (N=2) filtered none. 
Table 8. Filtered Content Categories 
Content Categories Filters 
All 
% 
N Filters 
some 
% 
N Filters 
 None 
% 
N Total 
Responses 
Adult/Mature 95.2 20 4.8 1 0.0 0 21 
Pornography/Nudity 95.2 20 4.8 1 0.0 0 21 
Alcohol/Tobacco 77.8 14 22.2 4 0.0 0 18 
Gambling 81.0 17 9.5 2 4.8 1 20 
Hate/Racism 76.5 13 17.6 3 5.9 1 17 
Drugs 66.7 12 33.3 6 0.0 0 18 
Criminal/Illegal 66.7 12 27.8 5 5.6 1 18 
Cult/Occult 62.5 10 25.0 4 12.5 2 16 
Violence 53.3 8 46.7 7 0.0 0 15 
Weapons 58.8 10 35.3 6 5.9 1 17 
Alternative Lifestyles 
(LGBT) 
46.2 6 38.5 5 15.4 2 13 
Intimate Apparel/Swimsuits 40.0 6 53.3 8 6.7 1 15 
Sex Education 20.0 3 66.7 10 13.3 2 15 
Hacking/Proxy Avoidance 84.2 16 10.5 2 5.3 1 19 
Malicious sites 83.3 15 16.7 3 0.0 0 18 
Internet Radio/TV 55.6 10 44.4 8 0.0 0 18 
Media downloads/file 
sharing 
46.7 7 53.3 8 0.0 0 15 
Telephony (VoIP) 36.4 4 45.5 5 18.2 2 11 
Social Networking 58.8 10 41.2 7 0.0 0 17 
Email/Chat/Instant 
Messaging 
50.0 7 50.0 7 0.0 0 14 
Blogs/Wikis 23.1 3 69.2 9 7.7 1 13 
 
 School districts also filtered content posing possible security threats and 
bandwidth consuming content. Most districts (84.2%, N=16) filtered all hacking and 
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proxy avoidance Web sites, 10.5% (N=2) filtered some, and 5.3% (N=1) filtered none. 
Similarly, 83.3% (N=15) filtered all malicious sites, 16.7 (N=3) filtered some, and 0% 
filtered none of this content. Bandwidth consuming content was also filtered in most 
school districts. More than half (55.6%, N=10) blocked all Internet radio and television 
sites, 44.4% (N=8) blocked some, 0% blocked none. Less than half (46.7%, N=7) 
blocked all media download and file sharing sites, 53.3% (N=8) blocked some, and 0% 
blocked none. A smaller percentage of respondents (36.4%, N=4) blocked all telephony 
(VoIP) Web sites, 45.5% (N=5) blocked some and 18.2% (N=2) blocked none.  
 Web sites that support communication and collaborative activities (Web 2.0) were 
filtered in some school districts. All social networking sites were filtered in 58.8% 
(N=10) of school districts, 41.2% (N=7) filtered some, and 0% filtered none. Fifty 
percent (N=7) filtered all email, chat, and instant messaging sites, 50% (N=7) filtered 
some, while 0% of respondents filtered none. Less than one-fourth (23.1%, N=3) filtered 
all blogs and wikis, 69.2% (N=9) filtered some, and 7.7% (N=1) filtered none of this 
content. 
IT survey questions 7a and 7b were asked to determine whether districts 
customized filter configurations to limit content over-blocking. When asked if the district 
used the filter’s default settings, 75% (N=15) of respondents answered no and 25% (N=5) 
answered yes. In response to item 7b, “when appropriate, the filter is configured to block 
specific sub-categories,” 95.2% (N=20) responded yes, and 4.8% (N=1) responded no.  
The literature review revealed several factors that influence content filtering 
decisions. To determine the extent to which these factors affected filtering and safety 
policy implementation decisions, IT survey respondents were asked to indicate the degree 
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to which specific factors influenced filtering decisions on a 1-5 point scale where 1 
represented no influence and 5 represented substantial influence. As seen in Table 9, 
Table 9. Factors Influencing Content Filtering Decisions 
Influencing Factors Mean SD Rank Total 
Responses 
CIPA Compliance 4.95 0.21 1 21 
Maintaining Student Safety 4.80 0.39 2 21 
Maintaining Network Security 4.76 0.44 3 21 
Preserving Bandwidth 4.38 0.65 4 21 
Preventing Litigation (Lawsuits) 4.23 0.97 5 21 
Preventing Non-educational Use 3.76 0.97 6 21 
Community or Parental Opinions 3.62 1.25 7 21 
 
CIPA compliance (M=4.95) exerted the greatest influence on policy decisions. However, 
school districts blocked considerably more content than CIPA requires. Student safety 
(M=4.80) and network security (M=4.76) exerted almost as much influence as CIPA 
compliance. The need to preserve bandwidth (M=4.38) and prevent litigation (M=4.23) 
were highly influential considerations as well. The importance of the foregoing factors 
may explain why most districts elected to block more content than CIPA compliance 
requires. Although still important, preventing non-educational use (M=3.76) and 
community or parental opinions (M=3.62) exerted less influence on policy decisions. The 
level of influence that each factor exerted on filtering and safety policy decisions was 
greater than the average mean (3). This implies each factor was an important 
consideration for policymakers. The relative importance of each of these factors to 
filtering decisions may explain why districts implemented restrictive filtering policies.   
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Figure 2. Who makes content filtering decisions? 
Stakeholder Involvement in Policy Decisions 
To ascertain the level of stakeholder involvement and influence in policy decision 
making, the data collection instruments included items focusing on stakeholder input in 
filtering policy decisions. IT survey item 5 and SLMS survey item 2 was asked to 
determine whether representatives from various stakeholder groups (i.e., teachers, 
students, parents, media specialists, administrators) were involved in filtering policy 
decisions. SLMS survey item 7a also asked if input from all stakeholders was considered 
when content filtering decisions were made. Question set 1 of the interview protocol 
asked participants to describe how stakeholders were involved in policy decisions and 
whether stakeholder involvement positively influenced information access and student 
safety. IT administrators’ and SLMS’ responses in Figure 2 suggest that most content 
blocking decisions were made by district-based personnel or left to the software 
developer. Ninety percent (N=18) of IT respondents and 41.8% (N=51) of SLMS stated  
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that district administrators decided what content should be blocked. Sixty-five percent 
(N=13) of IT respondents and 70.5% (N=86) of SLMS said the filtering product made 
content filtering decisions because the product’s default settings were used. A similar 
proportion of respondents, 75% (N=15) of the IT group and 71.3% (N=87) of media 
specialists, replied that IT staff decided what content was filtered. Conversely, survey 
responses suggest school boards (1.6%, N=2 /SLMS, 20%, N=4/ IT respondents), 
stakeholder committees (6.6%, N=8 /SLMS, 15%, N=3/ IT respondents), media 
specialists (6.6%, N=8 /SLMS, 15%, N=3/ IT respondents), and other groups (5.7%, 
N=7/SLMS, 15%, N=3/ IT respondents) were minimally involved in filtering decisions. 
Additionally, when SLMS survey item 7a asked whether input from all stakeholders was 
considered when content filtering decisions were made, 50% (N=58) said no, 40.5% 
(N=47) were not sure, and 9.5% (N=11) said yes. 
A thematic analysis of open-ended survey comments and interview data provided 
additional insight into stakeholder involvement in filtering and safety policy decisions. 
Lack of stakeholder involvement was a major theme that emerged from participant 
comments. Interviewee 1 recalled being involved in AUP development at an earlier time, 
but indicated SLMS were no longer involved the process. Interviewee 4 broadened 
stakeholder noninvolvement to students and parents when she stated, “There is no 
involvement. Students and parents have no say so whatsoever.”  
Respondent statements reveal some districts’ filtering policy decision making was 
largely done in the technology department without the involvement of other stakeholders. 
Interviewee 3 indicated the technology department made most filtering and safety policy 
decisions when she stated, “All that (filtering/safety policy decisions) is handled in the 
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technology department at the district level….We have no input at this point.” An SLMS 
survey respondent expressed stronger sentiment regarding technology administrators’ 
control of technology policy decision making in the following comment:  
Our IT director makes all of these decisions single-handedly. She would say that 
she gets input from our district administration, but she is the one who tells them 
about content blocking and is their sole source of information on this topic (SLMS 
survey comment). 
Some districts attempted to get input from stakeholders; however, these attempts 
were unsuccessful because of ineffective implementation. One SLMS survey respondent 
commented that when the district attempted to involve a committee of stakeholders in the 
decision making process, IT staff with no teaching experience ultimately decided what 
content was blocked. Another SLMS survey respondent commented that the district’s 
committee did not include K-2 teachers. Consequently, filtering policies continued to 
block educational sites for younger students, such as Cyberchase™ and PBSKids™. The 
aforementioned comments suggest a committee of stakeholders is not a panacea for the 
issues that evolve from filtering and safety policy implementation, particularly when the 
committee’s recommendations are disregarded or when the committee is not 
representative of all end users. 
 Even when respondents indicated stakeholders were involved in technology 
policy decisions, this involvement was limited mostly to submitting blocking and 
unblocking requests. For example, an IT survey respondent commented that all 
employees were “empowered to identify and report” inappropriate sites to IT and these 
sites would be blocked immediately. In response to the stakeholder involvement inquiry, 
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Interviewee 2 reported that parents and students could report concerns or requests to 
unblock Web sites to school staff, and these requests would then go directly to the district 
office. Interviewee 2 added that when teachers and media specialists voiced their 
opinions about online content that should be unblocked; the district was receptive to these 
requests because teachers and media specialists were viewed as professionals who would 
only submit unblocking requests for educational content. 
  Some participants’ comments suggest end users should be more involved in 
Internet use policy decisions. Interviewee 1 stated, “We’re in the trenches, we’re using 
the resources. It makes perfect sense that we are involved in establishing the guidelines 
that govern the use of the resources.” Interviewee 4 also thought the district should seek 
input from students and teachers about content that should be blocked.  
 The aforementioned interview participant statements and survey respondent 
comments provided a deeper understanding of stakeholder involvement in filtering and 
safety policy deliberations. Survey and interview data suggest stakeholder involvement in 
Internet use policy decisions was minimal, limited mostly to submitting requests to block 
or unblock content. This data also provides insight into the access issues that arise when 
end users are not involved in filtering and safety policy deliberations.  
Differentiated Access Levels 
 Filtering products typically allow customization of filter settings for specific user 
groups to increase access to information and educational resources. IT survey item 7e and 
SLMS survey item 7d asked whether distinct access levels had been set for different user 
groups such as elementary students, secondary students, and staff. Table 10 summarizes 
survey data about differentiated access implementation. When asked if differentiated 
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access had been implemented, 47.5% (N=56) of SLMS said yes, 36.4 (N=43) said no, 
and 16.1% (N=19) were unsure, while 76.2% (N=16) of IT administrators said yes, 
23.8% (N=5) said no, and none were unsure. Substantially more IT administrators than 
SLMS reported that differentiated access levels had been implemented. One explanation 
of the discrepancy between SLMS’ responses and IT administrators’ responses could be 
that SLMS were unaware differentiated access policies had been implemented.  
Table 10. Implementation of Differentiated Access Levels 
Data Source SLMS 
N=118 
% 
IT 
N=21 
% 
(Survey item 7e (IT) and 7d (SLMS) 
Different Access levels have been established for specific user groups  
Yes 47.5 76.2 
No 36.4 23.8 
Not Sure 16.1 0.0 
 
Analysis of survey comments and interviewee comments suggest that 
differentiated access levels were established mostly for staff in some school districts. 
Access levels were rarely differentiated according to student age levels. For instance, an 
SLMS survey respondent reported that staff and students had different access levels, but 
there was no difference for any student levels. In another district, teacher and staff logins 
allowed them to access streaming video and other “coached” sites temporarily. Some 
districts implemented different access levels in addition to time of day restrictions. In 
these instances survey respondents reported that teachers could only access 
TeacherTube™ and YouTube™ before and after school. Finally, another SLMS survey 
respondent commented that different access levels had been discussed, but the respondent 
was uncertain whether differentiated access levels had been implemented.  
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Interview participant statements about differentiated access levels were similar to 
survey participant comments and suggest staff and students had different access levels, 
but students, regardless of age level, had the same access privileges. Interviewee 4 
commented that SLMS could “roam at will,” but teachers could not access Web sites 
such as YouTube™. Interviewee 5 specified that different access levels had been 
established for teachers and students. Teachers could access Facebook™ and 
YouTube™, but students were unable to access these Web sites. Interview and survey 
data suggest differentiated access levels were implemented in some school districts, but 
access levels were not tailored to meet the unique information needs of all user groups.  
Research Question 2 
Research question 2 asked, “What issues do SLMS encounter as they facilitate 
information access on filtered computers?”  To address this research question, the data 
collection instruments focused on filtering issues that were identified in the literature (see 
Table 4). To determine the scope of these issues and the way in which they affected 
teaching and learning, data was collected about filter over-blocking frequency, under-
blocking frequency, filter effectiveness, specific types of blocked educational content, 
and the efficiency of unblocking procedures.  
Over-blocking and Under-blocking 
 Over-blocking and under-blocking are inherent issues with all Internet filtering 
tools. To gauge the frequency of these filtering issues, IT survey item 9a and 9b asked 
respondents how often they received requests during a typical week to block 
inappropriate content and to unblock educational content that had been blocked 
inadvertently. SLMS survey item 5a and 5b asked how often the filter permitted access to 
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objectionable content (under-blocking) during a typical week and how often it prevented 
access to educational content during a typical week.  
According to Table 11, 4.8% (N=1) of IT respondents never received requests to 
block inappropriate content, 47.6% (N=10) rarely received requests to block 
inappropriate content, 42.9 (N=9) sometimes received requests to block inappropriate 
content, and 4.8% (N=1) frequently received requests to block inappropriate content.  
Table 11. Over-blocking and Under-blocking Frequency 
Survey Item Never 
% 
Rarely 
% 
Sometimes 
% 
Frequently 
% 
IT Survey Item 9                                               Total Responses (N=21) 
During a typical week, how often do you (or the person responsible for 
blocking/unblocking content) receive requests to: 
a) block inappropriate content 
 
4.8 
N=1 
47.6 
N=10 
42.9 
N=9 
4.8 
N=1 
 
b) unblock educational content 
that has been unintentionally 
blocked 
0.0 
N=0 
15 
N=3 
70.0 
N=14 
15.0 
N=3 
SLMS Survey Item 5                                         Total Responses (N=120) 
During a typical week, how often does the filter:  
a) Permit access to 
objectionable content 
16.7 
N=20 
55.0 
N=66 
24.2 
N=29 
4.2 
N=5 
 
b) Prevent access to 
information/resources that 
support educational, 
professional, or personal 
growth 
3.3 
N=4 
15.0 
N=18 
41.7 
N=50 
40.0 
N=48 
 
When asked how often they received requests to unblock educational content that the 
filter had blocked inadvertently, 0.0% stated never, 15% (N=3) stated rarely, 70% (N=14) 
stated sometimes, and 15% (N=3) stated frequently. When asked how often the filter 
permitted access to objectionable content, 16.7% (N=20) of SLMS replied never, 55% 
(N=66) replied rarely, 24.2% (N=29) said sometimes, and 4.2% (N=5) replied frequently. 
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When asked how often the filter prevented access to information/resources that support 
educational, professional, or personal growth, 3.3% (N=4) responded never, 15% (N=18) 
responded rarely, 41.7% (N=50) responded sometimes and 40% (N=48) responded 
frequently. Less than 30% of SLMS respondents reported under-blocking, which suggests 
that under-blocking is less of filtering issue than over-blocking. More than 80% of SLMS 
sometimes or frequently encountered over-blocking of educational content, which implies 
that over-blocking was a more pervasive filtering issue.   
 To assess further the effectiveness of implemented filtering solutions, IT survey 
items 10a and 10b, plus SLMS survey item 6 asked respondents to rate the filter’s 
efficacy in blocking inappropriate content and permitting access to educational content. 
Regarding the filter’s effectiveness in blocking inappropriate content, 14.3% (N=3) of IT 
administrators responded very ineffective, 4.8% (N=1) responded somewhat ineffective, 
9.5% (N=2) responded somewhat effective, and 71.4% (N=15) responded very effective. 
In response to item 10b, which asked IT respondents to rate the filter’s effectiveness in 
permitting access to educational content, 9.5% (N=2) rated it very ineffective, 9.5% 
(N=2) somewhat ineffective, 19% (N=4) somewhat effective, and 61.9% (N=13) very 
effective. SLMS survey item 6 asked, “Considering the filter’s over-blocking and under-
blocking efficiency, how would you rate the filter’s overall effectiveness?” In response, 
8.3% (N=10) of SLMS replied very ineffective, 15.8% (N=19) replied somewhat 
ineffective, 13.3% (N=16) replied neutral, 45.8% (N=55) replied somewhat effective, 
while 16.7% (N=20) replied very effective. A comparison of IT and SLMS responses 
reveals that more than 80% (N=17) of IT respondents rated filter efficacy as either 
somewhat effective or very effective, while a smaller percentage (52.5%, N=75) of 
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SLMS rated filter efficacy as somewhat effective or very effective. This indicates that 
end users were less satisfied with the filtering products deployed in school districts than 
the individuals who deployed them.  
 Filters are implemented to protect minors from deliberately or unintentionally 
accessing inappropriate content, but under-blocking and filter circumvention sometimes 
hinder technology protection measures from protecting minors. Item 8c asked SLMS 
whether they agreed that the district’s filtering solution prevented users from deliberately 
(circumvention) or unintentionally (under-blocking) accessing inappropriate content. In 
response to this item, 1.7% (N=2) strongly disagreed, 6.8% (N=8) disagreed, 63.6% 
(N=75) agreed, 22.9% (N=27) strongly agreed, and 5.1% (N=6) were neutral. This data 
suggests content filtering protects students from most inappropriate content. 
Although, most respondents believed filters adequately protected students, 
interview participant comments convey the context of filter circumvention and under-
blocking in public schools. Interview participant comments show that filter 
circumvention was more of an issue in the secondary school setting. When secondary 
SLMS interviewees were asked whether they were aware of instances when students 
bypassed the filter to access blocked content, their responses suggest filter circumvention 
was a common occurrence at the secondary level. Interviewee 1 was not sure of the 
correct terminology to describe how students circumvented the filter. Students knew how 
to “infiltrate” or “debug” the filter, according to Interviewee 1. Moreover, students tried 
to “fake it out” (the filter) so they would have more access rights than they were 
supposed to. Interviewee 4 said students circumvented the filter “all the time.” Before the 
district began blocking proxy avoidance sites, students would type “proxy” in as a 
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Google™ search to find directions for circumventing blocked content. Even though the 
district began blocking access to proxy avoidance Web sites, Interviewee 4 reported 
students had figured out how to get around the filter to access YouTube™ videos. In fact, 
students had shared this circumvention tactic with teachers who were using it to access 
YouTube™ videos for instructional purposes. Similarly, Interviewee 5 recounted that 
students circumvented the filter “on a weekly basis.” Instead of being a tool to protect 
students, Interviewee 5 believed the filter provided “a personal challenge” for some 
students to discover ways to outsmart the filter. 
When elementary SLMS were asked whether they were aware of students 
bypassing the filter, Interviewee 2 commented, “No, not in elementary school. They can’t 
figure that out yet.” Similarly, Interviewee 3 replied, “I’m sure middle school and high 
school students are savvier, but personally, I’ve not had any problems.” These statements 
imply that filter circumvention is more of an issue at the secondary level than at the 
elementary grade level. 
 Regarding filter under-blocking, Table 11 shows that almost half (47.7%, N=10) 
of IT respondents indicated they sometimes or frequently received requests to block 
inappropriate content. This suggests that filters cannot completely protect minors from 
inappropriate content and must be supplemented by other safety measures. Interviewees 
provided under-blocking scenarios when asked if they could give specific instances when 
under-blocking adversely influenced instruction or student safety. Interviewee 1 
described under-blocking issues perceived to be the result of policymakers’ failure to 
involve school-based staff in policy decisions. Although school-based staff had asked for 
Google™ images to be blocked, they were not blocked. As a result, students accessed 
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inappropriate images several times a week. Interviewee 1 described a particularly 
disruptive incident when a student typed in a pornographic actress’ name, accessed 
numerous pornographic images of her, and printed them. Interviewee 4 described less 
disruptive under-blocking situations. Under-blocking mostly resulted in students 
accessing “borderline inappropriate” content at Interviewee 4’s school. Examples of 
inappropriate access included a student who visited a chat room and used inappropriate 
terms to describe himself while in the chat room. “The worse thing I’ve seen” according 
to Interviewee 4, “is kids looking at pictures of local prisoners.” The aforementioned 
under-blocking scenarios along with survey data suggest under-blocking was not as 
pervasive as over-blocking, but when it occurs, it can disrupt the educational setting. 
These under-blocking incidents further underscore that filters cannot entirely prevent 
students from deliberately or inadvertently accessing inappropriate online content. 
 Survey item 3 asked SLMS to select the types of educational content the district’s 
filtering solution over-blocked. This item, which asked respondents to select all content 
that applied, was asked to ascertain how filtering policy decisions impact learning and 
information access. Figure 3 shows that 18.8% (N=22) of SLMS selected business and 
finance, 58.1% (N=68) selected controversial content (i.e., alternative lifestyles, hate 
groups, cults, occult), 45.3% (N=53) selected educational games, 52.1% (N=61), selected 
health and sex education, 25.6% (N=30) selected sports and recreation, 84.6% (N=99) 
selected streaming media (i.e. YouTube, UStream.tv, Internet radio), 35.9% (N=42) 
selected virtual worlds, 45.3% (N=53) selected visual images, 66.7% (N=78) selected 
Web 2.0 (i.e. wikis, blogs, social bookmarking tools), and 16.2% selected other, which 
included topics such as popular culture, entertainment, shopping/marketing, and travel 
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information . The majority of respondents (more than 50%) encountered blocked 
streaming media, health and sex education Web sites, controversial content, and Web 2.0 
resources, which implies that filter settings prevented users from accessing a substantial 
amount of educational content. 
 
Figure 3. Over-blocked content. 
 SLMS survey items 8a and 8b served to investigate further the influence of over-
blocking on teaching and learning. Item 8a asked SLMS to specify the extent of their 
agreement with the following statement: “The Internet filter prevents instructional staff 
from accessing resources needed for instructional or professional activities.” Four SLMS 
(3.4%) strongly disagreed, 21.2% (N=25) disagreed, 50.8% (N=60) agreed, 14.4% 
(N=17) strongly agreed, and 10.2% (N=12) were neutral about this statement. Item 8b 
asked SLMS to select the extent of their agreement with the following statement: “The 
Internet filter prevents students from accessing information and resources needed for 
classroom assignments.” Seven SLMS (5.9%) strongly disagreed with this statement, 
28% (N=33) disagreed, 40.7% (N=48) agreed, 8.5% (N=10) strongly agreed, and 16.9% 
(N=20) were neutral about this statement. More SLMS (65.2%, N=77) agreed or strongly 
agreed that filtering policies blocked access to instructional resources than SLMS 
(24.6%, N=29) who disagreed or strongly disagreed that filters blocked access to 
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instructional resources. Similarly, a greater proportion of SLMS (49.2%, N=58) agreed or 
strongly agreed that filtering policies blocked student access to educational resources 
while a lesser proportion disagreed or strongly disagreed (33.9%, N=40). This data 
suggests that district filtering policies were having an adverse influence on information 
access for many end users, including instructional staff and students. 
 Interviewees’ statements provide additional evidence of how over-blocking 
influenced end user access to educational content. Interview participants were asked 
whether they believed over-blocking adversely influenced student or teacher access to 
educational resources. They were also asked to provide specific examples of when over-
blocking prevented students from accessing resources needed for assignments or teachers 
from accessing resources needed for instruction or professional development. 
Interviewees’ observations featured instances when over-blocking prevented 
teachers from implementing lesson plans. Interviewee 5 reported that teachers often 
develop lesson plans at home, but when they get to school, the Web site they need is 
blocked. It was impossible to unblock Web sites immediately in Interview 5’s district 
because the unblocking process required about 24 hours. Interviewee 1 recounted a 
personal experience when a request to unblock a Holocaust Web site was denied. After 
preparing at home to teach a lesson that required taking students to a Holocaust Web site, 
the SLMS recalled that the site was blocked at school. The unblocking process entailed 
submitting a request to the principal who then forwarded the request to the IT director. 
After almost four weeks, the IT director informed Interviewee 1, via the principal that the 
images of emaciated bodies on the site were too graphic for students; therefore, the 
unblocking request was denied. Interviewee 1 expressed the kind of frustrations some 
teachers feel when someone without classroom experience disregards their professional 
opinion about what is appropriate for students when she stated, “It’s upsetting that they 
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don’t respect my professional integrity.” Administrators restricted access to content for 
reasons other than inappropriateness of the content. Interviewee 5 related how over-
blocking resulted from using filters to manage bandwidth when she stated, “For a while, 
the teachers and everybody, we were blocked from streaming video sites because of 
bandwidth problems.”   
Interviewee observations suggest over-blocking adversely affected educators’ 
inclination to incorporate innovative online resources into classroom instruction. 
Interviewee 4 described a time when she tried to convince a “techy” teacher to 
incorporate an innovative online resource into his lessons. The teacher’s response was “I 
gave up on that a long time ago because so much stuff is blocked.” Interviewee 4 
described another instance when over-blocking prevented educators from using an online 
resource. The SLMS stated, “Once I was at a conference and I learned about using 
Google Earth™ for ‘lit trips.’ I emailed some of my teachers about it from the 
conference. One [teacher] replied, ‘I just tried it and it was blocked.’” These observations 
illustrate how over-blocking can limit integration of Web-based technology. Moreover, 
end user frustration about over-blocking was evident when Interviewee 4 commented, 
“I’ve talked to teachers and some feel like many Web sites shouldn’t be blocked in the 
first place.”  
Interviewee observations describe how over-blocking adversely influenced 
students’ ability to complete assignments. Interviewee 5 suggested, “It’s hard for students 
to complete assignments if they can’t get to the online resources they need.” Furthermore, 
Interviewee 5 was concerned that over-blocking exacerbated the digital divide between 
students with home Internet access and students without home Internet access when 
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asserting, “The students with home Internet access just go home and access the sites that 
are blocked at school. The students without home access just can’t get to it. It’s like we’re 
back to the haves and have-nots.” Interview 4 observed that the filter prevented students 
from searching for breast cancer information because it blocked Web sites that included 
the word “breast.” The SLMS also described how students were unable to insert a Web-
based image into a PowerPoint presentation because the download capability had been 
disabled. Interviewee 5 recalled a time when several students were doing research on the 
history of gaming and many of the gaming Web sites were blocked. Consequently, these 
students were unable to complete their research at school. Over-blocking negatively 
affected student research at all levels, including elementary students. Conducting research 
on filtered computers involved “a lot of trial and error,” according to Interviewee 3, an 
elementary SLMS. Interviewee 3 related an over-blocking incident involving a 5th grader 
who had been conducting research at home on an immigration Web site, but when the 
student tried to access the same Web site at school, it was blocked.  
The aforementioned over-blocking scenarios provide a deeper understanding of 
the types of information filters over-block. They also describe how over-blocking 
adversely affected lesson planning, completion of student assignments, the digital divide, 
and limited opportunities for educators to incorporate innovative Web based technologies 
in their lessons.  
Unblocking Procedures 
 The literature review revealed that the adverse effects of filter over-blocking 
could be minimized with efficient unblocking procedures. The data collection 
instruments included several items about school districts’ unblocking practices and 
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procedures to determine how effectively they minimized the adverse effects of over-
blocking. IT and SLMS survey items asked whether filter settings could be adjusted to 
unblock educational content, what staff had been granted override privileges to unblock 
content, whether users were informed of unblocking procedures, and how efficiently the 
procedures allowed access to over-blocked educational content. To gain a deeper 
understanding of unblocking procedures and their impact on end users, interview 
participants were asked to describe their district’s unblocking procedures and whether 
unblocking procedures impeded or facilitated information access.  
  Table 12. Content Unblocking Configuration 
IT Survey Item 7c 
Filter settings can be overridden or adjusted to access educational content that 
has been blocked unintentionally. 
 % N 
Yes 95.2 20 
No 4.8 1 
Not Sure 0.0 0 
 
The literature review confirms that fine-tuning capability is a key feature for 
effective filtering solutions, and should be implemented to provide maximum information 
access. IT survey item 7c (see Table 12) asked respondents whether filter settings could 
be overridden or adjusted to permit access to blocked educational content. Twenty 
(95.2%) responded yes and 4.8% (N=1) responded no, and no respondent was unsure. 
Configuring filters so that on-campus staff can override the filter creates a more efficient 
unblocking process according to the literature review. IT survey item 7f and SLMS 
survey item 7b (see Table 13) asked participants whether filter override privileges had 
been granted to designated on-campus staff. Thirty-four (29.1%) of SLMS replied yes, 
65% (N=76) replied no, and 6.0% (N=7) were unsure if someone on campus had been 
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granted filter override privileges. Fourteen (66.7%) IT respondents indicated that filter 
bypass privileges had been granted, 33.3% (N=7) replied no, and no IT respondent was 
unsure about this item.  
   Table 13. Filter Override Privileges and Blocked Page Notification 
Survey item 7f (IT) and 7b (SLMS) 
Filter override privileges have been granted for designated on-campus staff 
(i.e., administrators, media  specialists, technology specialists)  
  SLMS 
Responses 
IT 
Responses 
 %                           N % N 
Yes 29.1 34 66.7 14 
No 65.0 76 33.3 7 
Not Sure 6.0 7 0.0 0 
Survey item 7d (IT), 7c (SLMS)     
When users encounter blocked content, the blocked page notification 
instructs users how to get the content unblocked.                                                                            
 %                           N % N 
Yes 53.4 63 95.2 20 
No 39.8 47 4.8 1 
Not Sure 6.8 8 0.0 0 
 
Compared to IT respondents (66.7%), a much smaller proportion of SLMS 
(29.1%) said filter override privileges had been granted to on-campus staff. One possible 
explanation of the disparity between SLMS and IT responses may be that some SLMS 
were unaware that override privileges had been granted to on-campus staff. In some 
circumstances, even though school-based staff was given override privileges, extenuating 
circumstances sometime delayed access to blocked content. One SLMS survey 
respondent explained that each school was given a filter override password. However, the 
respondent stated, “Sometimes the password will allow the user access; sometimes it 
won't, resulting in an educator sending an email to the technology office to get the Web 
site unblocked.” 
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 SLMS survey item 7c and IT survey item 7d (see Table 13) asked respondents 
whether the blocked page notification instructed users how to get blocked content 
unblocked. In response to this item, 53.4% (N=63) of SLMS answered yes, 39.8% 
(N=47) answered no, and 6.8% (N=8) were unsure. Twenty (95.2%) IT administrators 
answered yes, 4.8% (N=1) answered no, and there were no IT respondents unsure about 
this item. A smaller percentage of SLMS (53.4%, N=63) said the blocked page 
notification instructed users how to get blocked content unblocked than IT administrators 
(95.2%, N=20). The discrepancy between IT administrators’ and  SLMS’ responses for 
this item implies unblocking instructions might not have been adequately explained or 
may not have been perceptible to end users on the blocked content notification page. 
Interviewee 4’s comments support this conclusion. The SLMS stated, “I don’t know that 
people are told how to get something unblocked. The link on the blocked page is very 
subtle. The unblocking process is not well known.”  
 Several IT directors and SLMS survey participants submitted comments 
describing unblocking procedures that had been implemented. Most unblocking 
procedures required end users to submit a request to unblock content. For example, one 
SLMS survey respondent wrote, “In order to get a site unblocked we have to submit a 
technology work order,” and another commented, “We can ask for sites to be unblocked.” 
Some districts’ unblocking procedures allowed users to submit unblocking requests 
directly from the blocked page by clicking on a link. In some cases, direct input from the 
blocked page allowed immediate access to blocked content. One IT survey respondent 
wrote, “When a site is blocked, a request form can be completed at that moment. The 
request comes to me and it is unblocked immediately if [the site is] a legitimate site. If 
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[there is] a question, the superintendent is contacted.” In other cases, access to blocked 
content was delayed even when users submitted unblocking requests via a link on the 
blocked page, as the following IT respondent explanation illustrates:  
[When] users (student or staff) receive a blocked page, they can enter the request 
to unblock. The Lightspeed Company checks the site to see if it is in the correct 
category and often changes it, which allows access. It takes 2-4 hours. The 
following day upper level district IT checks the list of blocked sites and manually 
approves or denies the request. In any case, an email is sent to the requester 
explaining the action taken. (IT Respondent Comment) 
The aforesaid unblocking process delayed access to content because the unblocking 
request went through multiple bureaucratic layers (Lightspeed and district IT staff). 
Cumbersome unblocking processes were evident in other IT respondents’ explanations as 
well. For example, an IT respondent explained that unblocking requests were sent via 
“email from an administrator to the director of IT.” 
SLMS also described cumbersome unblocking procedures requiring requests to be 
sent through multiple bureaucratic layers. These procedures likely lead to delays in 
accessing blocked content. One SLMS commented, “Media specialists can forward 
requests from teachers to the IT staff to request that specific sites be unblocked.” Another 
SLMS commented, “If something needs to be unblocked at the school level, we tell our 
principal and he/she requests that it be unblocked.” Survey respondent comments suggest 
protracted delays also resulted when technology administrators were too busy with other 
duties to unblock sites. Another SLMS survey respondent wrote, “[We have] very limited 
override. There are unblocking instructions, but our Tech administrator is too 
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overwhelmed to have the time to unblock sites.” Another SLMS survey respondent 
stated, “We have to submit a request to the IT department to unblock a site. That process 
takes 2-4 weeks.” 
SLMS survey comments such as “Faculty members can request IT unblock 
specific sites,” and “Teachers and other district employees can send requests to have Web 
sites unblocked,” suggest some districts only permitted staff members to submit 
unblocking requests. However, a few districts accepted requests from any user as the 
following survey comment suggests: “Any user can submit requests to have sites 
unblocked and any user can recommend that sites be blocked.” Although users 
encountered delays in accessing blocked content, survey comments suggest most 
unblocking requests were granted. A SLMS commented, “….requests are usually 
honored,” and another stated, “If a site we want to use is blocked, we can request it be 
unblocked and it usually is.” 
An analysis of interviewee observations revealed themes similar to those that 
emerged from SLMS’ survey comments about districts’ unblocking procedures. 
Interviewees described similar impediments to accessing blocked educational content. 
Their statements indicate some end users were required to go through multiple 
bureaucratic layers, experienced long delays, or were uncertain about unblocking 
procedures.  
Interviewee 1 and Interviewee 5 described unblocking procedures requiring 
requests to be sent through multiple bureaucratic layers. Interviewee 5 reported, “If 
someone emails the principal the Web site to be unblocked, she emails someone at the 
district office who looks at the site, then emails the principal, and she emails back to 
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you.” Interviewee 1 described similar procedures when she stated, “When something is 
blocked by the filter, I submit a request to the principal, and he submits the request to the 
director of IT.” Interviewee 1’s observation that waiting “as long as four weeks to get 
something unblocked” suggests these cumbersome procedures resulted in substantial 
delays in accessing blocked content. Similarly, Interviewee 5 suggested the districts’ 
unblocking procedures were inefficient when stating, “Our access policies are 
inconvenient; it takes longer than it should to get something unblocked.”  
 Interviewee 2 and Interviewee 3, who were elementary SLMS, expressed less 
frustration about unblocking procedures than the secondary interview participants 
(Interviewee 1, 4, & 5). Elementary interview participants’ comments indicate approval 
of their districts’ unblocking procedures, despite having to wait several days for content 
to be unblocked. Their statements suggested that unblocking procedures permitted timely 
access to blocked content. For instance, Interviewee 2 stated, “It takes less than a week to 
unblock a Web site….There’s great turnaround time.” Similarly, Interviewee 3 
commented, “This is a good process. I’ve never had to wait more than two days.” In 
Interviewee 2’s district, instructional staff contacted the help desk to submit unblocking 
requests. Interviewee 2 expressed approval of the unblocking process when she stated, 
“They look at requests on a daily basis. They know we’re professionals, that if we ask for 
something to be unblocked, that obviously we need it. I haven’t heard of anything not 
being unblocked.” Interviewee 3, who also believed her district’s unblocking procedures 
were efficient, described an unblocking process that required users to click on a blocked 
page link to access an unblocking request form. As part of the request, users were 
required to provide the rationale as to why the requested Web site should be unblocked. 
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Elementary SLMS’ willingness to tolerate the inconvenience of delayed access to 
blocked content may reflect their perspective that younger students are especially 
susceptible to indecent content and should have more restricted online access. This 
perspective was evident when Interviewee 3 commented, “Middle school and high school 
students may have the right to access more, but honestly I’m in elementary school, I’m 
still concerned about what’s inappropriate.” 
Interviewee statements also indicate some end users may have been uncertain 
about unblocking procedures. According to Interviewee 4, there was an imperceptible 
link on the blocked page that provided unblocking instructions. The unblocking process, 
which took about one day, entailed sending an “email to a guy over a bunch of 
technicians.” Since the unblocking link was not easily discernible, the SLMS stated, “I 
don’t know how well it’s [unblocking process] known.”  
Most survey and interview respondents described unblocking procedures that 
required users to submit a request and wait for content to be unblocked, sometimes for up 
to four weeks. To gain a better portrayal of how long users waited for content to be 
unblocked, SLMS survey item 4 asked participants how long users typically waited for 
unblocking requests to be granted. Figure 4 shows that in response to this survey item, 
2.5% (N=3) selected immediately unblocked, 12.4% (N=15) selected less than 1 hour, 
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Figure 4. Timeliness of unblocking procedures. 
14% (N=17) selected several hours, 30.6% (N=37) selected 1-2 days, 10.7% (N=13) 
selected 3-4 days, 5% (N=6) selected 1-2 weeks, 1.7% (N=2) selected 3-4 weeks, and 
4.1% (N=5) selected more than a month. Figure 4 also shows that <1% (N=1) selected 
content cannot be unblocked and 18.2% (N=22) were unsure how long it took to unblock 
content. One explanation for the “not sure” selection could be that end users were not 
aware that content could be unblocked or had never submitted a request to unblock 
content. A large portion of respondents (66.6%) waited several hours or more to access 
blocked content, which meant blocked content was inaccessible at the point when end 
users needed it. 
 SLMS survey item 8d provided additional data about the efficiency of unblocking 
procedures. To assess further the efficiency of unblocking procedures, SLMS were asked 
whether they agreed that filter override procedures allowed timely access to blocked 
resources and information. In response to this item, 7.7% (N=9) strongly disagreed, 
27.4% (N=32) disagreed, 35% (N=42) agreed, and 7.7% (N=9) strongly agreed that filter 
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override procedures allowed timely access to blocked content, while 22.2% (N=26) were 
neutral about the timeliness of unblocking procedures. Despite delays, more respondents 
(42.7%) agreed than disagreed (35.1%) that unblocking procedures provided timely 
access to blocked content. This suggests that many SLMS accepted delayed access to 
blocked content as an inevitable outcome of educators’ obligation to protect students 
from online indecency. 
Research Question 3 
 Research question 3 asked, “How are school districts addressing Web 2.0 safety 
issues?” To answer this research question, the investigator analyzed districts’ AUPs to 
determine how they have been adjusted in response to Web 2.0 safety concerns and 
legislative mandates. SLMS and IT survey questions focused on the implementation of 
Internet safety education programs to address specific Web 2.0 safety issues. SLMS were 
also asked their opinions about the effectiveness of Internet safety approaches such as 
Internet safety education.  
Safety Policy Adjustments in Response to Web 2.0 Safety Issues 
 The investigator reviewed safety policies (AUPs) from 80 of 81 traditional school 
districts in South Carolina to determine whether AUPs were addressing Web 2.0 safety 
issues via Internet safety education. The Protecting Children in the 21st Century Act 
(2008) required E-rate recipients to educate minors about Web 2.0 safety issues including 
interacting with other individuals on social networking Web sites and in chat rooms and 
cyber bullying awareness and response. The FCC required E-rate participants to include 
the Web 2.0 education provision in their safety policies by July1, 2012. Safety policies 
were examined to determine when they were last updated and for references to Web 2.0 
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safety issues, and for references to educating minors about Web 2.0 safety issues. Table 
14 summarizes the data resulting from the safety policy analysis. 
The safety policy analysis revealed that 66.6% (N=53) of school districts had 
updated their safety policies during the last three years (2010-2012), but only 45% 
(N=36) had updated them to include references to educating minors about Web 2.0 safety 
issues including interacting on social networks, in chat rooms and cyber bullying 
awareness and response. Of the safety policies that have been updated in the last three  
Table 14. Web 2.0 Safety Policy (AUP) Adjustments 
Web 2.0 Safety References  Last Updated 
 2010-
2012 
 %      N          
2007-
2009 
%      N   
2004-
2006 
%      N   
1996-
2003 
%      N  
Total 
 
%    N   
No references to Web 2.0, no 
references to educating 
minors 
 
8.8 7 6.3 5 7.5 6 7.5 6 30.1 24 
References Web 2.0 safety 
issues, but no references to 
educating minors 
 
6.3 5 1 1 0 0 0 0 7.3 6 
References instructing minors 
about appropriate Internet use, 
but no reference to educating 
minors about Web 2.0 safety 
 
6.3 5 7.5 6 2.5 2 1 1 17.5 14 
References educating minors 
about Web 2.0 safety issues, 
including interacting on social 
networks, in chat rooms and 
cyber bullying awareness and 
response 
45 36 0 0 0 0 0 0 45 36 
Total 66.6 53 14.8 12 10 8 8.5 7 100 80 
 
years, 8.8% (N=7) made no mention of educating minors about Internet safety, 6.3% 
(N=5) referenced Web 2.0 safety (i.e., cyber bullying, social networking, etc.), but did 
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not mention educating minors about Internet safety; and 6.3% (N=5) referenced 
instructing minors about appropriate Internet use, but did not include Web 2.0 safety 
issues. When AUPs referenced Web 2.0 safety issues but made no reference to educating 
minors about Web 2.0 safety, they included statements such as “social networking sites 
are strictly prohibited.” Twelve school districts (14.8%) last updated their AUPs during 
the 2007-2009 time period, none of which included references to educating minors about 
Web 2.0 safety issues. In this group, 6.3% (N=5) made no mention of educating or 
instructing minors about internet safety, 1% (N=1) mentioned Web 2.0 safety, but did not 
mention educating minors about Internet safety. Six (7.5%) AUPs mentioned instructing 
students about appropriate Internet use, but made no reference to educating minors about 
Web 2.0 safety issues.  
 Eight (10%) school districts last updated their safety policies during the 2004-
2006 time period, none of which referenced educating minors about Web 2.0 safety. Six 
(7.5%) did not mention educating minors and 2.5% (N=2) included references to 
instructing minors about appropriate Internet use, but not specific Web 2.0 safety issues. 
Seven (8.5%) school districts last updated their AUPs during the 1996-2003 time period. 
Of these districts, six (7.5%) made no references to educating minors or to Web 2.0 
safety, 1% (N=1) referenced instructing minors about appropriate Internet use, but made 
no mention of Web 2.0 safety. This safety policy analysis suggests that school districts 
were relying mostly on Internet filters to protect students and were not adjusting their 
AUPs in response to Web 2.0 safety concerns. Seventy-six percent of the safety policies 
that referenced Web 2.0 safety education were updated within the past year (2012), which 
implies that Web 2.0 safety education is in a state of flux and that district-wide safety 
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education is in the beginning phase of implementation. Twenty-seven (32.5%) districts 
have not updated their AUPs in more than three years, which suggests safety policies 
may not be the focus of Internet safety in these districts. This analysis, IT content 
blocking data, and SLMS responses to the blocked content item suggests that school 
districts are mostly blocking access to Web 2.0 resources to address Web 2.0 safety 
concerns. 
Safety Education Implementation 
 IT survey item 8 and SLMS survey item 7e asked respondents if their school 
district had implemented an Internet safety education program. In response to this 
question, 39.8% (N=47) of SLMS replied yes, 41.5% (N=49) replied no, and 18.6% 
(N=22) were unsure about this question (see Table 15). Table 15 also shows that 90% 
(N=18) of IT respondents replied yes, 5% (N=1) replied no, and 5% (N=1) were unsure 
about this item.  
Table 15. Internet Safety Education 
Survey Item SLMS 
N=118 
IT 
N=20 
Survey Item 8 (IT), 7e (SLMS) 
The district has implemented an Internet safety program that educates 
students about appropriate online behavior, including social networking 
and chat room interactions, and cyber bullying awareness and response. 
Response % N % N 
Yes 39.8 47 90 18 
No 41.5 49 5 1 
Unsure 18.6 22 5 1 
 
Compared to the IT respondents, a smaller percentage of SLMS (39.8%) than IT 
respondents (90%) indicated that their school district had implemented an Internet safety 
education program to educate students about inappropriate online behavior, including 
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Web 2.0 safety issues. The difference in SLMS and IT responses to this survey item 
suggests these programs were not being implemented district-wide in many districts or 
that some SLMS may have been unaware of their district’s Internet safety education 
program. Another possible explanation for the difference between SLMS and IT 
responses could be that some IT respondents viewed their AUPs as the district’s Internet 
safety education program. IT survey comments in response to the Internet safety 
education item support this conclusion. For instance, one IT respondent commented, 
“The district has an Internet safety policy in place and we are currently updating [it] to 
include cyber bullying.” Likewise, another IT respondent commented, “We will be 
implementing a cyber bullying policy and are already providing information to students 
and parents. We do have an acceptable use policy in place.” 
 Interviewee and survey respondent observations clarify how Internet safety 
education was implemented in school districts. Overarching themes that emerged from 
analysis of these observations include lack of safety awareness programs, uncoordinated 
or passive Internet safety awareness efforts, uncertainty about safety awareness programs, 
and in a few situations, effective online safety awareness programs. Some respondent 
statements indicated that a district-wide Internet safety awareness program had not been 
adopted and implemented. Regarding district-wide safety education programs, 
Interviewee 1 commented, “There’s nothing in place.” The SLMS’ comments suggest 
teachers and media specialists were expected to educate minors about Internet safety, but 
had not been provided specific guidelines or a curriculum. The result was haphazard 
Internet safety education efforts as was evident when Interviewee 1 commented, “I do 
digital citizenship units of instruction with the kids. The district leaves it up to media 
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specialists and teachers. If they [teachers and media specialists] say it’s not important, 
they don’t do it.” Similarly, a SLMS survey respondent commented, “An internet safety 
education program is not mandatory at all schools in the district. Each school initiates its 
safety education program.” 
Other respondents were uncertain whether a district-wide Internet safety 
awareness program had been adopted and implemented. For example, Interviewee 4 
stated, I don’t know what the computer and keyboarding classes are doing. I can’t tell 
you.” Uncertainty was evident when Interviewee 4 stated, “…there’s no official course or 
online training program. Librarians haven’t been told officially about it. Maybe computer 
and business classes have a program, but I’m not aware of any.” The school district had 
made passive efforts to inform students about online safety, but these efforts did not 
involve direct instruction. The SLMS stated, “A while back, a group including media 
specialists developed posters on Internet safety and ways to stay safe on the Internet. 
These posters were displayed in classrooms.” Interviewee 4 also described a more recent 
district-wide effort to inform student about online dangers when she stated, “We also had 
something this year, some information about bullying and online bullying explaining how 
to protect yourself online. This came from the district. It was an instructional thing to put 
in your room.”  
Uncertainty about district-wide cyber safety education programs was apparent 
when Interviewee 5 stated, “The only thing that I know they do is that we have a one-day 
program in the freshman 101 class where the technology integration specialist does a 
jeopardy game on Internet safety.” District-wide efforts to educate minors were 
uncoordinated and sporadic as was evident when Interview 5 reported, “…students also 
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get a little bit of instruction when they pick up their iPad devices. Teachers sporadically 
address Internet safety, but it is not addressed district-wide.” Uncertainty was also 
apparent when a SLMS survey respondent commented, “I am not sure if there is a 
program created by the district to address these concerns.” Regarding district wide efforts 
to implement cyber safety education, the respondent’ explained, “[The] media specialist 
includes such information during our lessons on Internet use. Board policies are in effect, 
but teachers are responsible for sharing that information with students.” This explanation 
implies uncoordinated Internet safety efforts as there is no mention of an Internet safety 
program or district mandated cyber safety curriculum.  
On the other hand, a few participants’ statements suggest their districts had issued 
clear Internet safety education guidelines or had adopted a formal Internet safety 
curriculum. For example, Interviewee 2 remarked, “We were given a requirement as of 
last year saying we have to have a formal program in place and we had to have proof that 
every child is educated every year.” Interviewee 2’s school also made efforts to involve 
parents by sending a flyer home and advertising Internet safety programs on the school’s 
Web site. Similar to Interviewee 2’s observation, parental involvement was a key part of 
the Internet safety program Interviewee 3 described. According to Interviewee 3, the 
district Internet safety program “provides instruction for kids and workshops for parents.” 
The SLMS considered the program to be effective as the statement, “It’s a good one,” 
suggests. 
IT survey respondent observations indicated Internet safety education was in   
various stages of implementation. One IT respondent reported that the district had 
implemented a multi-level program entitled, “NetSmartz from [the] Center of Missing 
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and Exploited Children.” Another IT responded stated, “This is in [the] planning stages 
with implementation scheduled at the beginning of next school term.” The latter 
statement implies that up to this point some school districts may have been relying mostly 
on filters for Internet safety instead of using multiple Internet safety approaches, 
including a fully integrated district-wide safety education program. 
The literature review suggested that multiple Internet safety approaches are 
required to prepare students to be safe and responsible Internet users, particularly in 
unfiltered environments. To ascertain the effectiveness of district-implemented Internet 
safety approaches, SLMS survey item 8f asked respondents whether they agreed that 
filtering and safety policies/practices (i.e., AUPs, Cyber safety education, monitoring, 
etc.) prepared students to be safe and responsible users in unfiltered environments. In 
response to this item, 10.3% (N=12) strongly disagreed, 23.9% (N=28) disagreed, 38.5% 
(N=45) agreed, 6.8% (N=8) strongly agreed while 20.5% (N=24) were neutral about this 
item. Fewer than half of SLMS respondents (45.3%) agreed or strongly agreed that their 
district’s Internet safety approaches effectively prepared students to make safe and 
responsible decisions while using online resources. Interview participant observation 
enabled a better understanding of factors that contributed to ineffective Internet safety 
approaches. Moreover, interviewee observations detail factors that contribute to effective 
Internet safety approaches. 
Some interview participant observations support the safety policy analysis 
findings. Their observations suggested that current Internet safety efforts relied mostly on 
filters to keep students safe, which resulted in overly restrictive filtering policies, 
uncoordinated Internet safety education efforts, or minimal emphasis on AUPs. When 
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Interviewee 5 stated, “They [the district] have the mindset that if we block all the bad 
stuff, they don’t have to worry about teaching Internet safety,” the remark implied the 
district was relying mostly on strict filtering policies to protect students from online 
indecency instead of instructing students about online safety. Interviewee 4 was 
concerned that reliance on strict filtering policies interfered with efforts to educate 
students about online safety. She used the following thought-provoking analogy to 
convey her concern: 
You can have all the safety education you want, but if everything is blocked, we 
can’t train them on how to be safe online. It’s like teaching first graders and 
kindergartners all about scissor safety, but never putting scissors in their hands so 
they can practice cutting. We’re blocking so much that we can’t practice. For 
instance students don’t have email, can’t access blogs, forums. We can’t teach 
safety when they can’t access these online tools.  
Other interview participants suggested their school districts were minimizing the 
importance of AUPs as an Internet safety approach. For instance, Interviewee 1 
remarked, “They [the district] started something new, they’re saying more and more we 
don’t need that [signed AUPs]. Students don’t sign AUPs anymore, they did away with 
that saying it’s too much paperwork.” Likewise, minimal use of AUPs to promote 
Internet safety was implied when Interviewee 4 stated, “We have a great AUP that 
nobody knows about in the student handbook. Students are not required to sign any 
forms.” Interviewee 4 added, “In the handbook there’s one page that talks about the 
Internet. The handbook is sent home for parents to read, they contact the school if they 
have questions or concerns,” which suggested efforts to involve parents in Internet safety 
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was not proactive. It can also be construed that few students or parents read the AUP 
because the policy did not require students’ or parents’ signatures.  
 The aforementioned participant observations highlighted factors contributing to 
ineffective Internet safety strategies in school districts. Nevertheless, some participants 
described effective Internet safety approaches in their districts. Constant reinforcement of 
digital citizenship guidelines was a common theme that emerged when participants 
described effective district-wide Internet safety education programs. When asked what 
factors contributed to the success of their district’s Internet safety program, Interview 
participant 3 replied, “The program they [the district] use is not a stand-alone lesson, 
there’re projects. It’s not like a one-time thing. Internet safety is constantly reinforced.” 
Interview participant 2 replied, “Safety education is reinforced in the library and the 
computer lab.” Similar survey respondent comments include: “We have a strong Internet 
safety program in place for our students and clear guidelines for our teachers and staff,” 
and “The media specialist goes over Internet safety constantly.” 
Interviewee observations exemplify other factors that contribute to effective 
digital citizenship practices, including stakeholder involvement in Internet safety program 
implementation and integrated district-wide Internet safety efforts. When Interviewee 5 
remarked, “It [Internet safety] probably should be integrated into every course, and 
[there] should be a system-wide plan to teach and reteach this thing of Internet safety and 
etiquette,” it suggested integrated district-wide Internet safety instruction was an 
important factor in implementing effective Internet safety programs. Interview 
observations also suggest stakeholder involvement in program development is a critical 
component of effective Internet safety program implementation. Interviewee 5 asserted 
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that district Internet safety efforts were ineffective because instructional staff were not 
involved in policy decisions. The SLMS explained, “….the people who are making the 
decisions are not instructional staff, but are technicians.” The need for stakeholder 
involvement in Internet safety program implementation was echoed in other interviewee 
comments. Interview 1 stated, “They need to involve media specialists; we’ve got to be 
involved in that process.” Similarly, Interviewee 4 stated, “There needs to be more input 
from people who are teaching the students.” Interviewee 3, who viewed her district’s 
Internet safety program as “…a good one,” described how stakeholders were involved in 
the program’s implementation. The SLMS stated, “It’s a specific thing [program]. The 
technology teachers got with the district office to choose what they’ll use.” 
Interviewee observations, survey data, and the AUP analysis suggest Internet 
safety education has not been a major focus of Internet safety policies. Safety policies 
(AUPs) have not evolved to encompass 21st century computing technology and its 
inherent safety issues as the following Interviewee observations suggest: “…policies have 
not kept up with what it means to be a 21st century learner,” (Interviewee 1) and “...the 
district’s Internet use policies reflected a 1980’s mentality” (Interviewee 4). Interviewee 
observations also suggest that when safety education is implemented with stakeholder 
involvement, on a district-wide basis, and reinforced often, it can be an effective Internet 
safety approach.  
Research Question 4 
 Research question 4 asked, “In what ways do filtering policies impede access to 
information and resources necessary to achieve 21st century technology and information 
literacy standards?” The standards that were the focus of this question include the 
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communication and collaborative standards identified in Table 3. To answer this 
question, IT and SLMS survey items sought to determine whether Web 2.0 resources, 
which promote the acquisition of communication and collaborative skills, were accessible 
or blocked. Question set 5 on the interview protocol also sought to define specific Web 
2.0 access issues and safety concerns that prompted administrators to limit access to this 
content.  
 To discover how filters impeded access to Web 2.0 resources, wikis, blogs, and 
social networking sites, were included as content categories in IT survey question 4. 
Table 8 shows that 23.1% (N=3) of responding school districts filtered all wikis and 
blogs, 69.2% (N=9) filtered some wikis and blogs, while 7.7% (N=1) filtered no 
wiki/blog content. The majority (58.8%; N=10) of school districts blocked all social 
networking tools, 41.2% (N=7) blocked some, and there were no school districts that did 
not block all or some social networking sites. To ascertain how filtering policies 
influenced end user access to Web 2.0 tools, SLMS survey item 3 asked respondents to 
select the types of educational content that were most often over-blocked. Web 2.0 
content was one of the answer choices for this item. Seventy-eight (66.7%) SLMS said 
Web 2.0 resources were over-blocked in their school districts (see Figure 3). 
 SLMS were also asked whether they agreed that their district’s filtering and safety 
policies facilitated easy access to online collaboration and communication tools (Web 
2.0). Eighteen (15.8%) SLMS strongly disagreed, 30.7 (N=35) disagreed, 24.6% (N=28) 
agreed, and 4.4% (N=5) strongly agreed that their district’s filtering and safety policies 
facilitated easy access to Web 2.0 resources. Twenty-eight respondents (24.6%) were 
neutral about this item. A greater portion of SLMS strongly disagreed/disagreed (46.5%) 
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than agreed/strongly agreed (39.9%) that their district’s filtering and safety policies 
facilitated access to communication and collaboration tools. IT and SLMS survey data 
inferred that district-implemented filtering policies impeded access to many Web 2.0 
resources necessary for attainment of 21st century learning skills. 
 Additionally, impeded access to Web 2.0 resources was a recurring theme of 
interview participant observations. Interviewees were asked if Internet access policies or 
practices limited access to Web 2.0 tools that foster online communication and 
collaboration. Interviewee responses described specific communication and collaboration 
tools that were inaccessible. Interviewee 5 stated, “There’s no Twitter™, no Facebook™, 
and no YouTube™.” The media specialist also described sporadic access to Wordle™ 
when she stated, “Its sporadic, sometimes we get access, sometimes we can’t.” 
Interviewee 4, whose statements: “The only Web 2.0 tools we’re able to access is 
Edmodo™,” and “We just can’t get to anything,” also suggest very limited access to 
online communication and collaboration tools.  
Even when access to specific Web 2.0 tools was allowed, some features of these 
sites were disabled. For example, Interviewee 5 stated, De.lic.ious™ is available, but for 
some reason they block the toolbar icon that allows you to add a Web site to your 
account.” Interviewee 1, who recounted a similar experience involving disabled Web 2.0 
features, stated, “When we use Web 2.0 tools, email capability is blocked. Students can’t 
send articles to their personal email addresses.” 
If interview respondents indicated their district’s Internet use policies restricted 
access to Web 2.0 resources, they were also asked to explain how these policies limited 
attainment of 21st century information literacy and technology standards. Interviewee 
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responses suggest that restricted Web 2.0 access limited opportunities for students to 
interact appropriately with others, to create content, connect with experts, and become 
self-directed learners. Interviewee 4 stated, “….students aren’t getting to practice 
interacting appropriately with people on a live interaction tool,” which illustrated how 
restricted Web 2.0 access limited opportunities for students to interact appropriately. 
When Interviewed 4 stated, “They [students] can’t create content, aren’t learning how to 
use that,” the remark implied that Web 2.0 access policies limited opportunities for 
students to create and share content.  
Interviewee observations also described how Web 2.0 access policies restricted 
individual student collaboration. For example, Interviewee 4 stated, “Web 2.0 makes it 
easy to connect with experts, but students are almost stuck with letter writing. They can 
be communicating with authors or chemists, but that’s not happening because they can’t 
access the online communication tools.” Interviewee 5, who described similar Web 2.0 
access restrictions, reported, “District policies restrict collaboration with others outside of 
the district.” The district’s technology policy allowed teacher access to collaborative 
tools, but prevented students from accessing these tools. Interviewee 5 defined how this 
access policy limited opportunities for student interaction when she remarked, “If the 
teacher wants to collaborate with another class, she can only do it using the teacher’s 
account. I think our students should get the same opportunity to do it [collaborate] 
individually.” Interviewee 1 was concerned that restricted Web 2.0 access limited 
opportunities for students to become self-directed learners. The SLMS stated, “The 
district says we’re supposed to develop self-directed learners, we’re supposed to be 
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teaching them to be self-directed. She questioned, “How can students be in charge of 
their own learning if all these restrictions are in place?”  
Student safety had a substantial influence on content blocking decisions as Table 
9 illustrates. When asked what safety concerns prompted policymakers to restrict Web 
2.0 access, interview participants’ responses convey administrators’ concerns about 
student safety. Interviewee responses include the following recurring student safety 
issues: cyber bullying, online predators, and posting inappropriate content online. 
Interviewee 4 stated, “They’re [policymakers] worried about cyber bullying; they’re 
afraid that a student will email inappropriate messages and do inappropriate things that 
would put a bad mark on the school.” Interviewee 2 added that policymakers’ “biggest 
concern is bullying and students getting in contact with someone not at school who might 
be a predator.” Interviewee 5 indicated that policymakers restricted Web 2.0 access 
because of “all the stuff on the news about somebody being lead to meet with somebody 
online. Interviewee 5 further explained that policymakers were “afraid that kids will post 
inappropriate things; they’re worried about inappropriate verbiage and a whole list of 
things.” These statements call attention to the inherent safety issues that accompany Web 
2.0 usage. In response to these concerns, policymakers have mostly used a one-
dimensional Internet safety approach; block access to potentially unsafe content or 
controversial content, including Web 2.0 resources. Interviewee 3 likened this Internet 
safety approach to “throwing out the baby with the bathwater.” 
Some data indicates that policymakers are beginning to realize the educational 
benefits Web 2.0 resources afford. Though initially subjected to wholesale blocking, Web 
2.0 resources were becoming more accessible for students and teachers in some school 
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districts. Regarding increasing Web 2.0 access, Interviewee 2 reported, “I noticed that 
access denials or blocks have opened up more.” Interviewee 2 named specific Web 2.0 
tools that had become available for instructional use, including SharpSchool™ and 
Edmodo™. The SLMS suggested that Web 2.0 access for students was also becoming 
less restricted when asserting, “Access has been restricted more for students, but it’s 
beginning to open up.” Similarly, Interviewee 1 explained, “They’re [district 
administrators] starting to relax policies, but I’d love to be able to email articles to 
students’ personal email addresses.” The following SLMS survey comment illustrates 
that increased Web 2.0 access is an evolving process requiring communication between 
educators and administrators, some trial and error, and clear usage guidelines: 
We initially had and still have some difficulties in utilizing Web 2.0 tools, but are 
working with IT and the administration on these issues and use of certain tools, 
some being very open now and others requiring more tests and/or supervisory 
guidelines (SLMS Survey Comment).  
Interviewee 3’s school district was beginning to embrace social networking and online 
collaboration as well. However, limited student access to Web 2.0 resources was an issue. 
Interviewee 3 described this issue and district plans to expand students’ access in the 
following statement:  
We do the social networking thing. We do collaborative projects with people at 
different schools. There’s a bigger problem though. We Skype™ under the 
umbrella of the teacher login, but that’s something that’s going to be addressed. 
The school district is going to be using Google™; everyone will have Google™ 
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accounts. As a whole the district will embrace Google™ docs and other Google™ 
communication apps. (Interviewee 3) 
Some of the aforementioned SLMS observations described limited access to a 
variety of Web 2.0 resources, which inhibited communication and collaboration within 
and outside of school. However, some districts were loosening restrictions on Web 2.0 
tools, but access was still hampered by access issues such as staff-only Web 2.0 access 
policies, which prevented individual student collaboration and communication. The 
integration of Web 2.0 resources into instruction was also hampered by disablement of 
features on some sites, including email capability and toolbar features that enable users to 
add Web sites to their accounts. Overall, survey and interview data regarding Web 2.0 
access suggest that many end users were denied opportunities to develop 21st century 
communication and collaboration skills because of restricted access to the read and write 
Web. 
Comparison of Elementary and Secondary School Access Issues 
 The investigator compared elementary (K-5) and secondary (6-12) SLMS 
responses on survey items about content access issues such as over-blocking to ascertain 
how filtering policies affected users in each academic group. If SLMS survey 
respondents indicated that their school included any grade level beyond grade 5, they 
were included with the secondary group. Figure 5 shows that a greater percentage of 
secondary SLMS than elementary SLMS encountered over-blocking in all but one 
content category, educational games. The percentage difference between secondary 
SLMS and elementary SLMS experiencing over-blocked visual images, virtual worlds, 
heath/sex education content, and other content was greater than 10 percentage points. For 
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these content areas, 43.8% of secondary SLMS and 26.4% of elementary SLMS 
experienced over-blocking of virtual world content, 50% of secondary SLMS and 39.6% 
of elementary SLMS experienced visual image over-blocking, and 57.8% of secondary 
and 45.3% of elementary SLMS experienced health/sex education content over-blocking. 
Twenty-five percent of secondary SLMS compared to 5.7% of elementary SLMS 
experienced over blocking of other content, such as popular culture, entertainment, online 
ordering/shopping (i.e., school supply sites), and educational sites including 
Scholastic.com and PBS.org. A greater proportion of elementary SLMS (52.8%) than 
secondary SLMS (39.1%) encountered blocked educational games. This data suggests 
that elementary users need greater access to education games and secondary users need 
Figure 5. Comparison of elementary and secondary school access issues. 
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greater access to virtual worlds, visual images, health/sex education subject matter, and 
other specified content. 
 Compared to secondary SLMS, a smaller percentage (5-10 percentage points 
smaller) of elementary SLMS indicated that business/finance, sports/recreational, and 
controversial content was over-blocked. Fourteen secondary SLMS (21.9%) and 15.1% 
of elementary SLMS reported instances when business and financial content was over-
blocked. A larger portion of secondary SLMS (28.1%) experienced blocked sports and 
recreational content while a smaller portion of elementary SLMS (22.6%) experienced 
blocked content in this domain. This finding hints that secondary users have a greater 
need for business/financial and sports/recreational content. The majority (more than 50%) 
of both groups experienced blocked controversial content; however, more secondary 
(60.9%) than elementary (54.7%) SLMS indicated controversial content was over-
blocked. The fact that the majority of both academic levels encountered blocked content 
of this nature could be construed that both academic levels require greater access to 
subject matter that filters categorize as controversial. 
 Figure 5 shows that streaming media over-blocking and Web 2.0 over-blocking 
occurred with a majority of both groups, as compared to every other content area except 
controversial subject matter. However, the percentage difference between the elementary 
and secondary SLMS is less than five percentage points for both content areas. Streaming 
media content was over-blocked for 83% of elementary SLMS and 85.9% of secondary 
SLMS. Web 2.0 resources were over-blocked for 64.2% of elementary SLMS and 68.8% 
of elementary SLMS. This data suggests that over-blocking is an issue with both 
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academic levels, and that filtering policies need to be adjusted to allow greater access to 
streaming media content and Web 2.0 resources. 
Table 16. Comparison of Secondary and Elementary SLMS' Perceptions of the 
Influence of Filtering/Safety Policies on Instructional Staff 
Survey Item Elementary 
SLMS 
Secondary 
SLMS 
SLMS Survey Item 8a 
The Internet filter prevents instructional staff from accessing resources 
needed for instructional or professional activities. 
        N=52                 N=66 
Response % N % N 
Strongly disagree 5.8 3 1.5 1 
Disagree 30.8 16 13.6 9 
Neutral 9.6 5 10.6 7 
Agree 46.2 24 54.5 36 
Strongly agree 7.7 4 19.7 13 
 
Secondary and elementary SLMS’ perceptions about the influence of filtering 
policies on end user access to online content was compared to ascertain whether one user 
group experienced more access issues. As Table 16 shows, a greater proportion of 
secondary SLMS (74.2%) than elementary SLMS (53.9%) agreed/strongly agreed that 
district filtering policies prevented instructional staff from accessing resources needed for 
instructional or professional activities. Likewise, Table 17 shows that a greater portion of 
secondary SLMS (60.6%) than elementary SLMS (34.6%) agreed/strongly agreed 
filtering policies prevented students from accessing information and resources needed for 
classroom assignments. When asked whether they agreed that filtering and safety policies 
facilitated easy access to online collaboration and communication tools (Web 2.0),  
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Table 17. Comparison of Secondary and Elementary SLMS' Perceptions of the 
Influence of Filtering/Safety Policies on Students 
Survey Item Elementary 
SLMS 
Secondary 
SLMS 
SLMS Survey Item 8b 
The Internet filter prevents students from accessing information/resources 
needed for classroom assignments. 
        N=52                 N=66 
Response % N % N 
Strongly disagree 7.7 4 4.5 3 
Disagree 36.5 19 21.2 14 
Neutral 21.2 11 13.6 9 
Agree 30.8 16 48.5 32 
Strongly agree 3.8 2 12.1 8 
 
a greater portion of secondary SLMS (53.9%) disagreed/strongly disagreed than 
elementary SLMS (36.7%) (see Table 18). This data analysis indicates filtering and 
safety policies were having a more adverse effect on secondary users’ access to 
educational information. The data also implies that secondary users need greater access to 
online content. 
Table 18. Comparison of Secondary and Elementary SLMS' Perceptions of the 
Influence of Filtering/Safety Policies on Web 2.0 Access 
Survey Item Elementary 
SLMS 
Secondary 
SLMS 
SLMS Survey Item 8e 
Filtering and safety policies facilitate easy access to online collaboration 
and communication tools (Web 2.0) 
        N=49                 N=65 
Response % N % N 
Strongly disagree 6.1 3 23.1 15 
Disagree  30.6 15 30.8 20 
Neutral 24.5 12 24.6 16 
Agree 34.7 17 16.9 11 
Strongly agree 4.1 2 4.6 3 
 
Interviewee statements support the foregoing supposition that filtering restrictions 
need to be relaxed for older students to allow greater access to online content. 
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Interviewee 4 suggested that high school students’ maturity level enabled them to make 
better decisions about online content; therefore, high school students should have greater 
access to online content. The SLMS stated, “I think you should treat high school students 
pretty close to adults. It’s the same with a Website as with a book. Just like they put down 
a book they don’t like, they can do the same with a Website.” Interviewee 5 also believed 
there was a difference in the maturity levels of elementary and secondary students. The 
SLMS explained, “There’s a difference between high school students and elementary 
students. Things blocked for elementary can be released with no detrimental effect on 
high school students.” 
Interviewees 2 and 3, who were elementary SLMS, also acknowledged that 
elementary and secondary students had different information needs. Interviewee 2 
explained that at the elementary level there were fewer unblocking requests, but was 
certain that “high schools and middle schools get more requests.” When Interviewee 2 
stated, “…you’re probably going to see a big difference between middle and high school 
media specialists,” it was further acknowledgement of the differences in elementary and 
secondary users’ information access requirements. Interviewee 3 also acknowledged that 
secondary and elementary students have different information requirements when 
recommending that, “Filter access levels should be tiered so they [high school students] 
can have access to more.”  
The foregoing interviewee observations confirm that elementary and secondary 
level students have dissimilar information needs and maturity levels, which suggests that 
a one-size-fits-all filtering scheme may not be the best filtering approach for elementary 
and secondary students. Moreover, a comparison of elementary and secondary SLMS’ 
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survey responses supports the need for fewer restrictions on Internet access at the 
secondary level. 
Attitudes about Filtering and Safety Policies 
 During the course of this investigation, other themes emerged that demonstrate 
how end users reacted to filtering policy implementation. A thematic analysis of 
interviewees’ and survey respondents’ comments revealed end users’ attitudes about 
district-implemented filtering and safety policies. These attitudes include acquiescence, 
tolerance, and frustration. Some end users have acquiesced to Internet filter 
implementation and accept restrictive filtering policies as an unavoidable consequence of 
legal and social mandates to protect students from harmful online content. As Table 19 
shows, some end users acknowledged the technology’s over-blocking tendency, but were 
willing to accept restrictive filtering policies without objection (AR1, AR2, & 
Interviewee 3). 
 Other users tolerated restrictive filtering policies while seeking alternative ways to 
access or utilize blocked educational content. These users applied work-around strategies 
to access blocked educational content, such as downloading blocked content in advance 
(AR3), finding similar unblocked content (Interviewee 1), and using staff logins and a 
projector to share blocked content with students (Interviewee 5). Other respondent 
observations revealed an unwillingness to accept filtering policies as they were 
implemented (AR4, Interviewee 1). Frustration about current filtering policy 
implementation was evident in the use of words like “annoying,” “aggravating,” and 
“upsetting.” The attitudes summarized in Table 19 provide additional substantiation of 
the issues users encountered as they sought information in a filtered environment.  
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Table 19. End User Attitudes about Filtering Policies 
Attitude/Reaction Participant Statements Exemplifying Attitude/Reaction 
Acquiescence It is very hard to find good clip art but I also understand how 
easily students can find inappropriate images so I try not to get 
too frustrated with that content being blocking. (AR1) 
 
You can request an override, but I have never done it. I respect 
their [administrators] decisions and endeavor to set a positive 
example for the students. (AR2) 
 
I don’t see it [filtering software] as a problem anymore. It’s 
evolved to the point where I feel as if it’s more of a friend than a 
roadblock. (Interviewee 3) 
Tolerance Teachers should have downloaded what they need for their 
lessons. We all know the filter is in place. The filter cannot catch 
everything. (AR3) 
 
If something is blocked and the students can’t get to it, 
sometimes the teacher can login to it on her computer. They all 
have projectors so they can share the sites with their students. 
(Interviewee 5) 
 
They [end users] use other means such as using another Web 
site. They just keep trying until they come up with something 
that is not blocked. (Interviewee 1) 
Frustration Not having access to Scholastic.com is annoying. As a librarian, 
not being able to jump onto Amazon.com or sometimes bn.com 
[Barnes and Noble] is very aggravating. (AR4) 
 
It’s upsetting that they [administrators] don’t respect my 
professional integrity. (Interviewee 1) 
Note: AR=Survey Respondents’ Attitude/Reaction 
Summary of Results 
 This chapter presented the results of the quantitative and qualitative research 
undertaken for this investigation. This study endeavored to describe how filtering and 
safety policies were being implemented in South Carolina’s K-12 public schools. This 
investigation also sought to describe how filtering and safety policies influenced end 
users’ access to information. Data collected from IT and SLMS surveys, an interview 
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protocol, and an analysis of artifacts (AUPs) were combined to answer each research 
question.   
 Survey and interview data provided insight into the issues surrounding filtering 
and safety policy implementation in South Carolina’s public schools. Regarding the 
implementation question and content blocking considerations, IT survey data indicated 
policymakers were electing to block considerably more Web content than online 
obscenity. Several factors influenced filtering decisions, the three most influential being 
CIPA compliance, maintaining student safety, and maintaining network security. IT and 
SLMS survey data and interview observations suggest that in most school districts, 
school-based stakeholders had minimal input in policy decisions. The research results 
revealed many school districts were implementing differentiated access levels for staff, 
but all students, regardless of age level, had the same access level.  
 Survey and interview results were combined to portray the issues SLMS 
encountered as they facilitated information access in a filtered environment. Survey data 
revealed that filters were effective in protecting students from inappropriate content, but 
overly restrictive filtering policies prevented most end users from accessing controversial 
subject matter, streaming media, health and sex education resources, and Web 2.0 tools. 
Interview data supplemented survey findings by providing concrete scenarios in which 
filtering policies denied end users access to educational resources. In addition to the over-
blocking issue, end users also encountered inefficient content unblocking procedures. 
Bureaucratic and poorly communicated unblocking procedures and lack of on-campus 
override privileges delayed access to blocked content.  
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 An analysis of school districts’ AUPs coupled with survey and interview data 
revealed that school districts were relying mostly on filters to protect students from 
online indecency. The majority of school districts have not adjusted their AUPs to 
include educating minors about Web 2.0 safety issues, as the Protecting Children in the 
Twenty First Century Act (2008) requires. Survey and interview data also suggests that 
Internet safety education is not an important Internet safety approach in many school 
districts. Over-reliance on filters to protect students from Web 2.0 safety issues has 
resulted in restricted access to Web 2.0 resources that enable students to acquire 21st 
century communication and collaboration skills. In essence, the research results show that 
school districts’ filtering and safety policies were mostly outdated, and have not kept 
pace with 21st century online technologies.  
 The researcher compared elementary and secondary SLMS responses on survey 
items specifically related to how Internet use policies influenced end users, including 
students and instructional staff. Elementary and secondary user groups encountered the 
adverse effects of overly restrictive filtering policies, but these adverse effects were more 
pronounced at the secondary level. Over-blocking was more prevalent among secondary 
users, suggesting that their information needs require access to more of the content that 
filters typically classify as controversial, potentially liable, or non-educational. 
Considerable over-blocking occurs when filters are set to block such content.  
 Overall, school districts have mostly implemented a one-dimensional and one-
size-fits-all approach to Internet safety through the application of unnecessarily restrictive  
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Internet filtering policies. The outcome was frustrated end users with limited access to 
resources enabling them to experience fully the Internet’s many educational benefits. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary 
 
Introduction 
 This mixed method study examined school districts’ implementation of Internet 
filtering and safety policies and the influence of these policies on end users’ access to 
information. Quantitative and qualitative data collected during the course of this study, 
provided insight into each of the research questions that guided the study. This chapter 
will present the conclusions and implications of the research in addition to the 
recommendations that evolved from analysis and interpretation of the data. Finally, a 
summary of the dissertation will be presented.  
Conclusions 
The problem that launched this study was the need for a comprehensive 
examination of Internet filtering and safety policies to determine how they were 
influencing information access in South Carolina’s K-12 public schools. Specifically, this 
research sought to detail filtering and safety policy decision making and factors that 
influenced policy decisions. Internet use policies can be implemented in a manner that 
either maximizes or minimizes user access to information. Therefore, this research 
investigated end users’ experiences with content over-blocking, content under-blocking, 
and unblocking practices to determine how these factors influenced teaching and 
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learning. This investigation also examined the trends and issues surrounding Web 2.0 
safety, and the role of filtering, AUPs, and Internet safety education in protecting students 
from inappropriate online content. Finally, filtering policies were examined to ascertain 
the manner in which they impeded access to Web 2.0 tools enabling students to hone 21st 
century collaboration and communication skills. This research provides answers to the 
aforementioned inquiries. These answers were gleaned from stakeholder groups who 
were keenly aware of how filtering and safety policies were developed and implemented 
(IT directors) and the resulting effect of these policies on teaching and learning (SLMS). 
The conclusions from each of the four research questions will be presented following a 
brief description of the methodology used to obtain the data. 
Research Question 1   
 Research question 1 asked, “How are filtering and safety policies being 
implemented in public schools?” To answer this question, survey and interview items 
focused on three filtering and safety policy implementation issues (variables) that were 
identified in the literature review (see Table 4). These variables include content blocking 
considerations, stakeholder involvement in policy decisions, and differentiated access 
levels for specific user groups. One of the most important policy considerations is 
deciding what content to block and the level of blocking within each category. An 
important conclusion drawn from the IT survey data was that in implementing filtering 
policies, school districts were deciding to block more content than CIPA requires. CIPA 
requires E-rate discount recipients to filter access to visual images that are obscene, child 
pornography, or harmful to minors. As E-rate recipients, this mandate applied to all 
school districts from which the research data was collected.  
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 School districts’ decisions to block more than CIPA requires may be explained by 
the factors that influenced filtering decisions. CIPA compliance had the greatest influence 
on content blocking decisions. The decision to block more than CIPA requires may be 
due to misinterpretation of CIPA’s guidelines or other factors. With the exception of 
CIPA compliance, concern for student safety was the most influential factor in filtering 
policy decisions. Policymakers’ concerns about student safety likely lead them to block 
perceived threatening content such as weapons, violence, alcohol, tobacco, gambling, 
drugs, criminal, and other illegal content. Maintaining network security and bandwidth 
preservation were also highly influential on filtering decisions, which may explain why 
most districts filtered access to hacking, proxy avoidance, and malicious sites in addition 
to Internet radio/TV, telephony, and media downloads. Concerns about litigation exerted 
considerable influence on policymakers’ filtering decisions as well, which most likely 
influenced them to filter controversial content such as alternative lifestyles, hate, racism, 
cult, occult, sex education, and intimate apparel. Although preventing non-educational 
use and community/parental opinions exerted less influence on filtering decisions than 
the aforementioned factors, both factors had a considerable influence on filtering 
decisions. Community pressures and the need to prevent non-educational use could 
possibly explain why school districts blocked content such as wikis, blogs, and Web-
based email, and contributed to decisions to block controversial content.  
 A prevailing supposition from survey and interview data is that filtering policy 
decisions were mostly made by district administrators, IT staff, and the filtering software 
(the software’s default/recommended settings are deployed). End user stakeholder groups 
such as SLMS, teachers, students, or school-based administrators had little input in 
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filtering policy decisions. Conversely, when asked if the filter’s default setting was 
deployed, most IT respondents indicated the filter’s default setting was not implemented. 
These competing results suggest that districts began filter implementation with the filter’s 
default setting and modified these settings as needed. Nevertheless, end user input in 
filtering policy decisions was mostly limited to suggesting Web sites that should be 
blocked or unblocked after the filtering solution had been implemented.  
 The establishment of differentiated user profiles to meet the research, educational, 
and professional needs of all user groups was another consideration under investigation. 
Although districts had implemented some differentiated access levels, they were not 
tailored to the needs of all user groups, or to provide maximum access to online content. 
For instance, some SLMS could access Web 2.0 content and YouTube, but other 
instructional staff could not access this content. In other instances, content such as 
YouTube was unblocked for staff after school hours, but blocked during the school day 
and unavailable for instructional purposes. Differentiated access levels were not 
established to meet the educational and research needs of various student age groups, 
such as elementary, middle, and high school groups. 
 School districts have implemented overly restrictive filtering policies mostly 
without the input of the stakeholders with firsthand knowledge of student and staff 
information needs. Moreover, minimal steps were taken to tailor filtering policies to the 
needs of specific user groups.  
Research Question 2   
Research question 2 asked, “What issues do SLMS encounter as they facilitate 
information access on filtered computers?” To answer this question, the data collection 
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instruments focused on filtering issues that were identified in the literature (see Table 4). 
To determine the scope of these issues and the way they affected teaching and learning, 
survey and interview data were collected about filter over-blocking frequency, under-
blocking frequency, filter effectiveness, specific types of blocked educational content, 
and the efficiency of unblocking procedures. 
The data provided a portrayal of the issues SLMS encountered as they facilitated 
information access on filtered computing devices, the most prevalent of which was filter 
over-blocking. A large majority of IT directors received requests to unblock erroneously 
blocked educational content, but only a few received unblocking requests on a frequent 
basis. A similar majority of SLMS indicated filters over-blocked educational content, and 
almost half of SLMS respondents said over-blocking was a frequent issue. End users’ 
acquiescence to and tolerance of filtering policies most likely resulted in fewer 
unblocking requests. Lack of awareness of unblocking procedures could also have 
contributed to fewer unblocking requests. These factors may explain why so few IT 
administrators frequently received requests to unblock resources while many more SLMS 
frequently encountered over-blocked educational content.  
 An investigation into the types of blocked content provided furthered 
understanding of the types of filtering issues end users experienced. Most end users 
encountered blocked controversial content such as alternative lifestyles, hate groups, 
cults, and the occult. Most end users experienced blocked streaming media, health and 
sex education, and Web 2.0 content as well. Slightly fewer than half encountered blocked 
educational game and visual image sites. Over-blocking of the aforementioned subject 
matter is directly related to policymakers’ decisions to filter all or some potentially liable 
160 
 
content categories such as alcohol/tobacco, criminal/illegal, cult/occult, drugs, gambling, 
hate/racism, social networking, sex, education, Internet radio/TV, and VoIP.  
The results of the abovementioned content being over-blocked were far-reaching. 
Instructional staff was prevented from accessing resources needed for instructional or 
professional activities, and students were prevented from accessing information and 
resources needed for classroom assignments, according to most SLMS respondents. This 
effect was particularly acute at the secondary level according to a comparison of 
elementary and secondary SLMS’ responses. However, over-blocking occurred at all 
academic levels. Specifically, teachers were unable to carry out lessons they planned at 
home because content accessible at home was blocked at school. Students also 
encountered situations where they conducted research for class projects at home, but 
could not complete the research at school because of over-blocking. Teachers were 
reluctant to plan lessons that involved the use of Internet resources because of over-
blocked content. Students were unable to add images to PowerPoint presentations 
because the images they needed were blocked. One specific instance noted that students 
could not access all the information they needed on the history of gaming because many 
gaming sites were blocked. These interviewee scenarios portrayed the far-reaching 
effects of the restrictive filtering policies that have been implemented in many South 
Carolina school districts.   
 Many of the adverse effects of over-blocking can be mitigated with efficient and 
clearly communicated over-blocking procedures. Examination of districts’ content 
unblocking efficiency concluded that unblocking procedures in most districts did little to 
mitigate the adverse effects of over-blocking. Specifically, most end users waited 24 
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hours or more for content to be unblocked, and of this group, some waited more than a 
month for content to be unblocked. Another interesting factor was that almost 20 percent 
of SLMS were not sure of the unblocking wait period. End-user acquiescence and 
tolerance could be one explanation for SLMS’ uncertainty about unblocking wait periods 
because users who acquiesce to blocked content may not seek to get it unblocked, while 
those who tolerate over-blocking attempt to locate alternate content that is not blocked. 
The result is these users may not submit requests to get content unblocked, therefore they 
were uncertain about the unblocking wait time. 
 The prevalence of lengthy unblocking periods may be attributed to the absence of 
on-campus individuals with filter override privileges and bureaucratic unblocking 
procedures. Granting filter override privileges to school-based staff such as 
administrators, SLMS, or technology specialists, facilitates timely access to blocked 
content. However, most SLMS indicated school-based staff was not given filter override 
privileges. When on-campus privileges were not granted, end users were required to 
submit an unblocking request, some of which passed through multiple bureaucratic 
layers. Even when users could submit unblocking requests directly from the blocked 
page, there was a wait period. In the final analysis, only a small percentage of school 
districts provided immediate access to block content. 
 Another prevalent unblocking issue was uncertainty about unblocking procedures. 
Most SLMS indicated blocked page notifications did not provide unblocking instructions 
while almost all of IT respondents indicated the blocked page notifications provided 
unblocking instructions. This discrepancy suggests instructions may have been provided, 
but were not clear to end users. For instance, one interviewee stated, “I don’t know that 
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people are told how to get something unblocked. The link on the blocked page is very 
subtle.” In addition, an IT respondent stated, “The filter instructs the end user to contact 
the system administrator.” This unblocking instruction was unclear because the system 
administrator is not identified; therefore, end users may not have known who to contact 
to get content unblocked. In addition, most IT respondents indicated override privileges 
had been granted to school-based staff; however, most SLMS, who are school-based 
staff, indicated override privileges had not been granted to school-based staff. This 
finding provides additional evidence that there was widespread uncertainty about 
unblocking procedures. 
 Over-blocking was the predominant filtering issue SLMS encountered while 
facilitating access in a filtered environment, but under-blocking and filter circumvention 
affected end users as well. SLMS and IT administrators indicated that filter under-
blocking was far less of an issue than over-blocking. Almost half of IT respondents 
received requests to block inappropriate content, while slightly more than one-fourth of 
SLMS occasionally encountered inappropriate content. Nevertheless, most IT and SLMS 
respondents believed their districts’ filters were effective in preventing users from 
accessing blocked content. Interviewee observations also suggest that filter 
circumvention occurred occasionally, but was mostly an issue at the secondary level, 
since elementary students were not as technologically savvy. Even though under-
blocking and filter circumvention occurred less frequently than over-blocking, the fact 
that these issues occasionally occurred, underscores the flawed nature of filtering 
technology.  
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 Over-blocking was the most pervasive filtering issue for end users. As a result of 
over-blocking, end users were denied access to a broad range of educational content. 
School districts’ unblocking procedures exacerbated the negative effects of filter over-
blocking. Unblocking delays, uncertainty about unblocking procedures, and lack of on-
campus override privileges were factors that exacerbated the negative effects of filter 
over-blocking. Over-blocking coupled with under-blocking and filter circumvention were 
factors that emphasized that technology protection measures cannot be the sole Internet 
safety approach for school districts. 
Research Question 3   
Research question 3 asked, “How are school districts addressing Web 2.0 safety 
issues?” School district AUPs were analyzed to determine how they had been adjusted in 
response to Web 2.0 safety concerns. SLMS and IT survey items focused on the 
implementation of Internet safety education programs to address specific Web 2.0 safety 
issues such as social network interactions. SLMS were also asked their opinions about the 
effectiveness of Internet safety approaches such as Internet safety education. Interview 
observations concurred with the literature review and indicate that policymakers’ Web 
2.0 safety concerns included inappropriate student postings, inappropriate student 
interactions online, and cyber bullying.  
The AUP analysis determined that the majority of school districts had not updated 
their AUPs to address Web 2.0 safety issues. AUPs were examined to determine if they 
stated that minors were to be educated about appropriate online behavior including social 
network and chat room interactions, and cyber bullying awareness and response. Federal 
CIPA guidelines required E-rate discount recipients to include this provision in their 
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AUPs by July 1, 2012. This mandate applied to every school district included in the AUP 
analysis, which was conducted after July 1, 2012. Two-thirds of the school districts had 
recently updated their AUPs (within the last three years); however, one-third of this 
group did not address educating minors about Web 2.0 safety issues. Moreover, most 
AUPs in compliance with the federal safety education mandate were updated in 2012, 
which indicates Web 2.0 safety policies were in a state of flux, and district-wide safety 
education was in the beginning phase of implementation. Essentially, a coordinated 
district-wide Internet safety education program has not been a significant part of most 
school districts’ online safety efforts. 
SLMS’ survey and interview observations support the abovementioned 
conclusion that safety education was not a significant component of most school districts’ 
online safety efforts. Many SLMS survey respondents indicated that a district-wide safety 
education program had not been implemented. Others were uncertain whether a program 
had been implemented. SLMS’ interview and survey comments largely indicated poorly 
coordinated efforts to educate minors about Internet safety. Essentially, school districts 
had passed the responsibility of Internet safety education to teachers and SLMS without 
making it a requirement, without providing clear guidelines, or indicating that a specific 
curriculum was required for compliance purposes. Others indicated that students received 
safety instruction on a one-time basis at the beginning of the school year or via classroom 
displays. Consequently, fewer than half of SLMS believed their district’s Internet safety 
approaches (i.e., AUPs, filtering, Cyber safety education, monitoring, etc.) effectively 
prepared students to navigate an unfiltered Internet environment, safely and responsibly.    
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Slightly more than one-third of SLMS respondents indicated that a district-wide 
safety education program had been implemented. Interviewee statements about 
implemented safety programs suggested these programs were successful because of clear 
guidelines, constant reinforcement of Internet safety concepts, and a concerted district-
wide focus on Internet safety education.  
An interesting finding was that a large majority of IT respondents indicated a 
district-wide Internet safety program had been implemented while far fewer SLMS 
indicated the same. One possible explanation for the discrepancy between the two groups 
was that SLMS were inadequately informed about the district’s program. Another 
plausible explanation is that IT respondents’ may have equated the district’s AUP as its 
education program. IT respondent survey comments support the latter conclusion. For 
instance, one IT respondent added the following comment to the survey item about 
district-wide safety education programs: “The district has an Internet safety policy in 
place and we are currently updating [it] to include cyber bullying.”  
At the time of the study’s survey, safety policies were in a state of flux with Web 
2.0 safety education in the early stages of implementation for less than half of South 
Carolina school districts. However, most AUPs, some of which have not been updated in 
more than nine years, were inadequate to address 21st century safety issues because they 
were written for an earlier technological era. Safety policies and safety education have 
not been the primary focus of Internet safety efforts. School districts have mostly 
implemented a one-dimensional, restrictive filtering approach to Web 2.0 and other 
Internet safety issues, which may be undermining student safety as well as information 
access. 
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Research Question 4   
Research question 4 asked, “In what ways do filtering policies impede access to 
information and resources necessary to achieve 21st century technology and information 
literacy standards?” To answer this question, IT and SLMS survey items sought to 
determine the accessibility of Web 2.0 resources, which promoted the acquisition of 
communication and collaboration skills. Interview items also sought to define specific 
Web 2.0 access issues. Concerns about safety issues such as cyber bullying and 
inappropriate online interactions prompted policymakers in most school districts to block 
some or all Web 2.0 resources including wikis, blogs, and social networking sites. 
Consequently, many educational Web 2.0 sites were inaccessible to end users. SLMS’ 
survey data showed that almost two thirds of SLMS encountered blocked educational 
Web 2.0 resources. SLMS’ survey data also revealed that school districts’ filtering 
policies impeded access to communication and collaboration tools. Similarly, interview 
data demonstrated that access to the read/write Web was impeded. Interviewees provided 
scenarios in which Twitter™, YouTube™, blogging sites, and Wordle™ were 
inaccessible, certain Web 2.0 features including emailing and site bookmarking were 
disabled, and Web 2.0 access was restricted to staff logins.  
 Interview participants’ statements provide evidence that restrictions on Web 2.0 
access limited opportunities for students to develop 21st century communication and 
collaboration skills. Specifically, many students were unable to practice online interaction 
with peers and were unable to create online content. Online communication with experts, 
such as chemists or authors, was also inhibited because of Web 2.0 filtering. Some school 
districts’ filtering policies differentiated Web 2.0 access and allowed staff access but 
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prevented student access to this content. When communication and collaboration was 
limited to staff accounts, individual student participation was difficult and it inhibited 
self-directed student learning. The abovementioned Internet policy situations underscored 
the manner by which such policies limit development of 21st century skills. 
 One interviewee’s observation that Internet use policies have not “kept up with 
what it means to be a 21st century learner” was applicable to policies implemented in 
many districts. However, some school districts were beginning to relax Web 2.0 filtering 
restrictions. These districts were permitting access to Web 2.0 tools such as Edmodo™, a 
social networking website for education, embracing Google™ docs and Google’s™ 
collaborative tools, and providing access to Web 2.0 tools via SharpSchool’s™ school 
Web hosting services.  
 Still, Web 2.0 access was limited in most school districts. Restricted Web 2.0 
access restricted student engagement in online interactions, and other online activities 
that enable students to enhance 21st century communication and collaboration skills.  
Implications  
This study added to the Internet use policy literature by comprehensively 
investigating filtering and safety policy implementation and its effect on end users. The 
study enlisted a large number of participants from 36 school districts who were uniquely 
positioned to inform the investigation. IT administrators, who typically play a key role in 
Internet use policy implementation, provided information about content blocking 
decisions, stakeholder involvement in policy decisions, factors influencing filtering 
decisions, and specific filter configurations. SLMS, facilitators of end user information 
access, provided information about school-based stakeholder input in policy decisions, 
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filter over-blocking and under-blocking and its influence of information access, the 
efficiency of unblocking procedures, and the implementation of Internet safety education. 
Accordingly, this study contributed to the filtering and safety policy domain by 
addressing previously unexplored dynamics such as: 1) school districts’ filter 
configuration details; 2) the degree to which safety, security, and other concerns sway 
policy decisions; and 3) the influence of a wide range of filtering and safety policy issues 
on end users.  
The study participants were not selected via random sampling; therefore, 
generalization of the results may be limited. Nevertheless, the results were consistent 
with related studies (Finsness, 2008; Fuchs, 2012; Holzhauer, 2009), most of which were 
anecdotal and/or less comprehensive. In addition to previous investigations, the present 
study supports the need for evaluation and revision of school districts’ Internet use 
policies to permit more integration of 21st century online technologies into the K-12 
curriculum.  
An overarching theme that emerged from this investigation was that school-based 
stakeholder groups (i.e., SLMS, teachers, administrators, students, etc.) had minimal 
input in Internet access policy decisions. The implication of this finding is that when 
Internet use policies are implemented without stakeholder input, they often fail to balance 
the need for safety with the information needs of end users. Individuals (IT administrators 
and district administrators) without direct knowledge of online educational resources and 
their educational benefits were making all Internet policy decisions. This factor could 
explain why non-teaching policymakers would elect to block access to all blogging tools, 
not realizing this decision would restrict access to educational blogging sites as well. This 
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is just one illustration of the access issues that emerge when school-based stakeholders 
are excluded from filtering policy decisions. 
Student safety, network security, network performance, lawsuits, non-educational 
online activities, and community opinions are serious issues policymakers must balance 
when implementing Internet access policies. This investigation revealed that these 
concerns substantially influenced school districts’ filtering and safety policies. The 
implication of this conclusion is tightly controlled Internet access policies that place so 
much emphasis on potential safety and security threats that access to educational 
resources is impeded. Robinson, Brown, and Green (2010) support this supposition when 
they contend that the more school districts fear security threats, the more restrictive 
district Internet access policies will be. Input from school-based stakeholders could help 
policymakers develop and implement Internet access policies that maximize access and 
while maintaining security.  
 Another important theme that emerged from this study was lack of 
communication. School districts’ Internet safety policies were not clearly communicated 
to stakeholders. IT respondents affirmed that end users were informed about unblocking 
procedures via the blocked page notification, school-based stakeholders were granted 
override privileges, differentiated access levels had been implemented, and a district-
wide Internet safety education program had been implemented. To the contrary, most 
SLMS respondents indicated that these filtering and safety policy measures had not been 
implemented. These competing perspectives imply school-based stakeholders were not 
adequately informed of Internet safety policies and procedures. The following respondent 
observations confirm this supposition: “Unblocking procedures are not well known,” 
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“The only thing that I know they do is that we have a one-day program [Internet safety 
program],” and “I am not sure if there is a program [Internet safety] created by the 
District.” Including school-based stakeholders in policy decisions would result in better-
informed end users, and increased end user support for Internet access policies.  
  The use of a one-dimensional approach to Internet safety—the filtering 
approach—was also a significant theme emerging from this investigation. The 
implications of this limited Internet safety strategy are uncoordinated efforts to educate 
minors about safe and responsible Internet use and ineffective, outdated AUPs. The 
research results confirmed that both circumstances were occurring, likely because of the 
one-dimensional filtering approach to Internet safety. The literature suggests that the 
enormous challenge of maintaining a safe online environment for minors can only be 
accomplished through a multidimensional approach, with filtering technologies being one 
dimension (Losinski, 2009; Sutton, 2012; OSTWG, 2010), not the only dimension. 
Finally, federal legislation mandates that multiple Internet safety approaches including 
filtering technology, monitoring, AUPs, and Internet safety education be components of 
districts’ Internet safety efforts. 
 The study clearly demonstrates that significant barriers to technology integration 
in K-12 education still exist, with restrictive Internet access policies being one barrier. 
The most salient barrier, access to technology, has largely been overcome with the 
assistance of the E-rate program and heavy investments in computing technologies. The 
result has been wired schools where computing technology is available in most settings 
(Robinson, Brown, & Green, 2010), which sets the stage for full integration of computing 
technologies in education. Yet availability does not always equal accessibility, 
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particularly in the case of online technology resources. Restrictive access policies render 
many informational, interactive, and collaborative online technologies inaccessible. 
Consequently, frustrated end users may be more reluctant to incorporate computing 
technologies into educational activities, and technology use inside of school will continue 
to be markedly different from outside of school, where computing technology is 
embedded in every aspect of society. 
Recommendations 
Recommendations for further study 
 In order to further validate the results of this study and to affect educational policy 
changes, this study needs to be replicated in different geographical regions and on a 
larger scale. This study was limited to participants from a socially conservative state; 
therefore, the results may not be applicable to other less conservative regions. Inclusion 
of socially diverse participants in a similar study would yield data that are more 
representative and better inform filtering and safety policy implementation. Similar 
research with other end user groups such as teachers, students, and school-based 
administrators would provide additional data with which to evaluate existing Internet 
access policies. 
 This research was conducted with the assumption that less restrictive filtering 
policies result in increased access to online educational resources, less user frustration, 
increased technology integration, and ultimately, enhanced learning. In order to verify 
this assumption, research should be conducted comparing how the most restrictive 
filtering policies and the least restrictive policies affect end users. Additionally, 
policymakers implementing the most restrictive policies typically cite safety and security 
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as the basis for these policies, but do restrictive polices lead to safer online 
environments? An examination of the effectiveness of less restrictive filtering policies 
and very restrictive policies would verify the aforementioned assumptions, and provide 
additional data to inform filtering and safety policy decision making. 
 Another assumption of this research was that consistently reinforced Internet 
safety education encourages students to exhibit safer and more responsible online 
behaviors in filtered and unfiltered environments. However, research into the 
effectiveness of Internet safety education and awareness is lacking. The most recent 
legislative Internet safety mandate requires school districts to educate minors about safe 
and responsible Internet use even though little is known about the effectiveness of this 
Internet safety approach. A qualitative investigation of how Internet safety education 
influences students’ online behaviors within and outside of school would inform Internet 
safety education and awareness program development. 
Recommendations for Improved Policy and Practice 
 The results of this study underscored a number of filtering practices and 
procedures that were impediments to information access or delayed information access. 
The research results suggest that implementation of the following recommendations 
would lessen the access barriers end users encounter in filtered environments. 
• Involve school-based stakeholders (i.e., teachers, SLMS, and administrators, etc.) 
with direct knowledge of online educational resources and end users’ access 
issues in filtering policy decisions. 
• Tailor access policies to the needs of individual user groups, including staff and 
various academic levels, in order to maximize Internet access for each user group. 
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• Provide filter override privileges for designated on-campus staff such as 
technology specialists, SLMS or administrators, to allow immediate access to 
blocked educational content. 
• Clearly communicate unblocking procedures to all end users via the blocked page 
notification, and allow end users to submit unblocking requests directly from the 
blocked page to facilitate access to blocked content. 
• Implement a multifaceted Internet safety program that balances filtering 
technology with continuous reinforcement of safe and responsible technology use. 
This balance can be achieved with an updated safety policy that clearly defines 
acceptable use and incorporates Internet safety education with the use of 21st 
century communication and collaboration technologies. 
Summary 
School districts have implemented filtering and safety policies in response to 
legislative and social mandates to protect students from the proliferation of objectionable 
Internet content. Some subject related literature reports that administrators are filtering 
beyond federal and state mandates in order to combat increasing security threats, 
degraded network performance, and distractions caused by non-educational Internet 
content. Anecdotal literature suggested restrictive Internet filtering policies limit access 
to online resources, often involve time-consuming bureaucratic procedures for 
unblocking acceptable Web sites, and ultimately limit educators’ ability to integrate 
online technologies fully into instruction. The problem that propelled this study was the 
need to verify the aforementioned filtering issues and to determine how they were 
influencing information access and instruction.   
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The goal of this investigation was to examine Internet filtering and safety policy 
implementation in South Carolina’s public K-12 schools and its influence on teaching 
and learning. A limited number of studies have investigated the effect of filtering policies 
on teaching and learning.  Therefore, the study intended to update and expand upon 
anecdotal or small-scale studies examining the influence of Internet filtering on 
instruction and information access in the K-12 sector. This study sought to provide 
stakeholders (administrators, teachers, SLMS, technology coordinators, and parents) with 
the data and information necessary to guide filtering and safety policy decisions.  
The following research questions guided this study: 
• How are filtering and safety policies being implemented in public schools? 
• What issues do SLMS encounter as they facilitate information access on filtered 
computers? 
• How are school districts addressing Web 2.0 safety issues?  
• In what ways do filtering policies impede access to information and resources 
necessary to achieve 21st century technology and information literacy standards? 
An extensive review of the literature determined that there were numerous issues 
surrounding filtering and safety policy implementation. The study focused on the 
following issues as identified in the literature: 
• Content category blocking decisions and the rationale for those decisions, 
• Stakeholder involvement in filtering/safety policy decisions, 
• Implementation of distinct filtering policies for different user groups, 
• The implications of over-blocking and under-blocking, 
• The efficiency of unblocking procedures, 
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• The effect of filtering policies on Web 2.0 access, and 
• The role of Internet safety education in student online safety efforts. 
A mixed research methodology, including quantitative and qualitative approaches, 
was used to address the research questions. Anonymous online surveys, which focused on 
the aforementioned filtering and safety policy issues, were designed to collect mostly 
quantitative data. The research population consisted of SLMS and IT directors. IT 
administrators provided data about the technical considerations of filtering policy 
implementation. SLMS, information access facilitators, provided data about filtering and 
safety policy issues and the influence of these issues on end users. Subsequent one-on-
one telephone interviews with a small number of SLMS provided qualitative data. This 
data provided a deeper understanding of school districts’ Internet safety practices and 
how they either impede or enhance information access. AUPs were also examined to 
determine whether districts were adjusting their safety policies to include educating 
minors about Web 2.0 safety issues. 
Survey data was used to describe filtering and safety policy decision making and 
factors influencing policy decisions. The research instruments collected data that defined 
end users’ experiences with content over-blocking, under-blocking, and unblocking 
practices. This data provided insight on the manner in which these issues influenced 
teaching and learning. This investigation also examined Web 2.0 safety issues, and the 
manner in which content filtering, AUPs, and Internet safety instruction was used to 
address these safety issues. Finally, filtering policies were examined to ascertain the 
manner in which they impeded access to Web 2.0 resources that enable students to 
achieve 21st century collaboration and communication standards.  
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The research conclusions provide a better understanding of filtering policy 
implementation from the perspective of IT directors. The data indicated policymakers 
were configuring filters to block considerably more than visual images that were obscene 
or harmful to minors (as CIPA stipulates). As noted in the literature review, filtering 
technology has not advanced to the level where it can efficiently block only images. 
Nevertheless, several factors influenced filtering decisions, the three most influential 
being CIPA compliance, maintaining student safety, and maintaining network security. 
The data also indicated that administrators were configuring filters to preserve 
bandwidth, prevent litigation, prevent non-educational use, and to a lesser extent, in 
response to community opinions. IT and SLMS survey data and interview observations 
suggested that in most school districts, school-based stakeholders had minimal input in 
policy decisions. The research results revealed many school districts were implementing 
differentiated access levels for staff, but students, regardless of age, level had the same 
access level. This one-size-fits-all approach to student filtering resulted in more instances 
when secondary level users experienced content over-blocking. 
 Survey and interview results were combined to portray the issues SLMS 
encountered as they facilitated information access in a filtered environment. Survey data 
revealed that filters were somewhat effective in protecting students from inappropriate 
content, but overly restrictive filtering policies prevented most end users from accessing 
controversial subject matter, streaming media, health and sex education resources, and 
Web 2.0 tools. Interview data supplemented survey findings by providing specific 
scenarios in which filtering policies denied end users access to educational resources. In 
addition to the over-blocking issue, end users also encountered inefficient content 
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unblocking procedures. Bureaucratic and poorly communicated unblocking procedures 
and lack of on-campus override privileges delayed access to blocked content.  
 An analysis of school districts’ AUPs coupled with survey and interview data 
revealed that school districts were relying mostly on filters to protect students from 
online indecency. The majority of school districts had not updated their AUPs to include 
educating minors about Web 2.0 safety issues, as the Protecting Children in the 21st 
Century Act (2008) required. Survey and interview data also suggested that Internet 
safety education was not an important Internet safety approach in many school districts. 
Over-reliance on filters to protect students from Web 2.0 safety issues resulted in 
restricted access to Web 2.0 resources and thus handicapped students in acquiring 21st 
century communication and collaboration skills. In essence, the research results show that 
school districts’ filtering and safety policies were mostly outdated, and have not kept 
pace with 21st century online technologies.  
 The researcher compared elementary and secondary SLMS’ responses on survey 
items specifically related to how Internet use policies influenced end users, including 
students and instructional staff. Elementary and secondary user groups encountered the 
adverse effects of overly restrictive filtering policies, but these adverse effects were more 
pronounced at the secondary level. The fact that over-blocking was more prevalent 
among secondary users, suggests that secondary school users’ information needs require 
access to more of the content that filters typically classify as controversial, potentially 
liable or non-educational. Considerable over-blocking occurs when filters are set to block 
such content.  
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 This study shows that South Carolina school districts were mostly using a one-
dimensional and one-size-fits-all approach to Internet safety that resulted in restrictive 
Internet filtering policies. Consequently, end users had limited access to resources 
enabling them to experience the Internet’s vast educational benefits. School districts can 
improve filtering and safety policies by including end users in policy decisions; 
implementing unblocking procedures that permit immediate access to blocked content; 
differentiating access for staff and tailoring access according to students’ academic 
levels; and using a multi-dimensional approach to Internet safety that includes filtering, 
enforced AUPs, monitoring minors’ online access, and consistent Internet safety 
education that is integrated with the use of 21st century online technologies.   
 The advent of ubiquitous Web 2.0 and mobile technologies has essentially 
negated the effectiveness of “lock down” Internet access policies that aim to protect 
students by blocking access to all potentially harmful content. These reactive policies not 
only undermine student safety by providing a false sense of security, but they widen the 
gap between students’ in-school and out-of-school technology use. Students must have 
opportunities to apply safe and responsible online behaviors while using 21st century 
technologies for authentic learning activities. In order to maximize these learning 
opportunities, the focus of Internet safety must shift from restrictive Internet access 
policies to proactive Internet safety strategies that emphasize digital citizenship 
awareness and education. Otherwise, the in-school and out-of-school technology use gap 
will only widen, and efforts to integrate 21st century communication and collaboration 
technologies will continue to be hampered. 
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Appendix A 
Expert Panelists and Instrument Evaluation/Revisions  
 
Expert Panelists 
Helen R. Adams, Online Instructor, School of Library and Information Studies 
Mansfield University, PA,  
 
Scott S. Floyd, M.Ed., Director of Instructional Technology 
White Oak Independent School District, TX 
 
Doug Johnson, Director of Media and Technology 
Mankato Area Public Schools, MN 
 
Melissa P. Johnston, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, School of Library and Information 
Science, University of Kentucky, KY 
 
Lynn Sutton, Ph.D., Dean, Z Smith Reynolds Library 
Wake Forest University, NC 
 
 
Instrument Evaluation and Revisions 
Original Item (IT Survey) Average 
Rating 
(Mean)   
Item Revisions Based on 
Expert Panel 
Recommendations 
1) What is your job title? 
 
3.25 No Revisions 
2) Does your district participate in the E-rate 
program? 
 
3.75 No Revisions 
3) What Internet content filtering product 
does your district use? 
3.25 Changed beginning of 
question to: “If your district 
filters Internet access” 
 
4) Which of the following content categories 
does your district filter?    (Check all that 
apply)? 
Adult/Mature, Alcohol/Tobacco, 
Alternative Lifestyles (LGBT), 
Criminal/Illegal, Cult/Occult, 
Blogs/Wikis, Drugs, Email/Chat/Instant 
Messaging, Gambling, Hate/Racism, 
Hacking/Proxy Avoidance, Internet 
Radio/TV, Intimate Apparel/Swimsuits, 
4.0 Revised question to state:  
Please indicate the level of 
filtering for the following 
content categories. Select 
“filters all” if the entire 
content category is filtered, 
“filters some” if the category 
is partially filtered, or “filters 
none” if the category is not 
filtered. 
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Original Item (IT Survey) Average 
Rating 
(Mean)   
Item Revisions Based on 
Expert Panel 
Recommendations 
Media downloads/file sharing, 
Malicious sites, Pornography/Nudity, 
Sex Education, Social Networking, 
Telephony (VOIP), Violence, Weapons 
 
Added a comment section for 
additional filtered categories 
or explanations. 
 
5) Who decides which content categories are 
blocked?  
 District Administrators, Filtering 
Software (district uses the program’s 
default/recommended settings), IT Staff, 
School Board, 
Committee of Stakeholders, Other 
(please specify) 
 
4.0 Added “check all that apply,” 
Added “media Specialists” as 
a choice 
6) Please indicate the extent to which the 
following concerns influence content 
filtering decisions.  
               (Rate 1-5, 1 no influence-2 
substantial influence) 
CIPA Compliance, Preserving 
Bandwidth, Preventing Non-educational 
use, Preventing Potential Litigation 
(Lawsuits), Maintaining Network 
Security, Maintaining Student Safety, 
Community or Parental Opinions 
 
3.75 Added a comment section.  
7)  For each statement, select the answer that 
corresponds with your district’s Internet 
filtering policies and practices. (Answer 
choices: Yes, No, Not Sure) 
a) The district uses the filter’s default 
settings. 
b) When appropriate, the filter is 
configured to block specific sub-
categories instead of entire content 
categories. 
c) Filter settings can be overridden to 
access educational content that has been 
blocked unintentionally. 
d) When users encounter blocked 
content, the blocked page notification 
provides instructions on how to get the 
content unblocked. 
4.0 Added a comment section. 
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Original Item (IT Survey) Average 
Rating 
(Mean)   
Item Revisions Based on 
Expert Panel 
Recommendations 
e) Different access levels have been 
established for specific user groups (i.e., 
elementary students, secondary students, 
teachers, staff) 
f) Filter override privileges have been 
granted to designated on-campus staff 
(i.e., administrators, media specialists, 
technology specialists)  
 
8) The district has implemented an Internet 
safety education program that includes 
cyber bullying and social networking 
safety issues. 
Yes, No, Not Sure 
 
4.0 No Revisions 
9) During a typical week, please indicate 
how often you receive request to:   
Block inappropriate content ( Never, 
Rarely, Sometimes, Frequently) 
Unblock educational content that has 
been unintentionally blocked ( Never, 
Rarely, Sometimes, Frequently) 
       
4.0 Inserted (or the person 
responsible for 
blocking/unblocking content) 
after “how often do you.” 
 
Added a comment section for 
respondents to describe 
procedures for addressing 
blocking/unblocking requests. 
 
10) How effectively does the filter: 
Block inappropriate content (Very 
ineffective, Somewhat ineffective, 
Somewhat effective, Very effective) 
Permit access to educational content 
(Very ineffective, Somewhat 
ineffective, Somewhat effective, Very 
effective) 
4.0 Added a comment section. 
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Appendix B 
IT Administrators’ Survey  
 
Introduction 
Thank you for responding to the filtering/safety policy survey.  Your response is 
vital to this research project and should take 10 minutes or less to complete.    
Proceeding to the next page indicates your voluntary participation in this research study. 
 
Background Information 
1) What is your job title? 
____________________________________________  
 
2) Does your district participate in the federal E-rate program? 
The E-rate program provides discounts of 20 percent to 90 percent for eligible 
telecommunications services, depending on economic need and location. 
[ ] Yes 
[ ] No 
[ ] Not sure 
 
3) If your district filters Internet access, what Internet filtering product is used? 
____________________________________________  
 
Filtered Content Categories 
4) Please indicate the level of filtering for the following content categories. 
Select "filters all" if the entire category is filtered, "filters some" if the category is 
partially filtered, or "filters none" if the category is not filtered. 
 
Filters all Filters some Filters None 
Adult/Mature ( )  ( )  ( )  
Alcohol/Tobacco ( )  ( )  ( )  
Alternative Lifestyles (LGBT) ( )  ( )  ( )  
Criminal/Illegal ( )  ( )  ( )  
Cult/Occult ( )  ( )  ( )  
Blogs/Wikis ( )  ( )  ( )  
Drugs ( )  ( )  ( )  
Email/Chat/Instant Messaging ( )  ( )  ( )  
Gambling ( )  ( )  ( )  
Hate/Racism ( )  ( )  ( )  
Hacking/Proxy Avoidance ( )  ( )  ( )  
Internet Radio/TV ( )  ( )  ( )  
Intimate Apparel/Swimsuits ( )  ( )  ( )  
Media downloads/file sharing ( )  ( )  ( )  
Malicious sites ( )  ( )  ( )  
Pornography/Nudity ( )  ( )  ( )  
Sex Education ( )  ( )  ( )  
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Filters all Filters some Filters None 
Social Networking ( )  ( )  ( )  
Telephony (VOIP) ( )  ( )  ( )  
Violence ( )  ( )  ( )  
Weapons ( )  ( )  ( )  
Additional filtered categories/Additional comments 
 
Content Filtering Decisions 
5) Who decides which content categories are blocked? (check all that apply) 
[ ] Committee of Stakeholders 
[ ] District Administrators 
[ ] Filtering Software (district uses the software's default/recommended settings) 
[ ] IT staff 
[ ] School Board 
[ ] Media Specialists 
[ ] Other, please specify 
 
Content Filtering Influences 
6) On a scale of 1-5, with 1 indicating no influence and 5 indicating substantial 
influence, how much do the following concerns influence content filtering decisions? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
CIPA Compliance ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Preserving Bandwidth ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Preventing Non-educational Use ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Preventing Litigation (Lawsuits) ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Maintaining Network Security ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Maintaining Student Safety ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Community or Parental Opinions ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Additional Comments: 
 
Filtering Policies 
7) Please indicate whether the following filtering policies are being implemented in 
your school district? 
 
Yes No Not sure 
a) The district uses the filter's default settings. ( )  ( )  ( )  
b) When appropriate, the filter is configured to 
block specific sub-categories instead of entire 
content categories (i.e., filter settings block 
non-educational Web 2.0, but allow educational 
Web 2.0 tools). 
( )  ( )  ( )  
c) Filter settings can be overridden/adjusted to 
access educational content that has been 
blocked unintentionally. 
( )  ( )  ( )  
d) When users encounter blocked content, the ( )  ( )  ( )  
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Yes No Not sure 
blocked page notification instructs users how to 
get the content unblocked. 
e) Different access levels have been set for 
specific user groups. (i.e., elementary students, 
secondary students, staff) 
( )  ( )  ( )  
f) Filter override privileges have been granted 
for designated on-campus staff (i.e., 
administrators, media specialists, technology 
specialists). 
( )  ( )  ( )  
Additional comments: 
 
Internet Safety Education Program 
8) The district has implemented an Internet safety program that educates students 
about appropriate online behavior, including social networking and chat room 
interactions, and cyber bullying awareness and response. 
[ ] Yes 
[ ] No 
[ ] Not sure 
Additional comments: 
 
Blocking/Unblocking Frequency 
9) During a typical week, how often do you (or the person responsible for 
blocking/unblocking content) receive requests to: 
 
Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently 
a) Block inappropriate 
Internet content? 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
b) Unblock educational 
content that has been 
unintentionally blocked? 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Briefly describe the procedure for addressing blocking/unblocking requests. 
 
Filter Effectiveness 
10) How effectively does the filter: 
 
Very 
ineffective 
Somewhat 
ineffective 
Somewhat 
effective 
Very 
effective 
a)Block 
inappropriate 
content 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
b)Permit access to 
educational 
content 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Additional Comments: 
 
Thank You! 
Thank you for responding to the survey! 
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Appendix C 
School Library Media Specialists’ Survey  
 
Introduction 
Thank you for responding to the filtering/safety policy survey.  Your response is 
vital to this research project and should take less than 10 minutes to complete. 
Proceeding to the next page indicates your voluntary participation in this research 
study. 
 
Title/Academic Level 
1) What is your: 
a) Job Title?: _________________________ 
b) Academic Level (of your school) (i.e, K-5, 6-8, 9-12, etc. )?:  ____________________ 
 
Content Blocking Decisions 
2) Who decides which content categories are blocked? (check all that apply) 
[ ] Committee of Stakeholders 
[ ] District Administrators 
[ ] Filtering Software (district uses the software's default/recommended settings) 
[ ] IT staff 
[ ] School Board 
[ ] Media Specialists 
[ ] Other, please specify 
Additional Comments: 
 
Over-blocking Content 
3) If the Internet filter over-blocks, what kind of educational/instructional content 
does it block? (check all that apply) 
[ ] Business/Finance 
[ ] Controversial content (i.e, LGBT, alternative lifestyles, hate groups, cults, occult, etc.) 
[ ] Educational games 
[ ] Health/Sex Education 
[ ] Sports and Recreation 
[ ] Streaming media (i.e. Youtube, UStream.tv, Internet Radio, etc.) 
[ ] Virtual Worlds 
[ ] Visual images 
[ ] Web 2.0 resources (i.e., Wikis, blogs, social bookmarking tools, etc.) 
[ ] Other, please specify 
Additional Comments: 
 
Unblocking Time 
4) If the filter unintentionally blocks educational Web content, how long does it 
usually take to get the content unblocked? 
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[ ] Content is unblocked immediately 
[ ] Less than 1 hour 
[ ] Several hours 
[ ] 1-2 days 
[ ] 3-4 days 
[ ] 1-2 weeks 
[ ] 3-4 weeks 
[ ] More than 1 month 
[ ] Content cannot be unblocked 
[ ] Not sure 
 
Over-blocking/Under-blocking Frequency 
5) During a typical week, how often does the filter: 
 
Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently 
Permit access to 
objectionable content (under-
blocking) 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Prevent access to 
information/resources that 
support educational, 
professional, or personal 
growth (over-blocking) 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Filter Effectiveness 
6) Considering the filter's over-blocking/under-blocking efficiency, how would you rate 
the filter's overall effectiveness? 
( ) Very ineffective 
( ) Somewhat ineffective 
( ) Neutral 
( ) Somewhat effective 
( ) Very effective 
Additional Comments: 
 
Filtering/Safety Policies and Practices 
7) Have any of the following Internet filtering/safety policies or practices been 
implemented in your school district? 
 
Yes No Not sure 
a) Input from all stakeholders is 
considered when content filtering 
decisions are made. 
( )  ( )  ( )  
b) Designated on-campus staff have filter 
override privileges (i.e. administrators, 
media specialists, technology specialists). 
( )  ( )  ( )  
c) When users encounter blocked content, 
the blocked page notification instructs 
users how to get the content unblocked. 
( )  ( )  ( )  
d) Different access levels have been ( )  ( )  ( )  
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established for specific user groups 
(elementary users, secondary users, staff). 
e) An Internet safety education program 
that educates students about appropriate 
online behavior (including social network 
and chat room interactions, and cyber 
bullying awareness and response) has 
been implemented. 
( )  ( )  ( )  
Additional Comments: 
 
Filtering/Safety Policy Opinions 
8) Please indicate the level of your agreement with the following statements about 
the district's/school's Internet filtering policies/practices. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
a) The Internet filter 
prevents instructional staff 
from accessing resources 
needed for instructional or 
professional activities. 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
b) The Internet filter 
prevents students from 
accessing 
information/resources 
needed for classroom 
assignments. 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
c) The Internet filter 
prevents users from 
deliberately or 
unintentionally accessing 
inappropriate content. 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
d) Filter override 
procedures allow timely 
access to blocked 
resources/information. 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
e) Filtering and safety 
policies facilitate easy 
access to online 
collaboration and 
communication tools (Web 
2.0). 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
f) Filtering and safety 
policies/practices (i.e. 
Acceptable Use policies, 
Cyber-safety education, 
monitoring, etc.) prepare 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
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students to be safe and 
responsible users in 
unfiltered environments. 
Additional Comments: 
 
Thank You! 
I am seeking 4-5 survey respondents to participate in a brief follow-up telephone 
interview. If you are willing to be interviewed, please email me at tyler@nova.edu or call 
me at 803-699-6479 (H) or 803-553-3276 (M). 
 
Thank you for taking the survey, your input is vital to this research study. 
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Appendix D 
Interview Protocol 
 
An Examination of Internet Filtering and Safety Policy Trends and Issues in                 
South Carolina’s K-12 Public Schools 
 
Interview with________________________________ Date: _________ Time: ________ 
Phone: ________________________________ 
 
Hello. I want to thank you for your willingness to participate in this research study on 
Internet filtering and safety policy implementation. The research goal is to determine how 
Internet use policies influence teaching and learning. 
 
This interview will take 20-25 minutes. If at any time you wish to end your participation, 
just let me know. If you do not wish to have the information you have provided included 
in the study, I will destroy it when this conversation is terminated, along with my notes. 
Let’s begin. 
 
Question Set 1-- Stakeholder Involvement in Policy decisions (RQ1) 
How are stakeholders (teachers, media specialists, students, parents, etc.) involved 
in filtering and safety policy decisions? (i.e., do they have input in content blocking 
decisions, developing AUPs, or establishing filter unblocking practices/procedures?) 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________ 
If stakeholder involvement is 
minimal or nonexistent: 
Would the district’s safety/filtering 
policies be more effective if 
stakeholders were more involved in 
filtering and safety policy decisions? 
________Why or Why not? 
________________________________
________________________________
________________________________ 
 
If stakeholder involvement is significant: 
 
Does stakeholder involvement have a 
positive influence on access to online 
resources and on student online safety? 
______ Why or Why not? 
 
___________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
 
Question Set 2 -- Unblocking/blocking procedures and practices: (RQ1, RQ2) 
Please describe your district’s unblocking procedures/practices that have been 
established to allow access to content the filter blocks unintentionally. 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
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________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
Do you believe these unblocking procedures/practices facilitate or impede access to 
information? 
Facilitate 
What specific practices enhance 
information access? 
 
__________________________________
__________________________________
__________________________________
__________________________________
__________________________________
__________________________________ 
Impede 
What specific practices impede or delay 
access information? 
 
___________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
 
Question Set 3 – Influence of over-blocking and under-blocking on 
teaching/learning: (RQ2) 
In your view, has filter under-blocking (allowing access to inappropriate content) had an 
adverse influence on learning or student safety? 
Yes 
 
Can you give specific examples of when 
under-blocking had an adverse 
influence on instruction or student 
safety? 
__________________________________
__________________________________
__________________________________
__________________________________
__________________________________ 
No 
 
Go to next question. 
 
 
 
How frequently do students circumvent the filter to gain access to blocked content? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Has over-blocking (preventing access to educational resources) adversely influenced 
student or teacher access to educational resources? 
Yes 
Can you give some examples of when over-
blocking prevented students from 
information needed for assignments or 
teachers from resources need for instruction 
or professional development? 
____________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
No 
Go to Question Set 4 
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____________________________________ 
What strategies do students/teachers use to 
gain access to blocked content when it is 
needed for instruction or classroom 
assignments?  
____________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
Question Set 4 – Internet safety education programs (RQ3) 
What Internet safety education program(s) has your district implemented to 
educate students about responsible online behavior? (If there are no programs in 
place, go to question set 5) 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________ 
In your view, are these Internet safety education programs effective in preparing 
students to safely and responsibly navigate the Internet in filtered and unfiltered 
settings? 
Yes 
What makes your Internet safety 
education program effective? 
________________________________
________________________________
________________________________
________________________________
________________________________
________________________________
________________________________
________________________________
________________________________
________________________________
________________________________
________________________________
________________________________ 
 
No 
What makes the Internet safety education 
program ineffective? 
____________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
How can the Internet safety program(s) 
and policies be improved to increase overall 
effectiveness? 
_____________________________________
_____________________________________
_____________________________________
_____________________________________
_____________________________________ 
 
Question Set 5 – Web 2.0 safety and access issues: (RQ3, RQ4) 
In your view, do the district’s filtering and safety policies restrict access to Web 2.0 
tools that foster online communication and collaboration? (i.e., wikis, blogs, Google 
docs) 
Yes 
What safety concerns prompt policymakers 
to restrict Web 2.0 access? 
No 
What specific policies/practices have 
been implemented to facilitate access 
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In what ways do these policies restrict access 
to Web 2.0 tools? 
_____________________________________ 
_____________________________________ 
_____________________________________ 
_____________________________________ 
_____________________________________ 
How does restricted access to Web 2.0 tools 
limit attainment of 21st century information 
literacy and technology standards? 
______________________________________ 
______________________________________ 
______________________________________ 
______________________________________ 
 
Conclusion 
to online communication and 
collaboration tools? 
 
Is there anything else you would like to share regarding Internet filtering/safety 
policy implementation and how it affects the SLMS’s mission to provide 
information in the least restrictive and most timely manner? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix E 
Protocol for Analyses of Artifacts (AUPs) 
 
Research Question:  How are school districts addressing Web 2.0 safety issues?  
 
Beginning July 1, 2012, E-rate applicants are required to update their Internet safety 
policy (AUP) to reflect the requirements of the 2008 Protecting Children in the 21st 
Century Act. To address Web 2.0 safety issues, school districts must certify that their 
Internet safety policies have been updated to provide for educating minors about 
appropriate online behavior including interacting with other individuals on social 
networking Web sites and in chat rooms and cyber bullying awareness and response. 
 
School District Name: 
 
The AUP was last updated on: Date: 
 
Has the AUP been updated to 
provide for educating minors 
about appropriate online 
behavior including interacting 
with other individuals on 
social networking Web sites 
and in chat rooms and cyber 
bullying awareness and 
response? 
 
 
Yes 
 
  
Comments -- including 
references to educating 
minors, social networks, cyber 
bullying, etc. 
________________________ 
________________________ 
________________________ 
________________________ 
________________________ 
 
 
No 
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Appendix F 
 
Letter to Expert Panelists 
 
Hello, 
My name is Mary Tyler and I am a Ph.D. student at Nova Southeastern University’s 
Graduate School of Computer and Information Sciences. My dissertation research 
focuses on Internet filtering and safety policy implementation in South Carolina's public 
schools, and its influence on information access and instruction.  I have read your 
contributions to the knowledge base in this domain and am seeking your assistance. 
Would you be willing to serve on my dissertation expert panel as a subject matter expert? 
The expert panel’s role is to assist in validating the data collection instruments for the 
proposed research. These instruments have been designed to answer the following 
research questions: 
• How are filtering and safety policies being implemented in public schools? 
• What issues do school library media specialists encounter as they facilitate 
information access on filtered computers?  
• How are school districts addressing Web 2.0 safety issues?   
• In what ways do filtering policies impede access to information and/or resources 
necessary for achieving 21st century technology and information literacy 
standards? 
 
Expert panelists are asked to rate each item for relevance to the research questions, assess 
the comprehensiveness of the instruments (do they adequately cover the topic?), and 
provide comments regarding content, wording, format, and clarity? If you are willing to 
participate, please click on the links below to access the evaluation instruments. 
 
IT Survey evaluation: 
http://edu.surveygizmo.com/s3/784410/IT-Administrators-Survey-Evaluation  
 
School library media specialists survey evaluation: 
http://edu.surveygizmo.com/s3/784286/Media-Specialists-Survey-Evaluation  
 
If you have any questions regarding this study, you may contact me at tyler@nova.edu. 
Thank you in advance for your time and expertise. 
 
Mary Tyler 
tyler@nova.edu 
(803) 553-3276 
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Appendix G 
Letter to School Districts Requesting Authorization to Conduct Research 
 
January 24, 2012 
 
Dear Superintendent and School Board Members, 
 
I am a retired educator and Nova Southeastern University doctoral student in the 
Graduate School of Computer and Information Sciences department. The goal of my 
dissertation research is to investigate Internet filtering and safety policy implementation 
in South Carolina’s public schools and its influence on teaching and learning. This 
investigation requires surveying a sampling of technology directors and media specialists 
in the state. Therefore, I am requesting permission to invite your district’s technology 
director and media specialists to participate in the survey. 
 
The media specialists and IT surveys, which are attached, will consist of about ten items 
asking about your district’s Internet filtering policies and practices, the effectiveness of 
your filtering software and safety policies (AUPs), how Internet filtering/safety policies 
influence teaching and learning, and how Web 2.0 safety issues are being addressed.  
 
The surveys will be completely anonymous and can be accessed via SurveyGizmo’s 
Website. Survey participants will be sent a Web link to access the surveys. At no time 
will participants’ or school districts’ names be used in this research. 
 
The research results will provide district policymakers and stakeholders with research-
based data to inform Internet access policy decisions, and prescribe practices that 
optimize access to the most recent online educational resources. Thank you in advance 
for supporting and advancing this research study. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Mary E. Tyler-Vicks 
Doctoral Candidate, Nova Southeastern University 
 
Please mail your approval in the enclosed self-addressed stamped envelope or fax it to the 
above toll-free fax number. 
_________________School District  _____grants permission _____ does not grant 
permission for media specialists and the technology director to be sent invitations to 
participate in the proposed research study. 
___________________________________ and/or  ____________________________ 
Superintendent’s Signature          School Board Chairman’s Signature 
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Appendix H 
IRB Approval 
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Appendix I 
Media Specialists’ Survey Invitation Email 
 
Dear Colleague, 
 
I am requesting your participation in a research study about Internet filtering and safety 
policies in South Carolina’s public schools. This research is being conducted as part of a 
doctoral dissertation at Nova Southeastern University in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The 
purpose of the study is to determine how these policies affect information access and 
instruction in South Carolina’s public schools. The results of this study will provide 
stakeholders and policymakers with useful data for evaluating and improving existing 
Internet use policies. 
 
I am seeking your input because media specialists facilitate information access and are 
keenly aware of the issues users encounter when they search for information on filtered 
computing devices. You also play a critical role in educating users about safe and 
responsible Internet use. 
 
Below is a secure link to the online survey. Your responses will be anonymous and your 
name will not be attached to any results. The survey is user-friendly and should take no 
more than 10-15 minutes. Completing the survey indicates your voluntary participation in 
this research study. 
http://edu.surveygizmo.com/s3/940684/Media-Specialists-Survey 
 
I appreciate your willingness to participate in the survey. If you have any questions 
please feel free to contact me. 
 
Mary Tyler, 
Principal Investigator, 
Graduate School of Computer and Information Sciences 
Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33314 
Contact Information: 
tyler@nova.edu 
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Appendix J 
IT Administrators’ Survey Invitation Email 
 
Dear Colleague, 
 
I am requesting your participation in a research study about Internet filtering and safety 
policies in South Carolina’s public schools. This research is being conducted as part of a 
doctoral dissertation at Nova Southeastern University in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The 
purpose of the study is to determine how filtering and safety policies affect information 
access and instruction in South Carolina’s public schools. The results of this study will 
provide stakeholders and policymakers with useful data for evaluating and improving 
existing Internet use policies. 
 
I am seeking your input because IT administrators play a critical role in establishing and 
implementing filtering and safety policies. You are also knowledgeable of the technical 
considerations of filtering software selection and configuration. 
 
Below is a link to the online survey. Your responses will be anonymous and your name 
will not be attached to any results. The survey is user-friendly and you should be able to 
complete it within 15 minutes. Completing the survey indicates your voluntary 
participation in this research study. 
http://edu.surveygizmo.com/s3/958372/IT-Survey 
 
I appreciate your willingness to participate and value your input. If you have any 
questions before or after completing the survey please feel free to contact me. 
 
 
Mary Tyler, 
Principal Investigator, 
Graduate School of Computer and Information Sciences 
Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33314 
Contact Information: 
tyler@nova.edu 
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Appendix K 
Interview Consent Form 
                      
                NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY 
Consent Form for Participation in the Research Study Entitled An Examination of 
Internet Filtering and Safety Policy Trends and Issues in South Carolina’s K-12 
Public Schools 
 
Funding Source: None 
 
IRB protocol #:  04151204 
 
Principal investigator(s)   Co-investigator/Committee Chair 
Mary E. Tyler     Steven Zink, Ph.D. 
422 Ridge Trail Dr.    Nova Southeastern University, 
Columbia, SC  29229    3301 College Avenue  
803-699-6479     DeSantis Building, #4108   
803-553-3276     Fort Lauderdale, FL  33314  
      (954) 262-2020 or 800-541-6682 
   
For questions/concerns about your research rights, contact: 
Institutional Review Board   
Nova Southeastern University 
Office of Grants and Contracts 
(954) 262-5369/Toll Free: 866-499-0790 
IRB@nsu.nova.edu 
 
Description of the Study: 
What is the study about?  
You are being asked to take part in a research study about Internet filtering and 
safety policies in South Carolina’s public schools. The purpose of the study is to 
examine filtering and safety policy practices and procedures to determine how 
they may be influencing information access and instruction. The study utilizes 
multiple surveys and interviews to collect data. 
 
Why are you asking me? 
You are being asked to participate in the interview phase of the study because you 
responded to the initial media specialists’ survey and you agreed to take part in 
the post-survey telephone interview. 
 
What will I be doing if I agree to be in the study? 
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If you participate in the interview phase of the study, you will be interviewed 
about your district’s filtering and safety policy practices/procedures. The 
interview will also address your convictions and concerns about how Internet use 
policies influence end users’ access to information and resources. 
 
 
Audio/Video Recording 
Is there any audio recording? 
Interviews will not be audio recorded. The researcher will take extensive notes 
during the interviews. 
 
Risks/Benefits to the Participant: 
What are the dangers to me?  
All studies have some risks, whether direct or indirect. However, the present 
research involves no more than minimal risks as it seeks to investigate your 
district’s Internet filtering/safety policies and your perception of how these 
policies may be affecting teaching, learning, and students’ online safety. The 
procedures or activities in this study may have unknown or unforeseeable risks. If 
you have any concerns about the risks or the benefits of participating in this study, 
you can contact Mary E. Tyler, Dr. Steven Zink, or the IRB office at the numbers 
indicated above. 
 
Are there any benefits to me for taking part in this research study? 
There are no direct benefits, but the proposed study will arm school district 
stakeholders with the data and information necessary to guide filtering and safety 
policy decisions. The study will also prescribe filtering practices that may lead to 
improved Internet filtering and safety policies. 
 
Costs and Payments to the Participant: 
Will I get paid for being in the study?  
No payments will be made to participants in this study. 
 
Will it cost me anything? 
There are no costs to you for participating in this study. 
 
Confidentiality and Privacy: 
How will you keep my information private? 
Every effort will be made to keep participants’ information entirely confidential. 
No risk of exposure of sensitive information due to the research process is 
anticipated and data collected during the interviews will be handled and stored 
securely to protect participants’ privacy. Interview data will be retained in a 
secure digital file for 36 months from the conclusion of the study. No personally 
identifiable information will be revealed in the final report. That is, all 
information obtained in this study is strictly confidential unless disclosure is 
required by law. 
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Research records identifying you may be examined by the principal investigator’s 
dissertation chair, the Nova Southeastern University Institutional Review Board, 
and other regulatory Agencies. 
 
Participants Right to Withdraw from the Study: 
What if I want to leave the study? 
You have the right to leave this study at any time or refuse to participate. If you do decide 
to leave or you decide not to participate, you will not experience any penalty or loss of 
benefits to which you are entitled.  If you choose to withdraw, any information collected 
about you before the date you leave the study will be kept in the research records for 36 
months from the conclusion of the study, but you may request that it not be used. 
 
Other Considerations: 
If significant new information relating to the study becomes available, which may relate 
to your willingness to continue to participate, this information will be provided to you by 
the investigator. 
 
Voluntary Consent: 
 
By signing below, you indicate that 
• this study has been explained to you 
• you have read this document or it has been read to you 
• your questions about this research study have been answered 
• you have been told that you may ask the researchers any study related questions in 
the future or contact them in the event of a research-related injury 
• you have been told that you may ask Institutional Review Board (IRB) personnel 
questions about your study rights 
• you are entitled to a copy of this form after you have read and signed it 
• you voluntarily agree to participate in the study entitled “An Examination of 
Internet Filtering and Safety Policy Trends and Issues in South Carolina’s K-12 
Public Schools.” 
 
Participant's Signature: ___________________________ Date: ________________ 
 
Participant’s Name: ______________________________ Date: ________________ 
 
Signature of Person Obtaining Consent: _____________________________   
 
Date: _________________________________ 
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